










The legal and practice implications of 
the s18A amendment to the Children 






This thesis examines section 18A of the Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 
1989, which took force on 1 July 2016. The historical, drafting and rights issues 
associated with its enactment and its implications for child protection practice is the 
primary focus of the research. Section 18A is intended to prevent the potential risk of 
serious child maltreatment to a new class of statutory client called a ‘subsequent child’ 
by their parents who have either had a previous permanent removal of a child in their 
care or been convicted of the death of a child in their care. This approach is 
unprecedented in contemporary child protection law in New Zealand due to its focus 
upon the risk of potential harm as opposed to a forensic investigatory response to 
actual harm. In addition, the amendment was enacted quickly which precluded 
opportunities for commentary, debate and research. A research gap therefore exists 
relating to the implementation, interpretation and potential associated outcomes for 
vulnerable families who are targeted by the use of legal mechanisms such as section 
18A.  
This thesis attempts to address this research gap by developing a conceptual framework 
within which legal mechanisms such as section 18A can be situated. This conceptual 
framework compares the neglect and protection statutes that were enacted during the 
colonisation of Australia and New Zealand to draw parallels between Australian 
Aboriginal parents, children born to unmarried parents in New Zealand, and the two 
populations of parents identified under section 18B(1)(a) and section 18B(1)(b). 
Through the application of the framework, immediate challenges are identified relating 
to the drafting of the mechanism, its interpretation and the potential constitutional and 
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GLOSSARY, ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
ALC  The Australian Law Reform Commission 
CA  Court of Appeal 
CE  Chief Executive of the Ministry of Social Development 
CHPO  Child Harm Protection Orders 
COCA  Care of Children Act 2004 
CWA  The Child Welfare Act 1925 
CYFA1974  Children and Young Persons Act 1974 
CYFA1989  Children, Young Persons, and Their Families Act 1989 
CYF  Child Youth and Family 
DSW  New Zealand Department of Social Welfare 
FGC  Family Group Conference 
International Genocide Convention –  The UN Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948. 
LAC  Legislative Advisory Committee 
MSD  The Ministry of Social Development  
MVCOT  Ministry of Vulnerable Children – Oranga Tamariki 
NCCA  The Neglected and Criminal Children Act 1867 
NZBORA  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 
RC  Royal Commission 1988  
The Society  Foreign Aborigines Protection Society 
The Treaty  The Treaty of Waitangi 1840 
VCA  Vulnerable Children Act 2014 
VCB  Vulnerable Children Bill 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
On 1 July 2016, the section 18A amendment of the Children Young Persons and Their 
Families Act 1989 (CYFA1989) came into force. Section 18A is an innovative legislative 
response to increasing international calls for a shift in focus from providing only 
forensic statutory responses towards child abuse and seeking a more preventative 
approach for vulnerable children (Humphrey et al., 2010). Section 18A was enacted 
with the purpose of preventing the risk of potential harm to 'subsequent children’ by 
their parents who have either had previous children removed permanently from their 
care or who have been convicted of causing the death of a previous child in their care. 
To achieve this purpose, the amendment creates a new class of statutory client called a 
‘subsequent child’. However, to achieve this purpose, section 18A was drafted with the 
use of complex legal mechanisms such as an automatic presumption of guilt, propensity 
evidence and a reverse onus of proof. The amendment is therefore arguably ‘leading 
edge’ in terms of Parliamentary drafting and child protection law and practice.  
However, the implications for vulnerable families for utilising a statutory mechanism in 
a maltreatment preventative capacity is neither evidenced nor researched. 
Furthermore, the amendment places an obligation upon a statutory social worker to 
gather information and make an assessment for use in court about the prediction of risk 
of offending and previous removal behaviour. Social workers are therefore compelled to 
learn more about this system and to participate more fully with those who implement it.  
This thesis therefore addresses the following research question:  
What are the critical implications for vulnerable children and their families and social 
work law and practice in implementing section 18A of the Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act 1989? 
Chapter two provides a brief historical overview of child protection law in New Zealand. 
Through this overview, the author begins to advance the argument that the use of legal 
mechanisms in a preventative capacity, although novel in contemporary law and 
practice, was a significant characteristic of the care and protection statutes during 
colonisation. In addition, the chapter provides the reader with a fundamental 
understanding of the important constitutional milestones that occurred during New 
Zealand’s legal history.  
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Chapter three briefly introduces the reader to the section 18A amendment. It begins by 
providing the reader with an understanding of the four criteria needed to trigger a 
section 18A ‘assessment’ and provides an overview of important definitional terms such 
as subsequent child and the parent of a subsequent child.  
Chapter four provides an overview of the research methodology with associated ethical 
issues.   
Chapter five capitalises on the historical overview provided in chapter two by 
developing a four-stage conceptual framework within which the remaining chapters can 
be situated.  The Crown’s last use of legal mechanisms such as section 18A was in the 
protection and neglect statutes enacted during the colonisation of both New Zealand 
and Australia. This framework will be used to analyse these neglect and protection 
statutes to capture the parallels between four diverse groups of parents: Aboriginal 
parents in Australia, children born to unmarried parents in New Zealand, section 
18B(1)(a) and section 18B(1)(b) parents.  
The remaining thesis situates section 18A within the conceptual framework and is 
structured accordingly. Stages three and four receive particular attention as stage three 
addresses the research question by describing the critical legal and practice challenges 
involved in implementing section 18A. Stage four addresses the research question by 
outlining the implications for the two populations of parents targeted by section 18A.   
At stage one of the framework, chapter 6 provides an analysis of the reform process that 
led to the development of the section 18A amendment. The theoretical rationale that 
underpins section 18A’s enactment was revealed during this reform process. Chapter 
six analyses the role of the media and research as two dynamic factors that were highly 
influential in section 18A’s enactment. The chapter concludes by outlining the reform 
process itself.  
Chapter seven is the only chapter dedicated to stage three, which highlights how 
section18A raises a rebuttable presumption. The evidential issues for the two 
populations of parents targeted under section 18A are examined by comparing the 
significant procedural differences between an ‘investigation’ under section 17 and an 




Chapter eight begins stage three of the framework analysis by identifying the practice 
challenges involved in developing a clear aetiology of child abuse. Challenges involved 
in defining child abuse and maltreatment from a knowledge-base perspective arguably 
compromises the ability to subsequently draft an effective legislative mechanism 
designed to prevent maltreatment.  Inadequacies in drafting the mechanism represent a 
potential barrier to professional decisions when implementing the mechanisms in 
practice.  Practice issues relating to the reverse onus of proof are also addressed.  
Chapter nine develops stage two to greater depth by analysing the interpretational 
issues associated with the language used to identify the four criteria necessary to 
trigger a section 18A assessment.   
Chapter 10 concludes stage two by providing an in-depth analysis of the 
interpretational issues associated with including an ‘unborn child’ within the definition 
of subsequent children.  
Chapter 11 begins stage four by looking at the specific potential legal and practice 
implications associated with section 18B(1)(a).  
Chapter 12 continues stage four by addressing the specific potential legal and practice 
implications associated with section 18B(1)(b).    
Chapter 13 completes stage four by describing the potential impact on human rights 
when legal mechanisms are used to implement maltreatment prevention strategies. The 
chapter highlights the potential intergenerational traumatic and stigmatising effects 
these legal mechanisms can perpetuate when used inadequately as a maltreatment 
prevention strategy. 






Chapter 2: Historical Development of Child Protection Law in 
New Zealand 
This chapter establishes a link between New Zealand’s turbulent and conflicted colonial 
history and the enactment of the Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989. 
Through this analysis, strands of constitutional and legislative milestones relevant to 
the research question are identified. The analysis also reveals the embedded colonial 
knowledge-base discourses that continue to have an impact upon contemporary child 
protection social work law and practice, such as the section 18A amendment.   
Te Titiri O Waitangi 1840  
The Treaty was initially signed on 6 February 1840 between Northern Maori Rangatira 
on behalf of their ‘hapu’ and Lieutenant Governor William Hobson as the representative 
of the British Crown (Orange, 2015). Collectively, these groups of people had the ability 
to exercise (or abdicate) substantial public power in New Zealand (O'Sullivan, 2008). At 
the initial signing, not all hapu were represented (Ka'ai, 2004). To facilitate signing, 
copies of the Treaty were taken to various parts of New Zealand. By the time the Treaty 
was remitted to London in October 1840, over 500 Rangatira had signed it (Ka’ai, 2004).  
The Treaty comprises a preamble and four articles1. Over the years, the textual 
differences between the Maori and English versions of Treaty had given rise to much 
debate about the Treaty's meaning (Palmer, 2008).  Hobson, and the overwhelming 
majority of Rangatira who signed the Treaty, signed only the Maori version (Orange, 
2015).  At its essence, it is undeniable that the Treaty was about who was to have the 
mandate to exercise public power in New Zealand in the years to come. Palmer (2008) 
argues the Treaty was therefore clearly a constitutional document and its formulation in 
1840 a 'constitutional event’ (p. 31).  As a quasi-constitutional document, the exercise of 
public power in New Zealand is potentially limited by it – in certain circumstances.  This 
theme is explored in greater depth in chapter 12.  
 
 
                                                        
1 Three written; one verbal. 
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Neglected and Criminal Children Act 1867 (NCCA)  
The NCCA signalled the first decisive growth of the Crown in welfare matters involving 
children (Twomey, 1997). The NCCA is argued to be a social policy document primarily 
driven by assumptions about gender relations. Colonial social observers referred to 
destitute children as the ‘Bedouins of the Street’ who must be “reclaimed from a 
condition of nomadic wilderness and brought within the pale of civilisation” (Twomey, 
1997, p. 177). Reformatory schools were regarded as ‘compulsory’ to avoid children 
returning to inappropriate home environments. Children were regarded as materially 
and irrevocably compromised when they returned to ‘recalcitrant’ parents.  These 
complaints about the too rapid return of destitute children to unsuitable parents were 
important shapers in colonial discourse about the potential criminality of destitute 
children (Norman, 2014).  
Adoption of Children Act 1881 
Under the Adoption of Children Act 1881, New Zealand was the first British country to 
make statutory provision for the adoption of children.  Western adoption laws were a 
totally alien concept for Maori and have traditionally caused considerable anguish, 
especially care arrangements of Maori children following an actual incidence of neglect 
or abuse.  The prevalence of Western opinion in influential areas of law that affirms the 
view that a Maori child is to be treated as an ‘individual,’ ignores the communal 
orientation of Maoridom (Barlow, 1994).  For Maori, a child is not a child of their birth 
parents but of the family (whanau). Furthermore, the family is not a nuclear unit in 
space but an integral part of the tribal whole, bound by reciprocal obligations (Barlow, 
1994; Ka’ai, 2004). Western adoptions were an ‘aberration’ to Maori because they 
assume lineage can be “expunged at birth and parental rights irrevocably traded” 
(Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988, p. 75). Maori had their own customary adoption 
process called whangai (Barlow, 1994). At first, these were recognised by Western law 
but the term was erroneously used interchangeably with adoption. From 1901, it was 
required that whangai arrangements be registered to have legal status. Registration 
became important as it affected entitlement to benefit payments, housing and Maori 
land succession rights. By 1909, Maori adoptions needed to be registered with the 
Maori land court. In stark contrast, Maori people were not able to adopt European 
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children “as they were not living in a way we should consider proper for European 
children" (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988, p. 75). 
Industrial Schools Act 1882 
The Central Government's administrative responsibilities in relation to children who 
were removed from their mothers or were offending were handled at first by the 
Department of Justice. In 1880, these responsibilities were taken over by the 
Department of Education which initiated a more active and enlightened policy. The 
Industrial Schools Act 1882 permitted the boarding out of children who were in the care 
of such schools. By 1895, 81 per cent of children from the schools directly controlled by 
the Department were in foster homes (Twomey, 1997).  
Child Protection Act 1890 
As early as 1890, the death of children resulting from maltreatment needed to be 
recognised and addressed in legislation. Child fatalities were also increasingly 
perpetrated by carers other than biological parents or legal guardians.  In Thompson v 
Grey2 and R v Foster3 a woman having actual control of a child, although she was not the 
parent or legal guardian, was held to come within these provisions.  
Early 20th Century 
Infants Act 1908 
In the late 19th Century,  
delinquent young women were seen as an especially menacing 
phenomenon. Their sins, especially extra –martial fertility, demonstrated 
the consequences of a bad childhood and their offspring threatened to 
transfer the evil to a new generation. (RCSP, 1988, p. 16)   
This hegemonic discriminatory attitude was beginning to surface in legislation as early 
as 1908. Boyd (2004) argues that colonialism resulted in the significant subordination 
of women because colonial history is based upon the premise that "...immoral women 
and women of colour are viewed as more deviant than their moral counterparts" (p. 
28). Budd (2005) argues that moral regulations are constituted through the coming 
                                                        
2(1904) 24 NZLR457, 7 GLR 136  
3(1906) 26 NZLR 1254 GLR 179 
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together of historically specific cultures and legal tools.  This thesis will demonstrate in 
the following chapters how section 18A is one ‘legal tool’ that Budd (2004) identifies as 
demonstrating a moral ‘regulation’.    
The Child Welfare Act 1925 (CWA) 
The CWA has been identified as the first, most substantial piece of care and protection 
legislation in New Zealand, as it formed the early foundations of contemporary care and 
protection practice in New Zealand (Twomey, 1997). Part III section 13(1) of the CWA 
set out the process under which the protective jurisdiction of the Children’s Court could 
be activated.  If a child was being neglected, indigent, delinquent, or not under proper 
control or living in an environment detrimental to its physical or moral wellbeing, the 
parent(s) could be summonsed to the Children’s Court to appear before the justice. It is 
immediately clear that the determination of many of the elements under section 13(1), 
such as neglect, not under proper control, or living in an environment detrimental to a 
child’s physical or moral wellbeing, required the exercise of a value judgement, a 
judgement that was only exercised by the Justice of the Children’s Court.  This thesis 
argues this type of judicial decision making is replicated by the section 18A amendment 
because any decision making made by a social worker during the course of a section 
18A assessment requires confirmation in the Family Court. 
Children and Young Persons Act 1974 (CYFA1974)   
In 1987, a working party provided a report to the Minster of Social Welfare, Michael 
Cullen, that described how the CYFA1974 was publicly perceived as:  
(a) Inadequate in its resourcing of the Children and Young Persons Court; 
(b) Ineffective in its ability to balance care and protection issues against offending 
issues within the same jurisdiction; 
(c) Inadequate in resourcing effective procedures for dealing with child abuse; 
(d) Ambiguous in relation to establishing clear practitioner roles due to the lack of 
appropriate guidelines, specifications and resources; 
(e) Lacking accountability for decisions relating to placing children and young 
persons in secure residential facilities; 
(f) Responsible for the ongoing perpetuation of racist and monoculture practice. 
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The CYFA1974 was instrumental in establishing the definition of child (0–14 years) and 
young person (14 years to 16 years), a dichotomy that is still relevant in contemporary 
care and protection practice. However, this dichotomy represents a challenge for the 
interpretation of subsequent child under section 18A.  
One area of particular controversy related to the codification of the paramountcy 
principle. The CYFA1974 states:  
In consideration of this decree, the court must regard the welfare of the 
infant as the first and paramount consideration.  
 
In simple terms, the CYFA1974 clearly established that the welfare of a child or young 
person took priority over the interests and welfare of the family. At the time, the 
‘paramountcy principle’ was regarded as culturally insensitive because it “did not 
recognise that the interests of the child or young person can only be viewed as an 
integral part of a family unit” (RCSP, 1988, p. 12). Due to the mounting criticisms 
associated with the CYFA1974, a complete overhaul of the CYFA1974 was needed. 
Children Young Persons and Their Families Act 1989  
The CYFA1989 was initiated in 1983 by the Minister of Social Welfare, Mr Venn Young; 
however, it was not promulgated until 1989. During this 6-year period, the Bill was 
often subject to incompatible views primarily driven by the fundamental “divisions of 
New Zealand’s multi-cultural society” (RCSP, 1988, p. 6).  During this 6-year time frame, 
the incumbent Minister Michael Cullen established a working party that recommended 
care and protection procedures and practice “exemplify the Spirit of the Treaty of 
Waitangi …and any legislation affecting Maori enhance rather than erode mana 
whenua” (p. 7). This strategy was seen as critical if greater consensus relating to the 





Puao –  te –  Ata Tu – [Daybreak] 
To achieve ‘greater consensus’, in 1985, the next Minister for Social Welfare, Jenny 
Shipley, charged the Maori Committee with “investigating and reporting to her from a 
Maori perspective, on the operations of one of the largest departments of State whose 
activities impinge on all sections of the community – the Department of Social Welfare” 
(Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988, p. 7). The Committee’s terms of reference stated 
that its task was to advise the Minister on "the most appropriate means to achieve the 
goal of an approach which would meet the needs of Maori in policy, planning and 
service delivery in the Department of Social Welfare” (Ministerial Advisory Committee, 
1988, p. 5).  Puao te Ata Tu was the resulting report, which exemplified the renaissance 
in Maori thinking prior to the enactment of the CYFA1989. The report noted “…the 
historical perspective emphasizes the quantity of inherited laws, policies and practices, 
require substantial modification before Maori can be adequately catered for” 
(Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988, p. 71).   
CONCLUSION 
This chapter introduces the reader to the primary protection and neglect statutes that 
characterised child protection law and practice in New Zealand during colonisation. The 
cyclical reform processes that have characterised the evolution of child protection law 
and practice in New Zealand is also described. This thesis argues that although child 
protection law and practice in New Zealand is constantly evolving through cyclical 
reform process, legal mechanisms such as section 18A were the dominant legal 
mechanisms used during colonisation and may therefore be better described as a 
colonial mechanism. On the face of it, section 18A would arguably appear to be a 
retrograde step in the evolution of child protection law and practice in New Zealand. To 
examine this theme, the thesis develops a conceptual framework to capture the parallels 
between four diverse groups of parents to highlight the disastrous outcomes that these 
mechanisms have historically wielded: Aboriginal parents in Australia, children born to 




Chapter 3: Introducing section 18A 
This chapter introduces the reader to section 18A. Part 1 begins by introducing the four 
criteria necessary for a section 18A assessment to be triggered. These criteria, the 
relevant provisions and their associated definitions will be the focus of the remaining 
chapter. Part 2 describes the characteristics required to be defined as the ‘parent of a 
subsequent child’ under section 18B(1)(a) and (b) respectively.  Part 3 proceeds to 
outlines the statutory definition of a subsequent child.  
Part one   
Four criteria triggering a section 18A assessment  
Section 18A outlines four criteria that trigger a section 18A assessment:  
A person described in Section 18B; and 
is the parent of a subsequent child; and  
has, or is likely to have; the care or custody of the subsequent child and  
is not a person to whom subsection 7 applies 
 
Under a section 18A assessment, a reverse onus of proof applies because a statutory 
presumption is made that a parent of a subsequent child represents a potential risk of 
causing serious harm to subsequent children in their care. A reverse onus of proof 
means that a subsequent parent has the evidential burden to prove that this risk will 
not happen, rather than the Crown proving that it will.  Section 18A, as an assessment 
process, is significantly different to the usual investigative process under section 17.  
Part two   
Parent of a subsequent child 
Section 18A identifies two specific groups of people, that is, those convicted4 of a 
specified offence against children, and those who have had children removed with no 
possibility of return.5  
 
                                                        
4 Section 18B(1)(a) 
5 Section 18B(1)(b) 
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Definition of parent of subsequent children under section 18A  
Section 18B (1)(a) 
It is in section 18B (1)(a) that Parliament identifies its first group of what the White 
Paper describes as ‘serious abusers’.  
A person who has been convicted under the Crimes Act 1961 of the 
murder, manslaughter, or infanticide of a child or young person who was 
in his or her care or custody at the time of the child's or young person's 
death 
Section 18B (1)(b) 
Section 18B(1)(b) identifies what the White Paper describes as those to have been 
found, on the balance of probabilities, to have committed a specified offence against 
children:  
as a person who has had the care of a child or young person removed from 
him or her on the basis described in subsection 2(a) and (b) and in 
accordance with subsection 2(c), there is no realistic prospect that the 
child or young person will be returned to the person's care 
 
2(a) the court has declared under section 67, or a family group conference 
has agreed, that the child or young person is in need of care or protection 
on a ground in section 14(1)(a)6 or (b)7 and 
 
the court has made an order under section 101 (not being an order to 
which section 102 applies) or 110 of this Act, or under section 48 of the 
Care of Children Act 2004 and 
 
the court has determined (whether at the time of the order referred to in 
paragraph (b) or subsequently), or as the case requires, the family group 
conference has agreed, that there is no realistic prospect that the child or 
young person will be returned to the person’s care. 
 
Section 48 of the Care of Children Act 2004 (COCA) refers to: 
Parenting orders:  
                                                        
6 Section 14(1) a child or young person is in need of care or protection within the meaning of this part if – 
(a) the child or young person is being, or is likely to be harmed, (whether physically or emotionally or 
sexually), ill-treated, abused or seriously depressed 
7 The child’s or young person’s development or physical or mental or emotional well-being is being, or is 




(1) On an application made to it for the purpose by an eligible person, the 
court may make a parenting order determining the time or times when 
specified persons have the role of providing day-to-day care for, or may 
have contact with, the child. 
(2) A parenting order determining that a person has the role of providing 
day-to-day care for the child may specify that the person has that role— 
 
(a) at all times or at specified times; and 
 
(b) either alone or jointly with 1 or more other persons. 
 
(3) A parenting order determining that a person may have contact with 
the child may specify any of the following: 
 
(a) the nature of that contact (for example, whether it is direct (that is, 
face to face) contact or some form of indirect contact (for example, 
contact by way of letters, telephone calls, or email)): 
 
(b) the duration and timing of that contact: 
 
(c) any arrangements that are necessary or desirable to facilitate that 
contact. 
 
(4) A parenting order (whether an interim parenting order or a final 
parenting order) may be made subject to any terms or conditions the 
court considers appropriate (for example, a condition requiring a party to 
enter into a bond). 
 
At the first reading of the amendment, it is immediately apparent that these two 
separate groups of subsequent parents may be affected differently by the amendment 
given the vastly different characteristics that the drafting of section 18A has used to 
identify them. For example, the population of parents under section 18B(1)(a) have 
been convicted of causing a child fatality through maltreatment. This is in stark contrast 
to the parents under section 18B(1)(b) where the children under their care survived 
their abuse. The potentially, vastly different stigma these two population of parents may 
attract and any associated discrimination may result in significant bias during 
professional decision making leading to inconsistent application of the amendment 





Part three  
 Definition of Subsequent Child 
Section 2 defines a subsequent child as: 
a child, born or unborn, who has a parent who is a person described in 
section 18B 
The current definition of a ‘child’8 is: 
a boy or girl under the age of 14 years 
The jurisdictional expansion of section 18A by the inclusion of an unborn child within 
the definition of subsequent child represents a potential challenge of identifying the 
‘child’ who is to benefit from the protections established under section 18A and is 
addressed in chapter 10. 
    
                                                        
8 Which has existed since the CWA. 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
When this research began, section 18A was not in force. Consequently, there is no data 
available to conduct quantitative research on demographic data trends or patterns. 
Furthermore, given its relatively recent enactment, opportunities for conducting 
qualitative research of those parents directly targeted by the amendment, or those 
professionals who might be involved with the section 18A process, is similarly limited. 
At such an embryonic stage of its enactment, the text of the amendment itself is the 
main focus of the thesis, and through critical analysis, potential issues and implications 
for section the 18A amendment are identified all of which may benefit from future 
research once section 18A has had an opportunity to be fully implemented in practice. 
Swaminathan and Mulvihill (2017) describe critical research as looking “beyond the 
immediate, to question that which we take for granted and seek connections between 
seemingly disparate ideas …with an eye toward social change” (p. 4). This methodology 
is generically referred to as ‘unobtrusive’ research as it does not require the active 
participation of others and draws “social and cultural meanings from existing sources” 
(Liamputtong, 2009, p. 88).  
Research material was gathered through primary and secondary research methods. 
Primary research consisted of the collection and analysis of published and non-
published government papers and an analysis of public consultation documents, 
parliamentary and organisational records (including Hansard documents, 
organisational reviews, Royal commission reports), legal sources (primary Acts) and 
evaluation of the current amendments to the CYFA1989. The use of Hansard was 
particularly valuable in this respect as it provided an insight into the Parliamentary 
priorities for the body of reform that were influential for the enactment.  Included 
within this material are judicial decisions that were analyzed in relation to the 
challenges in interpretation and the constitutional issues that are implicated by the 
amendment. Several documents relating to the Vulnerable Children policy process are 
publicly available on government and parliament websites. Case law was used in 
preference to legal commentary and academic research. Court of Appeal and Supreme 
Court cases were given a priority, which is standard in legal research.  
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Secondary research involved the collation and analysis of existing research into child 
welfare policies, practice and legislation in New Zealand and overseas. Databases that 
were searched included ProQuest psychology, ProQuest Social Sciences database, 
WestLaw New Zealand, Lexis Nexis NZ and ProQuest Central. Secondary research also 
used scholarly books, and peer-reviewed articles. These documents provided 
information and, more importantly, direction about the contemporary child protection 
issues the amendment was attempting to address and the challenges associated with 
adopting a legislative response in addressing these issues. A broad range of research 
was considered. Because of the legal parallels between Australia’s and New Zealand’s 
colonisation and the section 18A amendment, literature that described the outcomes of 
parents targeted by legal mechanisms, such as provisions like section 18A during 
colonisation, were regarded as highly relevant.  
Strengths of the research 
The collaboration between law and social work disciplines represents a significant 
strength of the research. This is particularly important as close collaboration between 
law and social practice will be crucial for successful implementation of the amendment. 
The research involving the legal interpretation of the drafting of the amendment could 
be supported with relevant legal research involving case law and legal commentary. In 
addition, the legal research involving the constitutional and human rights issues is well 
supported in New Zealand jurisprudence.  However, the research relating to Treaty of 
Waitangi is prolific in both legal and social work knowledge bases.  
Limitations of the research 
Only one piece of literature made direct reference to the section 18A amendment itself. 
However, this reference was only made in footnotes.  
The amendment that is the focus of the thesis was enacted quickly leaving very little 
time for robust debate and discussion prior to its enactment. Furthermore, the research 
was limited because the amendment would only come into force half way through the 
research project. As a result, there is little demographic data available upon which any 




Chapter 5: Development of a four-stage conceptual framework 
Although section 18A is unprecedented in contemporary child protection law, chapter 
five argues similar legislative approaches were the dominant legal mechanisms used 
during the colonisation of Australia and New Zealand to address those parents who, at 
the time, society regarded as representing a risk of potential harm to their children. 
Given the colonisation statutes were the last time legal mechanisms such as section 18A 
were enacted, the literature has not developed a conceptual framework within which 
they can be situated. Furthermore, since section 18A took force on 1 July 2016, the 
ability to generate any meaningful data or statistics that can be used to conduct 
research upon the outcomes associated with its enactment is yet to occur.  
Part one addresses the above research gap by developing a four-stage conceptual 
framework for legal mechanisms, such as section 18A, that target the risk of potential 
maltreatment. Part two applies the framework to the protection and neglect statutes of 
Australia and New Zealand’s colonisation and section 18A. Through this analysis, 
section 18A’s origin as a colonial mechanism is revealed.  In addition, the framework 
demonstrates the inherently destructive nature these mechanisms have historically 
wielded when they are used inappropriately or inadequately.  It is therefore vital that at 
this early stage of section 18A’s enactment, the practice challenges involved in its 
implementation are adequately acknowledged and addressed.  
Part one:  
The development of a statutory child maltreatment prevention conceptual 
framework 
Part two develops a four-stage conceptual framework for child maltreatment where 
prevention legal mechanisms such as section 18A can be situated.  
The first stage identifies the distinct legal doctrine and theoretical rationale that 
underpin the mechanism being used. The theoretical rationale is fundamental to the 
operation of the mechanism as it justifies the legal categorisation of parents who are 
deemed to represent a potential risk of harm to children in their care. However, in a 
crude approximation of the underlying theory, the statutory drafting typically 
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oversimplified the theory into a collection of physical factors such as race or gender and 
social factors such as marital status or criminal history.  
The clear distinction between these two factors is that a physical characteristic does not 
change, whereas social factors can potentially fluctuate rapidly over a person’s lifespan.  
However, professional decisions made pursuant to these mechanisms are made at an 
isolated point in time and lack ability to adapt to reflect changes in the underlying social 
condition. This chapter argues that the physical or social factor used is also likely to 
coincide with a particularly strong stigma surrounding the population of parents who 
are targeted by the mechanism. The added complexity is that social factors (e.g., 
prostitution) are arguably disproportionately represented by a physical factor (e.g., 
prostitutes during colonisation were predominately women). In terms of the research 
question, it is important to acknowledge that although a social factor may be specifically 
drafted into the mechanism, the associated outcomes may have potential implications 
for any associated disproportionate representation.   
In contrast, the legal doctrine operates to justify professional decision making during 
the implementation of the mechanism.  This part demonstrates that the ‘best interest of 
the child’ concept that emerged during the colonisation of Australia and New Zealand is 
the embedded legal rationale that also underpins the CYFA1989.  The ‘best interest of 
the child’ concept is therefore another similarity that binds together the protection and 
neglect statutes enacted during colonisation and the section 18A amendment.  The 
following analysis will demonstrate that the ‘best interest of the child’ concept is not 
only deeply embedded within CYFA1989 but has had its legal potency significantly 
reinforced by the paramountcy principle in section 13.  
 Stage two describes the practice challenges involved in not only defining the groups of 
‘children’ these mechanisms are designed to protect but also identifying the population 
of ‘parents’ these children need protection from. Legal mechanisms such as s 18A have 
an inherent implication for an individual's civil rights because a presumption is raised 
in the absence of proof.  Therefore, accurate identification of the parents who are 
intended to be targeted by the mechanism is critical from a constitutional perspective 
to prevent the unintended limitation of an ‘innocent’ person's civil liberties. Therefore, 
one important indicator of these mechanisms’ efficiency is their ability to be 
implemented with precision.  
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Because of the focus upon potential harm, stage three involves describing the 
‘presumption’ raised in relation to the parents who are identified in stage two. A legal 
presumption operates on the premise that although a parent may not have 
demonstrated actual harm to children in their care, nevertheless, because they exhibit 
certain social or racial characteristics, they enter a legal category where they are 
presumed to represent a high risk of potential harm to children in their care. At stage 
three, accurate identification of the type of presumption raised is pivotal as some 
presumptions are rebuttable (as in section 18A) but others are not (as the following 
analysis will demonstrate). 
The final stage involves identifying the nature of the interventions that stemmed from 
the presumption and the potential outcomes that are associated with the use of legal 
mechanisms such as section 18A.  Stage 4 of the framework highlights that these 
interventions varied in severity with associated implications for constitutional and 
human rights, not just for the parents who are identified but also for their children.  
Part two 
Application of the statutory prevention framework to the Australasian 
colonisation statutes.  
In terms of the research question, the application of the conceptual framework to the 
protection statutes enacted during the colonisation of both Australia and New Zealand 
is important because within these countries, Aboriginal parents in Australia and 
children born to unmarried parents in New Zealand were the first population of parents 
to be subject this type of mechanism. From this first population of parents, the ripple 
effect of the ongoing intergenerational trauma these legal mechanisms have caused is 
well documented in the literature (Broadhurst & Mason, 2013; Buti, 2004; Douglas & 
Walsh, 2009; Douglas & Walsh, 2013). By comparing this population of parents with the 
parents identified under section 18A, the highly vulnerable characteristics of all these 
groups of parents is accentuated, as similarities between them are established. This 
comparison therefore highlights the potential intergenerational traumatic and 
stigmatising effect these legal mechanisms can perpetuate when used inadequately as a 
maltreatment prevention strategy. Through this analysis, the challenges associated with 
drafting legal mechanisms such as section 18A to implement child maltreatment 
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prevention strategies to address potential as opposed to actual harm are also 
illustrated. 
Stage one  
Describing the legal doctrine underlying the legal mechanism.  
The 18th century is regarded as the catalyst for change in relation to guardianship law as 
judges became willing to intervene in the parents’ upbringing of their children. The 
colonisation of both Australia and New Zealand coincided with this catalyst that 
represented a fundamental change in English law around the concept of a ‘child’, their 
‘rights’ and associated ‘parental obligations’. This conceptual shift, known as the ‘best 
interests of the child,’ has since established a long line of precedent and is the primary 
legal rationale embedded within contemporary child protection law and practice in New 
Zealand and the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child. The development 
of the ‘best interests of the child’ was initially prompted by the need to protect the 
rights of certain aristocratic children, who, by their birthright, would enter into 
important political spheres such as the House of Lords (Buti, 2004).  
The ‘best interest of the child’ is the legal doctrine used to leverage the rights of the 
child against other competing interests such as parental rights. For example, in 1893 in 
the Court of Chancery, in Re McGrath (Infants),9 Lord Justice Lindley stated: 
The dominant matter for the consideration of the court is the welfare of 
the child…the word welfare must be taken in its widest sense. The moral 
and religious welfare of the child must be considered as well as its 
physical well-being. (p. 16) 
 
As noted in chapter 2, the NCCA was the first statute in New Zealand to facilitate 
increased judicial involvement in matters that specifically related to children (Twomey, 
1997). Following the NCCA, the Infants Act 1908 mandated judges to prioritise 
children’s’ interests over other competing interests. Section 8 stated: 
 “... the court must regard the welfare of the infant as the first and paramount 
consideration” (marginal note, p. 1071, The Infants Act 1908).  
                                                        
9 [1893] 2 QB 232, 243 
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Almost identical wording has been duplicated in section 13(1) of the CYFA1989: 
Every court or person exercising powers conferred by or under this 
Part, …must adopt, as the first and paramount consideration, the welfare 
and interests of the relevant child or young person  
 
To reinforce this approach, section 13(2) states:  
In determining the welfare and interests of a child or young person, the 
court or person must be guided by the principle that children and young 
people must be protected from harm and have their rights upheld 
 
Section 13(2) provides statutory reinforcement that children’s rights are ‘upheld’, even 
if the exercise of those rights conflicts with parental rights.   
Describing the dynamic and static factors and associated theoretical 
rationale underlying the legal mechanism 
In Australia, that static factor was clearly race. The underlying theoretical rationale that 
drove the enactment of the protection statues was the ‘dying pillow’ or the ‘dying race’ 
concept (Buti, 2004). Buti (2004) argues the enactment is a discriminatory attitude is 
attributed to the stigma relating to indigenous mothers during colonisation. Douglas 
and Walsh (2013) argue that the stigma and associated discrimination were just as 
powerful in contemporary Australian society during colonisation, and colonial removal 
policies are continued “by stealth” (p. 9). Buti (2004) argues the stigma and 
discrimination towards Aboriginal parents was driven by theories around social 
Darwinism and eugenics. Clearly, this body of theory has since been ‘debunked’ (Foner, 
1992; Resnik, 1994). However, at the time, it was highly influential and dominated child 
protection law and practice for almost four decades (Douglas & Walsh, 2013). In 
contrast, during colonisation in New Zealand, correlations between poverty, criminality, 
and female-headed households were made. This correlation was driven by 
stigmatisation that developed discriminatory assumptions about gender and class 
relations (Twomey, 1997).  
Mothers who were prostitutes or had given birth to children illegitimately attracted a 
stigma and were therefore regarded as representing a particularly high risk of causing 
potential maltreatment to children in their care (Newman, 2014). The author argues 
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that the stigma relating to children born to unmarried parents children exhibits an 
extraordinary potency and resilience that can be traced to the development of 
infanticide law.  Infanticide was not a specific offence in any jurisdiction until 1922 in 
England, but the offence was preceded by a long history of legislative attempts to deal 
with problems seen to be presented by child murder. A 1624 Statute (21 Jas IC.27) 
entitled "an Act to prevent the destroying and muthering of bastard children" was the 
first legislative attempt to deal with the perceived inadequacies in the law of homicide 
as it applied to newly born infants.  
This rationale, when used in conjunction with the ‘best interest of the child’ doctrine 
justified direct judicial intervention into the lives of mothers considered to be inferior to 
their middle-class observers (Newman, 2014). Furthermore, this intervention needed to 
be ‘compulsory’ to avoid children returning to an “inappropriate home environment 
before any useful training could be affected” (Twomey, 1997, p. 177).  During the 
colonisation of both Australia and New Zealand, the underlying rationale for both 
approaches established a theory of 'civilization' which postulates an ‘a priori deficiency’ 
(Buti, 2004).  
In other words, separation was said to be in the children's 'best interests' because 
Aboriginal parents in Australia and children born to unmarried parents  in New Zealand 
were stigmatised as inherently deficient. No evidence of actual deficiency was required 
(Buti, 2004; Heather Douglas & Walsh, 2013; Newman, 2014; Twomey, 1997). This 
perspective was arguably driven by the strength of the social stigma that contextualised 
the enactment during that period. As outlined above, the stigma surrounding these two 
groups of parents was not only acute but exhibited an extraordinary resilience. This 
chapter argues the stigmatisation from this colonial period is inadvertently embedded 
within the contemporary use of these mechanisms such as section 18A.  
Under section 18A, parents with removal or criminal history are likewise presumed 
‘deficient’. Unlike Aboriginal parents during colonisation, where the theoretical 
rationale was purely racially motivated, parents who are identified under section 18A 
have a history of serious abuse causing harm and child fatality. Initially, this history 
ostensibly justifies the section 18A enactment. However, the predicative ability of 
previous permanent removal history to identify parents who represent a future risk of 
maltreatment to subsequent children is at best unequivocal, and largely unsupported by 
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the literature.  Furthermore, the author is unable to identify any research that tests the 
reliability of the use of criminal conviction data to identify parents who will harm 
subsequent children in their care.  
However, similar to Aboriginal parents in Australia and children born to unmarried 
parents children in New Zealand, the two populations of parents under section 
18B(1)(a) and (b) occupy a marginalised position within New Zealand’s contemporary 
society that is also highly stigmatised. Furthermore, although section 18A identified 
social factors as representing a potential risk to subsequent children, the resulting legal 
category may be disproportionally represented by a physical factor such as ethnicity. 
Therefore, irrespective of the social factors that influenced the drafting of the 
mechanism, the actual outcomes represent significant potential implications for a 
disproportionate population who are highly stigmatised and occupy a particularly 
vulnerable and marginalised social context. This thesis argues that awareness relating 
to the potentially disproportionate representation of Maori within section 18A merits 
particular attention and is fully addressed in chapter 12.  
The use of legal mechanisms such as section 18A in the neglect and protection statutes 
of both Australia and New Zealand was an exercise in overt racial and gender 
discrimination. Nevertheless, these statutes dominated Australia and New Zealand child 
protection practice for many decades. The gender discrimination that was reflected in 
the protection statutes of New Zealand’s colonisation history is also potentially 
embedded within the section 18A enactment. For example,     
section 18A(3)(a) states  
 a person meets the requirements of this subsection if, — 
(a) in a case where the parent’s own act or omission  
In the next sub paragraph, the section goes on to state: 
(b) to allow the kind of harm  
Section 18A(3) therefore exhibits an underlying rationale that may exhibit a 
discriminatory attitude towards victims of domestic violence who fail (i.e., omission) to 
act to prevent incidences of violence thereby allowing the abuse to occur. Given the 
majority of domestic violence victims are women, section 18A therefore reflects a 
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potentially embedded gender bias, the origins of which can be traced to the early New 
Zealand colonial protection statutes.    
Stage two  
Identification of parents with physical and social factors who represent a 
high risk of potential harm to children in their care  
When using the conceptual framework to analyse the colonisation protection and 
neglect statutes, it becomes clear that inadequate drafting of these legal mechanisms 
resulted in interpretational ambiguities that created practice barriers to their 
implementation. One consistent theme emerging from this analysis is that those families 
that were targeted by these mechanisms were often unable to be accurately identified. 
This lack of clarity resulted in abusive professional practices which had a significant, 
negative ‘knock on’ effect for the families that were targeted.  
The prevalence of wife desertion was a significant factor in New Zealand colonial life 
(Newman, 2014). The resulting stigma was arguably influential in the development of 
marital status as a social factor used to identify mothers who represented a risk of 
potential harm to children in their care. Section 2 of the Adoption of Children Act 1881 
identified children born to unmarried parents as requiring an immediate statutory 
maltreatment prevention intervention. A few decades later, under section 78 of the 
Infants Act 1908, parents who were divorced could be held to be—  
unfit to have custody of the children if any   
However, what was not clear was whether widowed mothers qualified under these Acts. 
For example, if a widowed mother with legitimate children subsequently entered into a 
relationship where she had further ‘illegitimate children’, the statutes are not clear 
whether these illegitimate children ‘tainted’ the status of her previous legitimate 
children.  Furthermore, this simple example highlights the identification difficulties that 
arise when social factors, because they are subject to rapid change during an 
individual’s lifespan, are used to construct legal categories within mechanisms such as 
section 18A.     
In contrast, the Australian neglect and protection statutes used race as the physical 
characteristic to identify parents who represented a risk of potential harm to children in 
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their care. When viewed purely from an interpretation perspective, one could argue that 
the use of a physical factor would minimise opportunities to create ambiguity, 
minimising the scope for the development of professionally abusive practice.  However, 
as the following analysis illustrates, interpretation difficulties were evident for two 
reasons. First, the drafting of the mechanism created barriers for practical 
implementation. Second, although an individual’s physical characteristic over their own 
lifespan remains stable, their demographic of the population itself can change rapidly 
over time, creating challenges for implementation.   
In the Australian colonisation protection and neglect statutes, full-blooded Aboriginal 
parents were regarded as representing a higher risk of potential harm than ‘mixed 
breed’ Aboriginal parents (Buti, 2004).  Although the protection and neglect Acts 
attempted a definition of Aboriginality, the legislation was poorly drafted and 
contradictory, which led to arbitrary and inconsistent interpretation and decision-
making bias (Buti, 2004). For example, The Chief Protector defined a "quadroon" as the 
"offspring" of a half-caste woman, by a "white” father.  However, no further explanation 
was provided as to how the Department made the distinction between a ‘half-breed’ and 
half-caste, and a ‘native’ and an ‘Aboriginal’. In the absence of complete information, the 
practice developed for decision makers to “assess” degrees of ancestry were determined 
on visual observation of colour. Furthermore, subsequent amendments allowed a court, 
judge, or magistrate to determine aboriginality “if having seen such a person the subject 
was, in their own opinion, Aboriginal.10”  Therefore, the two categories of aboriginal 
children could arguably11 be expanded arbitrarily following these amendments.  
Similarly, in relation to section 18A, the drafting of the amendment itself raises potential 
interpretational difficulties making the accurate identification of a ‘parent of a 
subsequent child’ and a ‘subsequent child’ a challenge for its practical implementation. 
For example, the definition of subsequent child includes an ‘unborn’ child within its 
definition. This approach is unprecedented in the history child protection law in New 
Zealand, making this interpretation issue a significant challenge in statutory social 
work. For example, no statutory guidance has been provided as to the exact stage of 
                                                        
10 Aborigines Protection (Amendment) Act 1909 (NSW), s 18B. 
11 Most of the population ‘growth’ through the use of this mechanism occurred in the ‘half-caste’ category. 
29 
 
pregnancy section 18A’s jurisdiction applies. This theme is explored in greater depth in 
chapter 10. 
Stage three 
Identification of the presumption being raised.  
Section 18A raises an automatic presumption that a parent under section 18B(1)(a) and 
(b) represents a high risk of potential serious harm to subsequent children in their care. 
A presumption is a ‘legal inference’ as to the existence or truth of a fact not certainly 
known. This legal inference is drawn from the known or proved existence of some other 
fact.  In relation to the parents of subsequent children under section 18A, this legal 
inference is dictated by the probability of risk of harm or abuse because parents 
categorised under section 18b(1)(a) have criminal convictions for causing the death of a 
child and section 18B(1)(b) parents have permanent removal history. Therefore, based 
upon this history, an inference is made that they are likely to offend or abuse again. 
However, unlike full-blooded Aboriginal parents during Australia’s colonisation, section 
18A allows a parent under 18B(1)(a) and (b) to produce evidence to the Family Court 
that this ‘legal inference’ or presumption does not apply to their current individual 
circumstances. In legal terms, this is called ‘rebutting’ a presumption.  
Rebutting a presumption introduces additional complexity around the requisite 
evidential burden that is required to satisfy the rebuttal. The Family Court holds the 
jurisdiction for deciding matters in relation to family law and is therefore where a 
rebuttal under section 18A would be presented for disposition.  A rebuttal in this 
jurisdiction can be satisfied by meeting an ‘on the balance’ evidential burden.  
In 1865, a child with an Aboriginal mother was presumed neglected (Kidd, 2000). Full-
blooded Aboriginal parents were presumed to represent a higher risk of harm to 
children in their care than mixed breeds. As a result, the presumption in relation to 
Aboriginal parents identified as full-blooded was not rebuttable. However, in certain 
circumstances, mixed-breed Aboriginal parents could rebut the presumption to a 
limited extent to so that they could apply to the Court to resume parental guardianship 
of their children.   
In New Zealand, section 2 of the Adoption of Children Act 1881 presumed a child 
‘deserted’ if it was born illegitimate and in the care of its mother. This was a non-
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rebuttable presumption. A few decades later, a presumption was raised under the 
Infants Act 1908 that children in single-parent families12 were at a potential risk of 
harm.  The ‘parent’ could rebut the presumption that they were ‘unfit’ to have custody 
of their children. However, the potential harm associated with mothers was regarded as 
higher than that of the father. As a result, the associated burden of proof for making a 
decree against a father as opposed to the mother required a very high evidence of 
unfitness.13 A few decades later, the CWA presumed a child neglected if “not under 
proper control or living in an environment detrimental to its physical or moral 
wellbeing14” This was also a non-rebuttable presumption.  
In relation to section 18A, a rebuttable presumption is raised in relation to the two 
separate groups of parents identified under the amendment.  Although the burden of 
proof technically falls upon the two groups of parents identified, it is a statutory social 
worker who collects and presents the evidence for rebuttal at disposition.  Rebutting 
the presumption under section 18A is therefore a two-staged process. First, a statutory 
social worker completes an ‘assessment’, of which there can only be one of two 
outcomes: either a declaration or a confirmation. Following this assessment, the 
outcome is also presented to the Family Court for disposition.  The issues relating to the 
burden of proof for the two sets of parents identified under section 18B(1)(a) and (b) 
are covered in depth in chapter 6.  Although parents of subsequent children under 
section 18A have a rebuttable presumption, it is an evidentially complex and technically 
onerous process.   
Stage four  
Under the colonisation statutes, the interventions were severe and irrevocable. 
Permanent automatic removal and detainment of children and removal of parental 
rights characterised the statutory interventions implemented. The Aborigines 
Protection Act 1869 (Vic) and the Aborigines Protection Act 1886 (WA) provided the 
initial statutory power to remove Aboriginal children from their families. Aboriginal 
children were triaged into one of two categories: Full-blooded or ‘mixed-breed’ 
                                                        
12 Through a divorce or separation 
13 Woolnoth v Woolnoth (1902) 
14 Section 13(1) 
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Aboriginal children. These two categories determined the interventions that flowed 
from the statutory presumption. In addition, all Aboriginal children were placed under 
the sole ‘guardianship’ of the Protectorate.   
Full-blooded children were restricted to live in ‘reserves’.  Once residing in these 
reserves, all civil liberties relating to every facet of their lives were completely 
abrogated for the remainder of their life. In contrast, half-caste Aboriginal children were 
sent to special reformatory schools to be trained as either domestic (female) or farm 
labourers (male). Following their ‘training’, these children were sent to work in rural 
areas so that their assimilation into white Australian society could be effected. Sexual 
exploitation of Aboriginal girls often became an ‘inbuilt’ requirement of employment 
under removal policies. As a result, interventions for half-caste Aboriginal children 
became exceedingly complex due to the rapid growth of the half-caste Aboriginal 
population following the ‘assimilation’ of their Aboriginal mothers.  
In New Zealand, automatic removal was also the primary statutory response for the 
presumption raised by the colonisation neglect and protection statutes.  Section 3 of the 
NCCA stated: 
it shall be lawful for the Superintendent of any province in New Zealand to 
establish for the purposes of the Act industrial schools and every such 
school to be occupied by and used for males or females exclusively as any 
such Superintendent may direct.  
 
This section established reformatory schools where children deemed to need care and 
protection were sent. This approach dominated child protection interventions in New 
Zealand until the end of the century. Stanley (2016) described the establishment of 
these institutions as an exercise in state violence against children.  
New Zealand was also the first British country to make statutory provision for the 
adoption of children. When a child was presumed “deserted,” the district judge stated: 
In the case of a deserted child, without such consent and on being satisfied 
that the applicant is of sufficient ability to bring up the child, and that the 
interests of the child will be promoted by the adoption make an order 




When a child was presumed ‘deserted’, no consent was necessary from the mother to 
authorise adoption. When adoption occurred, the child was deemed in law to be the 
child ‘born’ in lawful wedlock of its adopting parents.  
As outlined above, rebutting the presumption under section 18A requires disposition 
following a social worker assessment. When viewed this way, it is arguable that the 
section 18A process itself represents a potentially onerous and traumatic intervention. 
The CYFA1989 states under section 18A(2) that a social worker must: 
 inform the person that he or she is to be assessed under this section. 
The already limited opportunities for a statutory social worker to facilitate meaningful 
engagement with clients and their families is arguably further restricted under section 
18A by this requirement. The difficulties in ‘quoting’ the CYFA1989, explaining the 
operation of these complex legal mechanisms before starting an assessment represents 
a potential barrier in facilitating the engagement necessary to achieve a good quality 
assessment. Therefore, this requirement has the potential to significantly compromise 
the objective of the amendment. More research into this aspect of initial client 
engagement and practice development under section 18A is therefore needed. For 
example, as a section 18A assessment will require disposition in the Family Court and a 
parent of a subsequent child have the burden of proof, will a statutory social worker 
have the requisite ethical and legal obligation to advise a subsequent parent to seek 
legal advice at initial engagement?  
Disposition can have only one of two outcomes: either a confirmation or a declaration is 
made. If the presumption is unable to be rebutted, a declaration is made, triggering a 
statutory intervention. The first critical point about the declaration is that the 
requirement for an FGC to be held is waived.  The implications for this exclusion is 
examined in chapter six.  
Conclusion 
The application of the conceptual framework revealed several important implications 
for the enactment of legal mechanisms such as section 18A. First, the population of 
parents who are targeted by these mechanisms tend to occupy a time where they 
attracted strong social stigma, whether based upon static factors such as race or social 
factors such illegitimate parenting. Also, the operation of a social factor tends to be 
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complicated because often there is a disproportionate representation of a static factors 
within the population targeted, such as gender or race. This social stigma these physical 
and social factors attract is arguably highly provocative in triggering Crown responses. 
This framework reveals that historically one of those responses involved enacting legal 
mechanisms, such as section 18A, to potentially assuage dominant public opinion.    
The framework also demonstrates that the language used in the drafting of the 
legislative mechanism itself represented a significant challenge for the practical 
implementation of these mechanisms. Inadequacies in drafting the mechanism created 
practice barriers for implementation which were resolved through erroneous and 
discriminatory professional decision making that ultimately resulted in significantly 
poor outcomes for the children and their families these mechanisms targeted.  These 
themes are addressed throughout the thesis as this addresses a significant proportion of 
the research question. 
The framework established that the legal doctrine and the theoretical rationale have a 
symbiotic relationship.  At any given point in time, the theoretical rationale reinforces 
the social stigma that develops in relation to a population of parents deemed to 
represent a risk of maltreatment to children in their care. The legal rationale justifies 
the enactment of the mechanism in a preventative capacity and professional decision 
making during its practical implementation.  What also emerged from this analysis is 
that the ‘best interest of the child’ legal doctrine has not only demonstrated 
considerable resilience but has evolved significant capability within global 
contemporary child protection law and practice to provide the use of mechanisms such 
as section 18A with the very real potential to allow abusive professional practice to 
flourish.        
Social context and professional practice is one of the significantly distinguishing 
features between the implementation of the protection and neglect statutes during 
colonisation and the implementation of section 18A. Professional decision making 
during the implementation of these colonial statutes was made by Crown bureaucrats in 
Australia and magistrates in New Zealand. Since then, contemporary social work 
practice has evolved a dedicated and regulated profession. Although registration is not 
mandatory in New Zealand, it is a mandatory requirement for statutory social workers. 
Furthermore, contemporary society has a highly developed voluntary, NGO and health 
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sector that have highly valuable expertise to adequately implement maltreatment 
prevention strategies to target the two populations of families identified by section 
18A. In comparison to contemporary professional decision making, colonial decision 
making was archaic and anachronistic at best and therefore potentially explains the 
abusive practices that developed during this time.  
This chapter argues that the legal mechanisms that were implemented during 
colonisation were a Crown response to the social stigma that created a perception of 
risk by specific populations of parents. However, unlike contemporary society, there 
was no other welfare infrastructure that could be implemented to address these 
perceived problems in a preventative capacity. As a result, colonial New Zealand and 
Australia could only rely on mechanisms such as section 18A to address the perceived 
risk. However, despite this evolution, on 1 July 2016, the Crown enacted section 18A, a 
colonial mechanism that returns ultimate decision making in relation to two specific 
population of parents back to the magistrate.  This is despite contemporary society 
having a highly developed secondary prevention sector. The enactment potentially 
signals a Crown mistrust of contemporary statutory social work practice to adequately 
assess the risk of the two specific populations of parents identified under section 18A.    
This thesis concludes by arguing section 18A's enactment is the Crown's response to the 
social stigma these two specific populations of parents have attracted in contemporary 
society. The following chapter argues contemporary society's stigma for these two 
specific populations of parents is partly motivated and influenced by the media 





Chapter 6: Stage one – identifying the theoretical rationale that 
justifies the amendment 
One significant difference between the parents targeted during colonisation and section 
18A parents is that the protection and neglect statutes during colonisation were enacted 
in their entirety without any pre-existing statutory regime.  Section 18A is an 
amendment and owes its existence to the reform process that preceded it. It is during 
this reform process that important theoretical rationales that underpin section 18A’s 
amendment emerge. In addition, the media’s role in influencing the reform process is 
highlighted as the media is one factor that arguably contributes to the resilience that 
stigma in relation to vulnerable parents continues to demonstrate. This stigma 
therefore contributes to Budd’s (2005) earlier argument that moral regulation is often 
constituted through legal tools such as section 18A.      
Section 18A reform process 
On the 5th of March 2011 Mel Smith provided a report to the Honourable Paula 
Bennett15 following the serious physical abuse of a 9-year-old girl (M). This one-off 
incident was the catalyst for a review of the welfare, safety and protection of children in 
New Zealand. In his introduction, Smith (2011) states: 
…I have never before experienced the depth of sadness, anger and 
frustration about the deliberate harm inflicted on some of our children. 
The sad fact however is that cases such as the Aplin children, James 
Whakaruru, Nia Glassie and the Kahui twins and the case giving rise to 
this inquiry, keep on occurring all too often. (p. 5) 
 
Smith’s (2011) statement above reflects Warner’s (2014) observation that “the political 
work that is done through the ritual roll call of children’s names is important to 
understand with regard to the emotional politics that is in operation” (p. 142). As Smith 
(2011) outlined in his report, “I have never before experienced the depth of sadness, 
anger and frustration about the deliberate harm inflicted on some of our children” (p. 
                                                        
15 Minister for Social Development and Employment 
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5). Warner (2014) highlights the importance of “collective remembering…which can be 
understood as a form of social action” (p. 69) that drives reform. For Budd (2005), this 
accentuates the need for moral regulation through a statutory response. Warner (2014) 
argues the type of commemoration demonstrated by Smith’s (2011) statement above 
creates an “impulse to rescue children” (p. 69). 
This thesis argues it arguably goes beyond ‘rescue’ to include punitive elements. For 
well over two decades, New Zealand already possesses an extensive range of care and 
protection legislative and practice architecture that satisfies protection impulses.  
However, like the parents that were targeted during colonisation, the section 18A 
amendment identifies “two populations of parents” who can be held out as responsible 
for Smith’s (2011) “depth of sadness, anger and frustration about the deliberate harm 
inflicted on some of our children” (p. 5). This is evident when looking at the reform 
introduced by section 18A – the subsequent parent legislation and the constitutional 
implications associated with the amendment. Specifically, it is the interface between the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Treaty and International Conventions such as 
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and section 18A of the 
CYFA1989. This thesis argues the 18A amendment potentially crosses jurisdictional 
boundaries between protection and punitive objectives which may have negative 
implications for the families that it targets.  
Opening of the policy window 
Kingdon (1984) first coined the phrase the ‘opening of the policy window’ to describe 
accelerating cycles of crisis and reform prompted by public administration 
accountability issues. In its broadest sense, accountability is described as being 
answerable to stakeholders for performing up to expected standards, duties and 
obligations (Lawton & Rose, 1991). The opening of the policy window therefore 
provides a framework for an explanation of the factors that led to a suite of legislative 
changes implemented by the VCA.  This thesis provides an in-depth analysis of section 
18A of the CYFA1989, a fraction of the raft of legislative and practice changes 
implemented by the recent child protection reform in New Zealand. This chapter will 
provide the reader with a critical understanding of the necessary political and social 
context that was influential in the opening of the policy window which shaped the 
vulnerable children reform leading to the enactment of section 18A. 
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Humphreys et al. (2010) identified ‘negative drivers’ and ‘dynamic factors’ as influential 
in the creation of an ‘auspicious political climate’ that is a necessary pre-condition for 
the opening of the policy window. Part 1 of this chapter focusses upon the availability of 
‘particular discourses’ Humphrey et al. (2010) describe as ‘the dynamic factors’ critical 
in the underpinning of effective reform. This part will focus upon the Smith (2011) 
report, the International Literature Review (Kerslake Hendricks, 2012) and A Review of 
Selected Literature (Cram, 2012) and their role as ‘dynamic factors’ in the recent child 
protection reform in New Zealand.   
The ‘refocusing debate’ represents an underlying theme expressed in these theoretical 
discourses. The ‘refocusing debate’ reflects an international call for a ‘paradigm shift’; 
“seeking to resource support for vulnerable children and their families rather than 
providing only a forensic, investigative response” (Humphreys et al., 2010, p. 146). The 
‘refocusing debate’ therefore advocates for a shift in child protection practice from 
actual harm and associated forensic responses towards potential harm and preventative 
strategies. Part 2 of this chapter focusses upon ‘bad media’ as a distinct ‘negative driver’ 
that Humphrey et al. (2010) observes is “a fact of life in managing child abuse and child 
protection” (p. 153). The media is regarded as a ‘negative driver’ because it is highly 
influential and has the potential to “drive the reform in directions that is not good 
policy” (Humphreys et al. 2010, p. 153).  Part 3 then discusses how the recent child 
protection reform in New Zealand ultimately led to the section 18A amendment.   
Part one 
Dynamic Factors 
Humphreys et al. (2010) identifies research as one key dynamic factor in the reform and 
policy-making process. Research is critical in the provision of knowledge-base 
discourses that fuel dynamic factors that sustain reform development. Various types of 
research are identified as having varying levels of influence over the reform process. For 
example, research that involves administrative data analysis is regarded as both highly 
influential and can significantly determine reform development (Lewig, Arney, & Scott, 
2006). In 2006, the Chief Social Worker in New Zealand, Marie Connolly, reported to 
MSD that caution be exercised when using administrative data to establish “perpetrator 
related factors to inform reform” (New Zealand CYF, 2006, p. vi). For Connolly, because 
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New Zealand is a small country and child maltreatment fatalities are so rare, any trends 
identified using administrative analysis produces significantly volatile data (New 
Zealand CYF, 2006). However, the report did conclude that younger children are at a 
significantly higher risk of fatality than older children.  This report found that 30% of 
fatalities in New Zealand occur in the under-one age group and 63% in the under-five 
age group. However, their associated diverse environmental backgrounds made 
predictive risk-based modelling almost impossible (New Zealand CYF, 2006).  
The Smith (2011) report was influential in the current New Zealand child abuse reform 
process. Within his report, Smith (2011) made specific reference to the Lord Laming’s 
(2003) death review of Victoria Climbe in the United Kingdom. Smith (2011) 
highlighted the similarities between the Climbe case and M, such as the intensive 
involvement of multiple agencies over a long period and the significant lack of agency 
communication that attributed to M’s abuse and Climbe’s death. In their 
recommendations, both Laming (2003) and Smith (2011) identified the imperative for 
the facilitation of agency collaboration through greater information-sharing practice so 
that a child-centred perspective could be better facilitated. Smith (2011) regarded 
information sharing as “incontrovertible for those involved in child safety, welfare and 
protection” (p. 93). As a result of Smith’s recommendation, significant reform of 
information sharing agreements between MVCOT and other agencies has been 
implemented in the current child protection reform in New Zealand. However, in his 
report, Smith (2011) requested “urgent action is taken to commission evaluative 
research to inform legislative developments and changes in social work practice” (p. 
84). This request was in recognition of the well-established jurisprudential criticisms of 
the potentially disastrous consequences for child-protection practice when legislative 
mechanisms such as section 18A are used directly as a strategy to address social 
problems such as serious child maltreatment (Lonne, 2008).  
Death reviews and inquiries, such as the Lord Laming (2003) report into the death of 
Victoria Climbe in the United Kingdom, is another type of research that is highly 
influential in the reform process and only pivotal if it triggers an immediate reform 
process. Humphrey et al. (2010) observed that inquiries and reviews can only be 
beneficial “if you have a reform process that is informed by a review but not a response 
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to a child death then you can have change that does not have to be immediate and 
therefore is given greater consideration” (p. 155).   
The Smith (2011) report was critical of the “absence of useful research …which means 
that practice and the law are created in a vacuum of knowledge and are guided by 
ideology rather than by factual data” (p. 10). Humphreys et al. (2010) found that 
academic research and evidence “was used to strategically support reform rather than 
shape reform” (p. 156).  For example, research in social work theory that demonstrate 
correlations between previous permanent removals and future maltreatment risk 
supports recent reforms such as the enactment of section 18A.  This line of theory was 
influential for Cram (2012) who observed “having a previous child removed from 
parental care is likely to indicate risk to subsequent children” (p. 33). Therefore, 
acknowledgment of the role that research can play in child protection reform is 
necessary in understanding how research facilitates amendments such as section 18A.    
This part will also focus upon two literature reviews commissioned by the Minister for 
Social Development, Paula Bennett, from the research and evaluation team at the New 
Zealand Families Commission. These reviews were completed in January 2012. The first 
was an International Literature Review on the safety of Subsequent Children (Kerslake-
Hendricks, 2012). The second was a review of Selected Literature on the Safety of 
Subsequent children, with a specific focus upon Maori children and their whanau (Cram, 
2012). The section 18A amendment was largely supported by these two literature 
reviews. The influence of these literature reviews was immediately apparent by the 
enactment of section 18A and its objective to reduce the risk of potential harm to 
subsequent children who have had siblings removed from the care of either one or both 
of their parents. The reviews highlighted aspects of contemporary child-protection 
knowledge trends that were instrumental in the enactment of the section 18A 
amendment. 
Subsequent Children Literature Reviews  
Kerslake-Hendricks (2012) states that “enhancing the ability to identify families where 
children are likely to be at risk, particularly those families where children have already 
been removed, is the key behind this review” (p. 14). The report highlighted, however, 
the existence of a research gap in relation to families who have a history of statutory 
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removal. However, her literature review did identify a trend in academic literature that 
identified chronic neglect as opposed to physical abuse as the primary maltreatment 
prevention intervention that requires targeting in subsequent families. Kerslake- 
Hendricks (2012) acknowledged “there is little evidence of what works with neglect and 
more research is required” (p. 10). The review identified early identification as key in 
maltreatment prevention. Cram (2012) expressed concerns about vulnerable families 
coming to official notice, but monitoring subsequently ceases” (p. 15). Kerslake-
Hendricks (2012) explored the concept of an ‘always open file’ as a “means to alert 
health and other professionals to potential risks of subsequent children” (p. 15). 
Through the operation of an ‘automatic presumption,’ the section 18A amendment 
achieves the purpose of an ‘always open file’ as parents of subsequent children will 
always be ‘flagged’ in the system until they have rebutted the presumption. This 
enhances the monitoring characteristic of section 18A. However, the Independent 
Experts Forum made no reference to the emerging body of research around surveillance 
bias and how this may explain the number of re-notifications for families that have 
previous removals (Widom, Czaja, & DuMont, 2015).   
Maori Literature Review 
The project brief to the Families Commission from Minister Bennett for the Maori 
literature review was two-fold: first, assist families to overcome their complex issues so 
subsequent children are not exposed to ongoing risk; second, to prevent subsequent 
children coming into families “while their parents are still addressing their complex 
issues” (Cram, 2012, p. 12). This project brief description implies that any reform 
designed to protect subsequent children was targeting parents who were already 
involved in active interventions with MVCOT. Since this project brief, the reform has 
taken a considerably more expansive jurisdiction with the enactment of section 18A.  
The review also acknowledged the disproportionality of Maori in the welfare system. 
Racial or ethnic disproportionality is defined as the underrepresentation or 
overrepresentation of a racial or ethnic group compared to its percentage in the total 
population (Dettlaff & Rycraft, 2010). Furthermore, Cram (2012) concluded that “Maori 
women are more likely to be vulnerable to intimate partner violence and other violence 
than non-Maori women” (p. 8). The review highlighted how cultural identity and 
participation under Article 2 of the Treaty is constitutionally protected. However, the 
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review identified ongoing breaches of Article 2 as the ‘root cause’ of the 
disproportionality of Maori families in child protection. The review highlighted a 
significant research gap existed in the literature relating to  
“the rehabilitation needs of Maori parents who have had a child removed 
and in particular; assistance provided to help cope with the grief 
associated with the removal” (Cram, 2012, p. 9).  
 
Determining how section 18A potentially impacts upon Maori and their rights under the 
Treaty is therefore critical.  
Cram (2012) observed that none of the literature canvassed could identify the needs of 
whanau who have had a child removed from their care. This chapter expands this 
observation to argue that the potentially significant psychological impact for 
subsequent parents who have had a child removed from their care and are 
automatically subject to a legal mechanism such as section 18A that raises an automatic 
presumption of harm is currently unknown. Current research relating to successive 
removals can be distinguished from subsequent parents under section 18A because 
unlike subsequent parents under section 18A, successive removals of other parents 
occur under the same legal mechanism.   
Part two 
Negative drivers 
Responses to calls for reform are usually answered through legislative change (Chill, 
2004; Humphreys et al., 2010). Throughout time, society has sought to address the 
problems posed by changing social, economic and political environments through legal 
mechanisms. Crime, poverty, alcohol and drug abuse, mental and physical health issues 
all contribute to the development of perceived social problems, such as child abuse, 
where the law is regarded as a social institution for achieving desired ends (Fortin, 
1998). Considine (2005) describes the power relations that arise when legal 
mechanisms are used to ‘open the policy window’ in an attempt to address social 
problems. Considine (2005) argues if “power means the capacity to act, to have others 
act on your own behalf, and to influence behaviour in order to achieve a desired end, 
then policy is always an exercise and an artefact of power” (p. 41). This thesis argues 
that one characteristic of preventative legal mechanisms such as section 18A is that its 
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power can be used abusively to significantly abrogate the rights of those who are 
targeted by them.  
Humphreys et al. (2010) specifically identifies ‘bad media’ as a ‘negative driver’ in the 
reform process. Distinctions between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ media are made in the literature. 
‘Bad media’ is primarily media that is used in crime reporting. In this sense, ‘bad media’ 
can be seen as one response to a single incident of actual harm. In contrast, ‘good media’ 
can be characterised as an integral aspect of a primary-based maltreatment prevention 
strategy as it has demonstrated effectiveness when used as a population-based 
intervention method that promotes public awareness about child abuse and related 
issues. For example, in their study of population-based child abuse awareness 
campaigns in the Netherlands, Hoefnagels and Baartman (1997) found television media 
promoting child abuse awareness triggered population outreach to child abuse 
counselling hotlines and was effective in facilitating voluntary reporting of abuse.  
‘Bad Media’  
‘Bad media’ is identified as one significant external factor that potentially represents a 
detrimental influence in the reform process (Humphreys et al., 2010). Warner (2015) 
also argues the media is a critical driver in what she describes as ‘the politics of 
emotion’ where child protection reform is evoked by intense media scrutiny and public 
outcry following the serious harm or death of a child through extreme abuse or neglect. 
As a result, statistically rare incidences of serious physical child abuse leading to death, 
such as Nia Glassie and Cris and Cru Kahui, assume a hyperbolic effect to drive wide-
sweeping reforms to child protection practice in New Zealand. This hyperbolic effect 
can also be explained by the fact that MVCOT maintains high levels of confidentiality; 
therefore, child abuse is only accessible to the media when reported in criminal 
jurisdictions.  However, in recognition of the potential for media coverage to trigger 
‘bad policy’, the Chief Social Worker, Dr Marie Connolly (2006), in a report to the 
Ministry of Social Development, highlighted the importance of ensuring single 
incidences of physical abuse are not given undue attention when instigating reform 
because child homicide in New Zealand is an extremely rare occurrence.  
Warner (2015) argues that in New Zealand, child abuse has been constructed as a Maori 
problem “with a particular focus on Maori mothers and with explicit links to the welfare 
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benefit system” (p. 142). For example, the white paper estimates that “18 per cent of 
children born in 1993 spent at least nine years of their first 17 years supported by the 
benefit system” (MSD, 2012, p. 7). The juxtaposition of care with benefit statistics draws 
an implicit connection between children in care and beneficiaries. Beddoe (2014) 
argues that the focus of disgust in construction of the ‘vilified and folkloric bad Maori 
mother’ reflects colonial discourse about the disturbance of the ideals of a perfect 
nation.   
Warner (2015) analysed the print media’s ritualised use of a “roll-call” of names of 
children who have died from abuse. Currently, in New Zealand, it is called the “61 
dishonour roll” (New Zealand Herald, 2016). Warner (2015) argued that names that 
were recognisably Maori were more likely to be selected for inclusion. However, others 
argue that it is the level of violence and type of abuse that is perpetrated that attracts 
media reporting of child abuse (Hoefnagels & Baartman, 1997).  As a result, physical 
abuse as opposed to cumulative neglect is more likely to be included in media reports of 
child abuse with the result that physical abuse takes on a hyperbolic effect. Widom et al. 
(2015) argue that cumulative neglect is responsible for a greater number of child 
fatalities than physical abuse. Likewise, Damashek, Nelson, and Bonner (2013) 
recommend that unique risk factors for neglect as opposed to physical abuse are 
important when developing preventative strategies. Despite this emerging research, 
extreme violence causing fatality as opposed to neglect is one key focus of the section 
18A amendment.  
Part three  
Origins of section 18A: The Green Paper  
 The Green Paper for Vulnerable Children was published in August 2012. The purpose of 
the Green Paper was to  
“…invite all New Zealanders to offer their ideas, opinions and experiences 
to find new ways to protect children better.” (Ministry of Social 




One consistent theme that emerged from ‘youth’16 submissions is that an increase in 
‘monitoring’ was suggested. When this population of submitters was asked, who should 
be monitored? They replied: 
children or young people at risk (MSD, 2011, p. 8).  
As a result of the reform, section 18A is one of the legal mechanisms enacted to 
specifically target risk. However, how this risk is identified is a key focus of this thesis. It 
is important to note that a significant proportion of the demographic of children 
represented in the report (i.e., 13 yrs – 24 yrs.) are arguably excluded from the 
definition of a subsequent child and therefore, the protective jurisdiction of section 18A.   
In terms of legislative change, there was overwhelming support to  
“Put children at the centre of every policy consideration.” (MSD, 
2011, p. 13)  
The Green Paper (2011) recommended that a greater emphasis upon the United 
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCROC) was required in New Zealand 
child protection law. The Green Paper (2011) also recommended harsher consequences 
for maltreatment (MSD, 2011). What is clear is that section 18A adopts a ‘harsher’ or 
more ‘punitive’ approach for those with historical permanent removals.    
Many submitters also believed that “culture is a universal human right” (MSD, 2011, p. 
14). Furthermore, to meet the needs of vulnerable Maori children, “different pathways 
were necessary for these children” (MSD, 2011, p. 14).  As outlined above, the potential 
challenges for Maori and how section 18A may potentially impact upon the principle of 
equity under the Treaty have been given focus in following chapters. The Crown’s 
‘decisions’ that resulted from the submissions received under the Green Paper were 
communicated in the White Paper. 
The White Paper 
Following the Smith (2011) report, the White Paper for the VCB communicated 
parliament's intention to "introduce a range of tough new measures aimed at abusers 
who are likely to continue to hurt children in the future"(MSD, 2012, para. 1). This 
                                                        
16 Aged 13yrs – 24yrs 
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theme relating to the need for ‘harsher’ approaches to continued maltreatment that 
emerged from the Green Paper is further developed in the White Paper. Initially, these 
‘tough new measures’ included the introduction of a civil child abuse protection order 
for serious abusers called Child Harm Protection Orders.  The White Paper made it clear 
that the orders would be imposed on people who have been “convicted of, or found on 
the balance of probability to have committed, a specified offence against children” 
(MSD, 2012, para. 93). The objective of these orders was not to be punitive,17 but 
preventive.  CHPOs would, among other things, place conditions where any “future 
children can be automatically referred to the family court at birth so that their care and 
protection needs can be determined” (MSD, 2012, para. 96).  
To facilitate this approach, it was envisaged that the order would need to establish a 
presumption “that any future children of the person be removed, if the court is satisfied 
that the risk posed by the person justifies such a presumption” (MSD, 2012, para. 97). 
The proposed CHPOs attracted immediate controversy. The Auckland Law Society 
(2013) raised concerns around prospective legislation that exposed a person to a civil 
order based on the balance of probabilities; despite that person not having been 
convicted of a specified offence (Auckland Law Society, 2013, p1). The LAC (2013) 
expressed additional concerns. Despite the purpose of the proposed order was not to 
punish, but to protect, nevertheless, the LAC (2013) argued the orders had a punitive 
effect.  For the LAC (2013),  
…the rules governing criminal proceedings reflect the fact that, generally, 
one party has greater power than the other and the outcome of the 
proceedings may have a significant restriction of the rights of the party 
with the less power. (p. 2)    
  
This observation from the LAC (2013) mirrors Considine’s (2010) argument above that 
policy is an exercise and an artefact of power. In the second reading of the Bill, Minister 
Bennett stated that the government would not be pursuing the child harm protection 
order mechanism as its preferred method to achieve its intention of protecting 
subsequent children from the harm of subsequent parents (Hansard, 15 April 2014 col 
17264). However, in the suite of amendments introduced under the VCA, a completely 
                                                        
17 Clause 44(2) 
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new ‘assessment’ process was introduced under section 18A that achieved identical 
objectives as was proposed by the Child Harm Protection Orders Bill. Given the 
criticisms that the CHPO attracted during consultation, and in the interests of ensuring 
that “an appropriate balance between individual rights and the needs of the regime is 
achieved” (LAC, 2013, p. 3), this thesis examines section 18A in relation to International 
Covenants18 and domestic legislation, such as the NZBORA and the Treaty, to determine 
the potential interpretation and rights issues for subsequent parents and subsequent 
children. 
The Human Rights Commission (2013) stated that: 
“Clear robust risk assessment and oversight will be required to ensure 
that these orders successfully balance the human rights of children and 
the human rights of adults involved or affected”. (p. 11)   
 
Although this comment was made in relation to CHPOs, this thesis argues the same due 
diligence needs to apply to the section 18A amendment given the identical parallels 
between CHPOs and the 18A amendment in terms of the specific individuals targeted 
and intent. When the VCB was receiving submissions, both the Auckland Law Society 
(2013) and the LAC (2013) were critical of the short time frame required for 
consultation. The first reading of the VCB was on the 17 September 2013 and 
submissions were requested by 30 October 2013.  As a result, the Auckland Law Society 
(2013) stated:  
…in the short time frame, we do not believe that it can give the Bill proper 
consideration. The broad nature of the proposals in the Bill creates risk of 
individual cases being predetermined and families being disrupted 
without due consideration being given to the rights of all involved. (p. 1) 
 
Given the speed section 18A was enacted, any opportunity left for appropriate 
submissions relating to the proposed section 18A amendment was significantly limited 
due to the short time frame between its drafting and its enactment. Section 18A took 
force on 1 July 2016. Currently, section 18A is in its infancy.  In future years, this 
jurisdiction may be expanded with additional amendments; for example, the categories 
                                                        
18 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, Genocide Convention, International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights.  
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of parents of subsequent children may expand or the potential harm that is targeted 
may also expand. Ensuring that statutory social work theory and practice evolves as the 
use of legislative mechanisms such as section 18A evolves will be important moving 
forward. The remainder of this thesis takes the first theoretical step.  
Vulnerable Children Act 2014 
The VCA outlines the government’s priorities for vulnerable children as— 
(a) protecting them from abuse and neglect: 
To help achieve this objective, legislature created a new child protection assessment 
process within the CYFA1989 that applies to two separately identifiable groups of 
‘parents’ that Parliament presumes to represent a serious risk of potential harm to their 
subsequent children.  
CONCLUSION 
The reform that drove the enactment of the Vulnerable Children’s Act 2014 was 
primarily influenced by what Humphreys et al. (2010) describes as ‘dynamic factors’ 
and ‘negative drivers’, the dynamic factors being instrumental in stage one of the 
framework as they identify the theoretical rationale that underpins section 18A’s 
enactment. The ‘refocusing debate’ is a critical aspect of the underlying rationale as it 
provides support for the perspective that a legal mechanism can be enacted to address 
the risk of potential as opposed to actual harm.  However, Warner (2014) argues that 
the section 18A amendment is also contextualised by ‘emotional politics’, where the 
stigma towards abusive parents generates a need to punish rather than protect 
vulnerable families. Practitioners are therefore caught in the crossfire in making 
professional decisions under a mechanism that contains inherently contradictory 





Chapter 7: Stage two – describing the presumption raised in 
relation to section 18A     
As outlined in chapter three, section 18A raises an automatic presumption that a parent 
under section 18B(1)(a) and (b) represents a high risk of potential serious harm to 
subsequent children in their care. A presumption is a ‘legal inference’ drawn from the 
known or proved existence of some other fact. Section 18A raises an automatic 
presumption that a parent under section 18B(1)(a) and (b) represents a high risk of 
potential serious harm to subsequent children in their care due to their criminal past or 
previous statutory removal history.  
Comparison between sections 15, 17 and  section 18A 
Ordinarily, MVCOT obtains the jurisdiction to become involved in the lives of New 
Zealand families through an adjudicatory process that is triggered by a notification or a 
report of concern. However, as highlighted in chapter three, under a section 18A 
assessment, a reverse onus of proof applies because a statutory presumption is made 
because of the two populations of parents that are identified under section 18B(1)(a) 
and (b) represent a potential risk of causing serious harm to subsequent children in 
their care.  
Notifications can be made by anyone, either individuals or professionals who come into 
contact with the family. Section 15 states: 
Reporting of ill-treatment or neglect of child or young person 
 
Any person who believes that any child or young person has been, or is 
likely to be, harmed (whether physically, emotionally, or sexually), ill-
treated, abused, neglected, or deprived may report the matter to a social 
worker or a constable. 
 
The White Paper made it clear that the move towards mandatory reporting was not on 
Parliament’s agenda as there were concerns around the increase rate of notifications 
that mandatory reporting would introduce. However, VCA introduced mandatory child 
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protection policies that identify when an agency is required to make a notification to 
MVCOT if it believes a child is at risk of abuse or neglect. 
Section 17 outlines the adjudicatory process involved in an investigation. In terms of 
administrative law, the ‘adjudicatory process’ by an administrative agency (such as 
MVCOT) describes a process whereby the agency is conducting an ‘investigation’19 to 
make a determination that may affect the rights and obligations of the parties involved 
(Chill, 2004). Section 17 initiates this adjudicatory phase. It states: 
Investigation of report of ill-treatment or neglect of child or young person 
(1) Where any social worker or constable receives a report pursuant to 
section 15 relating to a child or young person, that social worker or 
constable shall, as soon as practicable after receiving the report, 
undertake or arrange for the undertaking of such investigation as may be 
necessary or desirable into the matters contained in the report and shall, 
as soon as practicable after the investigation has commenced, consult 
with a care and protection resource panel in relation to the investigation. 
(2) Where, after an investigation under subsection (1) into the matters 
contained in a report under section 15, the social worker or constable to 
whom the report was made reasonably believes that the child or young 
person to whom the report relates is in need of care or protection, that 
social worker or constable shall, as soon as practicable, notify a care and 
protection co-ordinator of those matters in accordance with section 18. 
(3) Where any person receives a report pursuant to section 15 relating to 
a child or young person, that person shall, as soon as practicable after— 
(a) that report is investigated under subsection (1); or 
(b) a decision is made not to investigate the report,— 
unless it is impracticable or undesirable to do so, inform the person who 
made the report whether or not the report has been investigated and, if 
so, whether any further action has been taken with respect to it. 
Once notifications are investigated, pathways other than statutory involvement may be 
implemented, such as differential/partnered response or a family/whanau agreement. 
However, as the section 17 outlines, if a social worker formulates the belief that a child 
needs care and protection, there is a mandatory requirement for the social worker to 
make a referral to a care and protection coordinator who will then convene a FGC. 
                                                        
19 Section 15 states that this process involves an investigation.  
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However, two things are clear. First, a notification is required before a section 17 
process is initiated. Second, a statutory social worker has the evidential burden, based 
upon actual harm, to prove if a child or young person needs care and protection.  
Family Group Conference 
Under section 17, a FGC must be held once a care and protection social worker 
formulates the belief that the child needs care and protection. This phase is important in 
relation to both legal and social work practice. In terms of legal practice, establishing 
the jurisdiction of a FGC become important. 
Section 37 states:  
Proceedings of family group conference privileged 
 
(1) No evidence shall be admissible in any court, or before any person 
acting judicially, of any information, statement, or admission disclosed or 
made in the course of a family group conference. 
 
(2) Nothing in subsection (1) applies to a record made by a care and 
protection co-ordinator under section 29(3). 
 
The term disposition refers to a court's final determination of a case or issue. Section 37 
therefore provides the FGC process with the legal privileges that are usually associated 
with a court proceeding. It is therefore arguable that the FGC process is the beginning of 
the dispositional phase of an investigation process for two reasons. First, it has some of 
the associated privileges of a court proceeding.  Second, the potential outcome of a 
completed FGC is a declaration that a child needs care and protection. Before MVCOT is 
able to take permanent custody of a child, this declaration is a prerequisite. However, 
pending the outcome of an investigation or an FGC, an additional dispositional phase 
can be implemented under section 7820 to secure the safety of the child during the 
initial adjudicatory phase. In more urgent situations, section 39 also provides for a place 
of safety warrant to be executed if the social worker believes that,  
on reasonable grounds, that the child or young person has suffered, or is 
likely to suffer, ill-treatment, serious neglect, abuse, serious deprivation, 
or serious harm 
                                                        




Section 18A Assessment process  
However, under a section 18A process, the section 17 adjudicatory phase has been 
replaced with an ‘assessment’ as opposed to an ‘investigation’.  It is therefore not 
immediately apparent whether a section 18A assessment is triggered by the usual 
‘notification’ process under section 15. Subsequent parents are placed under an 
immediate presumption of harm and have the requisite evidential burden to 
demonstrate safety. This would indicate that all that is required is that the ‘subsequent 
parent’ would come to the attention of MVCOT in order to trigger a section 18A 
assessment. Consistent with the recommendation from the Smith (2011) report, Laming 
Report (2003), and the Independent Experts Forum on Child Abuse (2009), the reform 
process has implemented moves to facilitate greater information sharing between 
professionals, such as education, health and justice, who may come in contact with 
vulnerable families.  In addition, the mandatory requirement for professional agencies 
to develop Child Abuse Reporting Policies all indicate that increased monitoring of these 
families may ensure that they may come to the ‘notice’ of MVCOT without a notification 
being raised. Whether this in itself is sufficient to trigger a section 18A assessment is 
unclear. 
If we take the two extreme ends of a usual assessment process and compare it with the 
new process under section 18A, the potentially onerous implications behind a section 
18A process are highlighted. Under the normal adjudicatory process, if a social worker, 
after completing a normal assessment, formulates the belief that a child is not in need of 
care or protection, the social worker has the jurisdiction to immediately end the 
intervention without leave of the court. However, in contrast, if a social worker 
formulates the belief removal is required, then this will involve the Family Court 
determining if the allegation or the notification that a child has been abused is ‘legally 
sufficient’ and ‘factually true’ (Chill, 2004, p. 543). In contrast, under an 18A assessment, 
a subsequent parent has the evidential burden to demonstrate safety. The author argues 
it is more accurate to describe a subsequent parent as having an evidential burden to 
demonstrate that harm will not occur in the future (i.e., proving a negative), when 
compared with that of a statutory social worker who is proving that harm has currently 
occurred (i.e., proving a positive). The difficulty with proving a negative in an evidential 
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sense has been debated in jurisprudence throughout the centuries. The disadvantage 
for a subsequent parent in meeting this burden is that “…it does not prove that the fact 
did not take place, but merely proves that the witness did not cognize it taking place” 
(“Proving a negative,”1895, p. 270).  
Furthermore, under a section 18A assessment, even if the social worker formulates the 
view that a subsequent child is not in need of care or protection, this decision will 
require leave of the court to make the final confirmation21. Therefore, not only is a 
subsequent parent not subject to the usual notification process, as outlined under 
section 15, but in addition, they have to demonstrate their parenting ability to both a 
social worker and the court even if a social worker formulates the view that they no 
longer represent a risk of potential harm to subsequent children in their care. 
During a section 18A dispositional phase, the court will decide what remedy would be in 
the ‘child’s best interests.’ However, in stark contrast to the section 15 investigation 
process, any opportunity for family or whanau input that is ordinarily available has also 
been eliminated. Section 18A(6) states: 
No family group conference need be held before any application referred 
to in subsection (4) is made to the Court and nothing is subsection 7022 
applies. Therefore, the only principle that is guiding the application of a 
section 18A assessment is the paramountcy principle under section 6. 
Principles relating to family participation for decision making and that 
endeavours need to be made to obtain the support of the family.  
 
This approach is therefore a direct outcome of the recommendation from the Smith 
(2011) stated that all those involved in child safety, welfare and protection needed to 
“ensure a child-centred perspective that focuses on the child” (p. 93). It was Smith’s 
(2011) observation that all other considerations should be subordinate to the 
paramountcy principle as found in s 6 of the CYPF1989.  
Without maintaining the FGC mechanism, any mandatory practical application of these 
family-centred principles are completely eliminated from any section 18A process. This 
                                                        
21 Section 18C(1)(3) 
22 This section states that no application for a declaration that a child is in need of care or protection can 
be made unless a family group conference has been held under this part in relation to the matter that 
forms the ground on which the application is made. 
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is especially if the outcome of the section 18A assessment involves seeking a declaration 
to apply section 67.23  
Within the same suite of amendments taking force on the 1 July 2016, section 67(2) has 
been introduced. It states: 
However, on an application under section 18A(4)(a) or 18D in relation to 
a person to whom section 18A applies, if the court is satisfied that 
subsequent child is in need of care or protection on the ground of section 
14 (1)(ba) it must make the declaration unless it is satisfied that the 
person has demonstrated that he or she meets the requirements of 
section 18A(3). 
 
This section therefore confirms that the declaration can occur without the input of a 
FGC.  Given the reverse onus of proof that a section 18A assessment is being assessed 
under, it is not even clear whether a social worker has the flexibility to allow these 
inclusive family decision-making principles to guide decision making until final 
disposition in the Family Court. 
 
  
                                                        
23 Grounds for declaration that child or young person is in need of care or protection 
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Chapter 8: Stage three – professional implications for section 
18A  
Stage three of the framework begins by highlighting that one significant barrier in 
implementing a legal mechanism such as section 18A to address serious maltreatment 
stems from the fact that conceptually, child abuse escapes clear aetiology. Four decades 
of research have consistently been highly unequivocal in identifying a quintessential 
aetiology of child abuse. Throughout the decades, several reviews indicate a 
bewildering and often conflicting array of possible aetiological factors (Spinetta & Rigler 
1972; Martin & Beezley, 1974; Starr, 1979; Schmitt, 1980; Garbarino, 1980; Vietze et al., 
1982). Rigorously conducted research on the origins of abuse and neglect has been 
considerably scarcer than suppositions (Plotkln et al., 1981).  
Child abuse is not a discrete social factor that a parent or caregiver clearly 
demonstrates; instead, it consists of an amorphous group of behaviours that, when 
manifested to a different degree, might be considered characteristic of abuse 
(Giovannoni & Becerra, 1979).  Munro (2007) argues that developing a definition of 
abuse is made even more difficult because child abuse is often a socially constructed 
concept that changes over time.  Booysen et al. (2007) observed that Western attempts 
at universalizing definitions of child abuse fail to consider the cultural and social 
realities of other places. Likewise, Gupta (2007) states “the professionalization of the 
care and protection of children in the West has resulted from a complex of particular 
events that reflect Western cultural beliefs about the self, subjective experience and 
interpersonal connections” (p. 63). Therefore, unlike the medical profession, child 
protection practitioners are faced with predicting the development of a problem whose 
very existence is often a matter of subjective interpretation because a clear, useful 
aetiology of the problem is neither known nor agreed. What is increasingly obvious is 
that a complex range of risk factors contributes to the causal pathway of child abuse 






Distinguishing characteristics of a section 18A assessment  
Section 18A has several different characteristics that distinguishes it from mainstream 
child protection decision making for several reasons. These differences may represent 
other practice implications for the section 18A amendment. First, similar to the early 
colonisation protection statutes, a presumption is raised relating to potential, as 
opposed to actual, harm. This presumption requires a practitioner to assess propensity 
evidence24 driven by removal and criminal history, making any decision under section 
18A inherently complex and uncertain. Given the presumption raised under section18A 
is driven by the removal and criminal history of subsequent parents, whether historical 
information is an adequate proxy for predicting the current abuse of subsequent 
children is unequivocal at best. This is especially true given section 18A has used social 
factors, which can change dramatically over an individual’s lifespan, to identify the two 
populations of parents to be targeted. Given the complexity is the decision making 
around section 18A, critics argue that this high level of uncertainty and complexity in 
decision making involves the operation of heuristic and bias, leading to issues around 
the reliability and validity of the decisions being made.    
Second, section 18A targets two specific groups of parents with significantly different 
qualifying criteria. As outlined earlier, section 18B(1)(a) parents have historical 
convictions for causing the death of a child in their care. In contrast, section 18B(1)(b) 
parents have permanent removal history. The potentially stigmatising effect for those 
parents targeted under section 18A will be addressed. This chapter distinguishes 
between the two groups by categorising section 18B(1)(a) parents as being identified 
by criminal conviction data held by the Ministry of Justice and section 18B(1)(b) 
parents identified through Removal information held by MVCOT that is protected by 
privacy provisions. The distinguishing feature between the two is that the 
substantiation data used to identify subsequent parents under section 18B(1)(a) was 
not sourced from the same substantiation data used to identify subsequent parents 
under section 18B(1)(b). In addition, the decision-making process that created these 
two different sources of data is completely different, giving these two data sources 
                                                        
24 The issues surrounding the use of propensity evidence for forensic purposes are fully addressed in 
chapter eight.  
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diverse characteristics.  How this potentially impacts upon decision making will be 
briefly described. 
The third difference is how ethical concerns impact upon the effectiveness of the 
preventative strategy enacted in section 18A.  
Characteristics of decision making under uncertainty  
Just like the protection statutes used during Australasian colonisation, section 18A 
identifies categories of parents who are presumed to represent a risk of harm to their 
children and implements a prevention-focused intervention. However, adopting such an 
approach has consistently raised controversy, given erroneous case decisions resulting 
from underlying discriminatory assumptions (Dettlaff & Rycraft, 2010; Buti, 2004), 
misleading data sets (Keddell, 2015), and evaluator subjectivity and bias (Herman, 
2009; Munro, 2007). Erroneous, inadequate and discriminatory decision making has 
demonstrated the very real capacity to devastate lives (Kidd, 2000).  As addressed 
above, the social outcomes for Aborigines following the implementation of the 
protection statutes during colonisation is a prime example. Everson and Sandoval 
(2011) observe progress in remedying this problem has been minimal since early 
warnings were sounded two decades ago (Corwin, 1987).  
Explanations for clinical decision making in the face of uncertainty is offered by the dual 
process theory of reasoning advanced by Croskerry (2009) and Osman (2004). Enosh 
and Bayer-Topilsky (2015) indicate that decision making within the context of 
uncertainty involves a dual process between two cognitive systems. The first 
involves heuristic-intuitive reasoning (automatic processes); the second is controlled-
analytical reasoning (rule-based processes). When faced with an incidence of actual 
harm under the substantive jurisdiction of the CYFA1989, that accompanies a 
corresponding high level of forensic value, practitioners are more likely to apply 
controlled-analytical reasoning in decision making (Herman, 2009).  In all other 
circumstances that occur in situations of high uncertainty, such as decision making 
under section 18A, practitioners employ heuristic-intuitive reasoning methods during 
decision making (Kearney, 2013). Critics argue that decisions involving high 
uncertainty, such as those under section 18A, are more susceptible to personal 
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heuristics and biases such as cultural differences and professional or organisational 
culture.  
Keddell (2015) attributes decision-making variability within child protection contexts 
to macro-level factors such as ‘hyper surveillance’; meso-level factors such as ‘site 
specific cultures’; and micro-level factors such as individual practitioner bias.  Widom et 
al. (2015) in their study relating to intergenerational abuse found support for the 
operation of surveillance bias. In this study, parents with documented histories of 
childhood abuse and neglect were two and a half times more likely to have a child 
protection report of concern than comparison parents. In their study, Reilly et al. (2013) 
found that socio-economically advantaged women in Australia were least likely to 
receive psychosocial screening for depression, domestic violence or abuse during both 
pregnancy and during the one year perinatal follow-up period, women from lower 
socio-economic groups therefore attracting greater screening-associated surveillance. 
  
Bias and Heuristics 
Herman (2009) has emerged as a leading critic of current decision-making practices 
arguing that professional judgements lack reliability and validity. Everson and Sandoval 
(2011) provided support for Herman’s (2009) criticism of the limited reliability of 
professional judgements. Furthermore, Herman (2009) raises serious questions about 
the legitimacy of decision making in child protection contexts without corroborating 
evidence.  However, for Herman (2009), ‘evidence’ is defined narrowly to include only 
evidence with high forensic value, such as perpetrator confessions, medical and 
photographic evidence. This criticism is particularly cogent in relation to a section 18A 
assessment, given the evidence relied on to make a decision under a section 18A 
assessment is characterised as ‘propensity evidence’ driven by removal and criminal 
history.  
Variability in forensic decision making 
Everson and Sandoval (2011) adopted the epidemiological concepts of ‘sensitivity’ and 
‘specificity’ to explain the differing professional attitudes of medical and legal 
professionals in regard to child sexual abuse allegations. They expanded the model to 
develop a tripartite test of forensic attitudes: sensitivity, specificity and scepticism. 
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Surprisingly, Everson and Sandoval (2011) found that in relation to sexual abuse 
allegations, child protection practitioners reflected elevated levels of scepticism that 
would ordinarily be associated with professionals that were “dis-believing of sexual 
abuse allegations” (p. 296).  Everson and Sandoval (2011) observed this finding 
contrasted previous research when child protection practitioner ratings for scepticism 
were extremely low, indicating that professional scepticism can change over time. This 
finding from Everson and Sandoval (2011) is relevant to a section 18A assessment 
because of the mandatory requirement for its conclusion by disposition in the Family 
Court where social worker professional attitudes might significantly differ from those of 
the judiciary. In addition, given the presumption raised by section 18A places the 
burden of proof upon the subsequent parent, the potential for practitioners to develop 
elevated levels of scepticism around the evidence that subsequent parents provide to 
rebut the presumption may require future research.    
This is consistent with previous findings from Chill (2004) who observed that decisions 
made based upon individual professional judgement and definitions of maltreatment 
can differ from the legal perspective. For Everson and Sandoval (2011), their 
observations relating to high levels of attitudes may bias a professional’s view of a case, 
even sight unseen. For Richards, Smith, Fogel, and Bjerregaard (2015),‘professional 
groupings’ rather than individual factors determined the types of information that was 
used in decision making. In addition, they identified the operation of the ‘best interest of 
the child’ as the legal rationale that guides professional decision making in child welfare 
cases. This is especially true when decisions relating to whether removal or family 
preservation is being considered.   
Decision making variability around types of harm  
Section 18A targets two groups of subsequent parents and three types of harm.25 The 
first group of subsequent parents are described as those who have convictions for 
infanticide, murder, or the manslaughter of children in their care. Damashek and 
Bonner (2010) distinguished between fatalities that are caused through an act of 
commission, for example, physical assault or an act of violence and an act of omission, 
                                                        
25 Chapters 11 & 12 provide the reader with an extensive analysis of the two groups of subsequent 
parents that are targeted by the amendment. 
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for example, fatality caused by neglect. It is not clear whether fatalities that are caused 
by ‘neglect’ are included within the section 18B(1)(a) group of parents of subsequent 
children.  Section 18B(1)(b) subsequent parents are substantially wider than section 
18B(1)(b) subsequent parents as the focus is not just upon physical abuse but includes 
emotional, sexual abuse26 and neglect.27  It is immediately clear that section 18A is 
distinguishing between victims of child abuse who have died and victims who have 
survived. As a result, recent research indicates a wide variability in professional 
decision making can result when these types of distinctions are made (Damashek & 
Bonner 2010; Damashek et al., 2013; Widom et al., 2015).  
Damashek et al. (2013) found that fatalities caused by ‘physical assault’ were perceived 
to represent a greater risk of harm to siblings than fatalities caused by neglect. This is 
despite evidence that more child fatalities are caused by neglect than physical violence. 
As a result, surviving siblings from physical assaults were five times more likely to be 
removed than surviving siblings of neglect-related fatalities (Damashek & Bonner 
2010). Widom et al. (2015) stated that “individuals with histories of child maltreatment 
were not at increased risk to physically abuse their children” (p. 1481). The immediate 
implication for the implementation of section 18A is that decision making between the 
two sets of parents may be more prejudicial against subsequent parents under section 
18B(1)(a) than section 18B(1)(b). This reinforces earlier arguments around 
practitioner decision making and propensity evidence. This is particularly true given the 
highly stigmatising effect that a criminal conviction for causing the death of a child 
represents (Warner, 2015). This potential problem is accentuated, given a section 18A 
assessment needs to progress through two separate and distinct decision-making 
processes and therefore, two separate professional groupings (i.e., statutory social 
worker assessment and disposition at the Family Court).  
For example, in the first part of the process, a social worker formulates a view whether 
a confirmation or a declaration is going to apply. However, this ‘view’ then requires 
disposition in the Family Court. As outlined above, each of these professional groupings 
have attitudes and bias that interprets information and evidence differently. For 
                                                        
26 Section 14(1)(a) 
27 Section 14(1)(b) 
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example, parents identified under section 18B(1)(a) have been found beyond a 
reasonable doubt to have committed abuse against a child that resulted in a fatality. This 
is in contrast with subsequent parents under section 18B(1)(b) who have been found on 
the balance of probability to have harmed children in their care. Whether parents under 
section 18B(1)(a) therefore require greater evidence to be able to have subsequent 
children in their care will be determined by the professional grouping that is assessing 
the evidence.  Furthermore, Widom et al. (2015) observe that the effective assessments 
of abuse across generations “depend on the source of the information used to assess 
maltreatment” (p. 1484). However, as the following analysis will demonstrate, the use 
of information in substantiation data and through information-sharing agreements, is 
not without its difficulties, especially in relation to the ethical conflicts that it creates for 
the entire professional community as a whole. 
Decision making and the ‘sequentiality’ effect  
Chill (2004) refers to the ‘snowball effect’ associated with care or court protection 
proceedings. For example, when a place of safety warrant is executed, children are 
taken into ‘custody.’  Under the warrant, children are detained for their immediate 
safety. The CE will proceed to file an affidavit applying for orders under the suite of 
orders that are available under the CYFA1989. These were outlined in chapter 9.  
At disposition, it is important to highlight that a child progresses from a being in 
‘custody’ to going into ‘care’. The focus of the court proceedings therefore undertakes a 
subtle shift from “whether a child should be removed to should a child be returned?” 
(Chill, 2004, p. 542).  It is at this stage, the burden of proof shifts to the parents. 
However, under a section 18A assessment, the parents have an automatic onus of proof 
– the preliminary onus has already been assumed. Section 18A effectively takes the two-
step process outlined in chapter 7 and reduces it to one.  
Chill (2004) argues that in any dispositional phase, practitioner decision making 
becomes self-reinforcing. For example, substantiation data informs the social work 
knowledge base that parents with previous removals or convictions for causing the 
death of children in their care represent an increased risk of potential harm to 
subsequent children in their care. Removing subsequent children may therefore be 
regarded as critical for their overall psychological, and cognitive, wellbeing. The 
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underlying rationale is that the longer a subsequent child spends with a subsequent 
parent, the higher the probability that a subsequent child will suffer a serious 
maltreatment or abuse and the more self-reinforcing the decision to implement a 
removal strategy. Chill (2004) refers to this as the 'sequentiality effect.' This effect can 
be observed when the dispositional stages of an assessment process become 
circumvented to such an extent the outcome becomes predetermining. This deprives 
the dispositional stage of due process, which is at its essence, its fundamental 
constitutional function (Chill, 2004). By introducing an automatic reverse onus of proof 
for a specific separately identifiable group, Parliament is introducing a process that 
significantly limits due process. Chill (2004) highlights that the second factor that 
amplifies the ‘sequentiality effect’ in child protection cases is the decrease in the 
Crown’s substantive burden of proof at dispositional hearings when a parent assumes 
the onus of proof to demonstrate safety. Chill (2004) was making his observation in 
relation to decision making that occurs under a usual section 17 investigation process. 
As outlined above, under a section 18A assessment, that onus of proof is placed upon a 
subsequent parent at the start of the assessment process. This observation from Chill 
(2004) represents a potentially significant challenge for the fair and equitable 
implementation of section 18A’s process.  
Chill’s (2004) ‘sequentiality effect’ was clearly used when describing individual 
practitioner decision making over the course of one intervention. This chapter expands 
Chill’s (2004) effect to include professional decision making around clients, such as the 
parents identified under section 18B(1)(b), who have had multiple removals. In this 
context, the sequentiality effect’ may operate to characterise decision making from an 
organisational perspective, that is, as the organisation has implemented previous 
removals; therefore, historical decision making becomes potentially self-reinforcing. 
This potential challenge is further accentuated by the binary decision-making 
mechanism where either a 'confirmation' or a 'declaration' is the outcome. The whole 
process will be overseen by a care and protection social worker who, depending upon 
their predilection for defensive practice, may make decisions based upon historical 
organisational trends. As outlined above, a practitioner's predilection for defensive 




Issues relating to professional Ethics  
Feng, Chen, Fetzer, Feng, and Lin (2012) succinctly summarised the ethical issues 
around child abuse decision making as an intricate tripartite corollary involving harm to 
the child, harm to the professional and harm to a third party (e.g., families, alleged 
perpetrators etc.).  Feng et al. (2012) argues that this tripartite relationship creates an 
ethical paradox that health professionals reconcile by adopting a ‘don’t ask don’t tell’ 
strategy, for example, health professionals will avoid abuse-related questions during 
routine psychosocial or health-screening assessments for fear that the response places 
them in the dilemma of having to report patients to child protection services.  Likewise, 
Read (2007) noted that psychiatrists and mental health workers in New Zealand 
consistently adopted this strategy to reconcile the associated ethical paradox that 
reporting child abuse generates. This low level of abuse inquiry by mental health staff in 
New Zealand is consistent with the results of similar studies elsewhere (Muenzenmaier 
et al., 2015). However, as outlined in chapter 6, the usual notification process is 
significantly different under section 18A than the substantive jurisdiction of CYFA1989. 
Effective implementation of section 18A from a practice perspective will require 
significant collaboration and information sharing with other professionals involved 
with vulnerable families, which accentuates the ethical issues outlined above.  
Privacy and information sharing 
In their study, Marsh, Browne, Taylor, and Davis (2015) addressed the ethical conflict 
for midwives in New South Wales following a recent development in child protection 
practice called ‘assumption of care’, resulting in the removal of babies from their 
mothers at birth. In their study, Marsh et al. (2015) translate the term “midwife” as 
‘with woman’, thereby highlighting “the midwifery philosophy which aligns midwives 
with women first and foremost” (p. 68).  Significant difficulties therefore arise when this 
approach conflicts with child welfare agencies and their statutory obligation to focus 
upon the ‘best interests of the child’. This chapter argues that midwives in New Zealand, 
since the enactment of section 18A, will be increasingly placed in what Marsh et al. 
(2015) describe as ‘cognitive dissonance.’ Cognitive dissonance occurs when “an 
individual must accommodate two contradictory beliefs, ideas or values at the same 
time” (p. 69). Based upon Festinger's (1985) seminal work, dissonance occurs when the 
conflicting values are unable to be reconciled leading to feelings of anxiety, stress anger 
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and sadness. The difficulties observed by Marsh et al. (2015) is addressed in a recent 
study by Haultain, Fouche, Frost, and Moodley (2016) who support increasing calls for a 
move away from what they describe as a binary either/or position of adopting a ‘child-
centred’ or a ‘woman’s-centred’ approach towards a dual orientation approach. This 
dual orientation is supported by a growing body of research (Featherstone et al. 2014, 
Gould & Baldwin, 2006, Laing & Humphreys, 2013, Lonne et al., 2009).   
Crucially, Marsh et al. (2015) have indicated that the implementation of section 18A 
leads to increased surveillance and may result in women with new-born babies 
avoiding antenatal care for fear of statutory interventions. Legal mechanisms such as 
section 18A therefore represent a potential direct barrier to the successful 
implementation of critical secondary health prevention strategies. Laing (2016) 
indicates this ‘fear’ is a particularly significant barrier to antenatal care for Aboriginal 
women in Australia. In New Zealand, midwives will be increasingly placed in this 
position because a section 18A assessment is triggered without a notification being 
raised, unlike the substantive jurisdiction of CYFA1989 that can only be triggered by a 
report of concern. Information sharing between agencies such as education, justice, 
health providers and the MVCOT is critical for the jurisdiction under section 18A to be 
activated. Therefore, all professionals who have what Feng et al. (2012) describe as a 
“close relationship with families” (p. 277) will be affected. 
Howe (2010) is particularly critical of information sharing and its potential to impede 
rapport and the development of functional working relationships. Munro (2007) notes 
that information sharing too quickly can lead to excessive intrusive interventions. In 
their study, Feng et al. (2012) surveyed professionals in relation to reporting attitudes 
and found ‘time frames’ was a consistent theme that professionals observed as 
representing an ethical challenge as they are often unrealistic, create anxiety and foster 
dangerous decision-making environments as decisions are made quickly with 
incomplete or inaccurate information.  Section 18A remain silent on either the time 
frame that is required for both the completion of an assessment and final disposition. 
More research relating to the time frames involved in completing a section 18A process 
is therefore recommended in the future to save subsequent parents from unnecessarily 
protracted assessments which can lengthen unnecessary feelings of fear and anxiety 







Chapter 9: Stage three – identifying the legal interpretation 
issues – an overview 
Chapter nine continues stage three’s analysis by adopting a general overview of section 
18A to highlight potential interpretation issues raised by the four criteria necessary to 
trigger a section 18A assessment. This is in contrast to the remaining chapters that will 
address specific interpretation issues relating to the inclusion of unborn children within 
the definition of subsequent child and the two population of parents under sections 
18B(1)(a) and 18B(1)(b). Through this chapter’s analysis, it is immediately apparent 
that the language used in the drafting of section 18A, and all its associated 
requirements28 is at times, potentially problematic. Problems in drafting at an 
enactment level can only represent significant challenges for implementing section 18A 
on a practice level.  
The first challenge in implementing section 18A from a legal perspective involves 
addressing whether it was Parliament's intention to develop an entirely new class of 
'parent' or ‘child' for the purpose of an 18A assessment, or alternatively, to incorporate 
the existing definition of ‘child’ and ‘parent’ within the amended definition of 
‘subsequent child’ and the introduction of a ‘parent of a subsequent child’ concept.  
Depending upon the interpretational approach that is adopted, section 18A’s 
jurisdiction is either hugely expanded or limited. To make this interpretation task even 
more difficult, Parliament has specifically introduced a definition of subsequent child 
into section 229 following the 1 July 2016 amendment, without a corresponding 
definition of parent of subsequent child.  
When comparing the CYFA1989 definition of a ‘subsequent child’ and a ‘child’, it 
becomes obvious that the amended definition of a 'subsequent child' is more expansive 
than the current definition of a ‘child’ as it includes a child born or unborn. However, its 
jurisdiction is also restricted as the definition of subsequent child does not include a 
                                                        
28 Sections 18B(1)(a) & (b), 18C and 18D 
29 The Interpretation section of the CYFA1989 
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young person within the definition, signalling a parliamentary intent that the protection 
under section 18A is for a child only.  
CYFA1989 defines young person as follows: 
young person means a boy or girl of or over the age of 14 years but under 
17 years; but does not include any person who is or has been married or 
in a civil union. 
 
Given it is possible for children over the age of 14 years old to be in the care and custody 
of the CE, this therefore raises the question as to whether this population of vulnerable 
children (i.e., over the age of 14 years old but under the age of 17 years old) is excluded 
from the additional preventative protections offered under section 18A. Potential rights 
issues are therefore raised as young people are being discriminated against due to their 
age.  
To be categorised as the ‘parent of a subsequent child, under section 18B(1)(a), a 
subsequent parent needed to have caused the death of a child or young person. However, 
the term young person is not used in the Crimes Act 1961 for the offences identified 
under section 18B(1)(a).  If section 18A is proving protection for a specific age range 
(0–14 years), then including young persons as a criterion for being classified as a 
subsequent parent would appear to be an unnecessary extension of the concept given 
the intent of section 18A is to prevent the risk of serious abuse to a child only. It 
therefore leads to the situation where a person who has been convicted of an offence for 
causing the death of a 15-year-old is classified as a subsequent parent, but could still 
have the full-time care of a 15-year-old without triggering a section 18A assessment.   
Unlike the definition of ‘subsequent child’ in section 2, the amendment does not 
introduce a new definition of the term ‘subsequent parent’. Instead, section 18B(1)(a) 
and (b) describe a set of characteristics that could ‘identify’ a group of subsequent 
parents at any given time. This allows Parliament the flexibility to easily expand the 
population of subsequent parents in future amendments. For example, another 
population of subsequent parent could be included by targeting those convicted of 
sexual offences against children.  Alternatively, future amendments could incorporate 





Drafting Challenges   
Section 18A(1)(b) 
Before looking at the specific characteristics of each group of subsequent parents 
identified in section 18B, this part of the chapter focuses upon section 18A (1)(b), one of 
the of the four criteria required to trigger a section 18A assessment.  
As outlined above, section 18A(1)(b) uses the term ‘parent’, not subsequent parent. The 
current definition of a parent contained within the interpretation section of CYFA1989 
is the following: 
A parent in relation to a child includes a step-parent of a child, but only if 
the step parent shares responsibility for the day to day care of a child with 
a parent of a child. 
 
Although CYFA1989 provides a definition of ‘parent’; it does not go far enough to 
achieve legislative clarity. If the term parent in section 18A(1)(b) is to be interpreted 
with reference to the existing definition of ‘parent’ in the CYFA1989, immediate 
limitations are introduced into the ‘subsequent parent’ concept.  For example, although 
the definition of parent is expanded to include a ‘step-parent;’ they are only included 
within the definition if they “…share responsibility for the day-to-day care of the child 
with the parent”. This allows a step-parent to argue that they do not share ‘day-to-day 
care’; therefore, section 18A does not apply to them. It was at this point that Parliament 
could have stated: is the subsequent parent of a subsequent child, and then introduced a 
definition of ‘subsequent parent’ into section 2 that included informal care 
arrangements to achieve legislative clarity. This is especially true given the preventative 
intent Parliament was trying to achieve by the section 18A amendment. For example, as 
stated in the White paper and Hansard, in certain cases, the wider whanau represented 
just as much of a risk of harm to children as their ‘biological’ parents. However, this was 
not done; therefore, the issue of whether the term ‘parent’ that is used in section 
18A(1)(b) is to be interpreted in reference to the definition of ‘parent’ that is currently 
in section 2 of the CYFA1989. If the recent tragedy around Moko Rangitoheriri (“baby 
Moko”), is considered, the interpretation of section 18A(1)(b) becomes critical.  
68 
 
Tania Shailer and her partner, David William Haerewa, were sentenced on the 27 June 
2016 to 17 years with a minimum of nine years in jail for baby Moko’s manslaughter in 
August 2015. The original murder charges were dropped and replaced with 
manslaughter. This is the longest sentence given for the manslaughter of a child. Shailer 
and Haerewa were supposed to be looking after baby Moko while mother Nicola Dally-
Paki was at Starship Hospital caring for one of her other children. Although the 
manslaughter charge would still satisfy the requirement for section 18B(1)(a), the 
characteristics for a subsequent parent under 18A(1)(a–d) also need to be met. If the 
above restricted approach were adopted, this particular situation would not be caught 
by the Act as neither Shailer nor Haerewa were baby Moko’s biological parents, nor 
were they baby Moko’s step-parents. Therefore, the intention of the amendments to be 
‘preventative’ would be circumvented if a restricted interpretation were adopted.   
Furthermore, when applying section 18A upon either Haerewa’s or Shailer’s release, a 
section 18A assessment may be triggered in relation to their own children. However, if a 
restricted interpretation approach was adopted to the definition of parent under 
section 18B(1)( b), then arguably, they could have care of other children without an 18A 
process being triggered.  This would therefore seem to be an absurdity given the 
intention of the CYFA1989 and the presumption that this group of people are unable to 
care for any child; it is not just restricted to their own biological children or to step-
children. The interpretation issue whether a restricted or expansive view of a 
‘subsequent parent’ become even more ambiguous when section 18B(1)(b) is read in 
juxtaposition with section 18A(1)(c).   
Section 18A(1)(c) states— 
 “has, or is likely to have, the care or custody of the subsequent child.” 
When looking at section 18A(1)(c), it includes persons who have ‘care or custody’. The 
next interpretation issue is therefore determining whether the term ‘care’ is coloured 
by the term ‘custody’.   
Custody is defined in the CYFA1989 as— 
“the right to possession and care of a child or young person.”  
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In Hewer v Bryant30, Fox LJ considered what custody involved. In dicta, the Lord Justice 
observed the central element for custody was control. Lord Scarman observed that “it 
starts with the right of control and ends with little more than advice”.  
The term ‘care’ is not defined in the CYFA1989. Given that the term ‘care’ is included 
within the definition of custody, determining whether the definition of custody colours 
the definition of care will either restrict or expand the definition of ‘care’. This 
interpretation difficulty becomes even more complicated when comparing the 
definition of custody with section 18A(1)(c). In the definition of custody; ‘care’ is a 
definitional requirement of custody. In contrast, section 18A(1)(c) implies that care is a 
separate concept as it refers to ‘care’ or ‘custody’. The main implication is determining 
whether this separate concept of care under section 18A (1)(c) includes informal care 
agreements.  The implication for this interpretation becomes obvious if we consider the 
case of Nia Glassie, specifically referred to in the Smith (2011) report.  It cannot be said 
that those convicted of her murder had ‘custody’ of her at the time of her death, as they 
had no legal or natural right of possession. However, they would be caught by section 
18A if the term ‘care’ was interpreted to include informal care arrangements.  
It is ironic that the case involving M that was the subject of the Smith (2011) inquiry, 
which informed the VCA to drive the 1 July 2016 amendments, would not be caught by 
section 18A irrespective of what interpretation were adopted. For example, M survived 
her abuse therefore section 18B(1)(a) would not apply. Second, at the time of the abuse, 
she had been returned to her mother’s care. Therefore, the requirement under section 
18B(1)(b) is not satisfied as it cannot be said that “there is no realistic prospect that the 
child or young person would be returning to her care”. As a result, Parliament’s 
intention following the Mel Smith (2011) report to protect children such as M would 
fail.  
Above, three separate, well publicised, child fatality and serious abuse cases were 
outlined that would not be caught by an 18A process if a restricted interpretative view 
of a ‘subsequent parent’ were to apply. This is because this restricted view does not 
cover scenarios where biological parents have informally delegated their parental rights 
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to persons other than their partners. Clearly, it is Parliament’s intention that such cases 
as the ones outlined above are caught by this provision (Smith, 2011). It is therefore 
necessary to explore other legal principles to assist in the development of a new 
conceptual parent (e.g., a subsequent parent), which is more expansive than the existing 
view of ‘parent’, to give effect to Parliament’s intentions to prevent the risk of potential 
harm by subsequent parents who have delegated their parental obligations, which has 
resulted in serious child maltreatment or fatality.  
In loco parentis 
The term in loco parentis, refers to the legal responsibility of a person or organization to 
take on some of the functions and responsibilities of a parent. It applies where a person 
has put himself/herself in the situation of a lawful ‘parent’ by assuming parental 
obligations without going through the formalities of legal adoption. It embodies the two 
ideas of assuming parental status and discharging parental duties (Pedagno, 2011, p. 
190).  Originally derived from English common law, it allows institutions such as 
colleges and schools to act in the best interests of the students as they see fit.  In 
addition, this doctrine can provide a non-biological parent with the legal rights and 
responsibilities of a biological parent if they have held themselves out as the parent. 
This common law principle has been codified in the Crimes Act 1961.31 Section 152 
states—  
Everyone who is a parent, or is a person in place of a parent, who has 
actual care or charge of a child under the age of 18 years is under a legal 
duty— 
(a) to provide that child with necessaries; and 
(b) to take reasonable steps to protect that child from injury. 
 
From section 152, it places parental obligations on a person in place of a parent who has 
actual care. In dicta, the CA in R v Lunt & Ors32 addressed the common-law position of in 
loco parentis and its applicability in New Zealand.  
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Mr Wharehinga and Ms Lunt were in a relationship. Ms Small and her daughter Iris 
were living with them in the same household. Mr Wharehinga and Ms Lunt had 
expressed concerns about Ms Small's ability to care for Iris. Over a subsequent period of 
some weeks, Iris suffered a series of injuries. However, during the night of the 17th–
18th October 2002, Iris received a fatal head injury. There was no dispute that this fatal 
injury was effected by Ms Small. However, the Crown also argued Mr Wharehinga and 
Ms Lunt were criminally responsible for her death because at the relevant time they 
were exercising custody and control over Iris. As such, they had charge of her jointly 
with Ms Small and had failed in their legal duty to protect Iris. When addressing 
whether Mr Wharehinga and Ms Lunt had a common-law duty, the CA were unable to 
express a concluded view. In delivering the decision of the CA, Blanchard J stated  
“…we heard no argument on whether at common law a parental duty is 
imposed upon someone in loco parentis. We are inclined to think that the 
common-law duty does so extend …we prefer not to express a concluded 
view” [para. 28].  
 
In McCallion v Dodd33 Turner and McCarthy JJ held at the foundation  
                           “…however, the younger the child, the stronger a parental right (and the 
requisite obligation). Strong parental rights are required at an early age 
because parental rights exist for the protection of the child and it was for 
the child’s benefit that the parent’s rights of control existed (Gillick34).  
 
In Iris’s case, McCallion v Dodds would indicate that owing to her infancy, the associated 
parental rights impose a higher level of obligation than that of older children. However, 
the added corollary is that the recognition of parental rights will potentially be 
‘stronger’ when a child is an infant or a young child. The above dicta suggesting that 
parental rights dilute as a child ages.  What is clear from CA in R v Lunt & Ors is that the 
CA are unable to reach a conclusive view as to whether informal care arrangements 
attract the obligations ordinarily attached to parents. Therefore, one way section 18A 
could have addressed concerns raised by the Smith (2011) in relation to fatalities such 
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as Nia Glassie and Baby Moko is to incorporate reference to section 152 of the Crimes 
Act 1961 within the definition of ‘parent of a subsequent child’.  This would enable 
informal care arrangements (i.e., a person in place of a parent who has actual care) to 
come within its protective jurisdiction. Furthermore, if only the definition of subsequent 
child were to incorporate reference to s 152, the remaining substantive jurisdiction of 
the CYFA1989 would be excluded thereby avoiding issues relating to the floodgates 
argument.35 Future research around the risk posed by informal care arrangements by 
caregivers other than biological or step-parents is therefore needed, and whether these 
arrangements should be included within the definition of ‘parent of subsequent child’.    
Role of social worker under section 18A(2) 
The decision making for a child protection social worker under section 18A is vastly 
different to the decision-making requirements under the substantive jurisdiction of 
CYFA1989.   
Section 18A (2) states: 
 
If the chief executive believes on reasonable grounds that a person is a 
person to whom this section applies, the chief executive must, after 
informing the person (where practicable) that he or she is to be assessed 
under this section, assess whether the person meets the requirements of 
subsection (3) in respect of the subsequent child. 
 
Section 18A (2) makes it clear that a social worker is immediately conducting an 
assessment as opposed to an investigation. Section 18A(2) also makes it clear that a 
social worker ‘must’36 inform the person that they are to be assessed. The amendment is 
therefore being directive about practice around initial client engagement.  
Section 18A(4) states: 
Following the assessment, — 
(a) if subsection (5) applies, the chief executive must apply for a 
declaration under section 67 that the subsequent child is in need of 
care or protection on the ground in section 14(1)(ba); or 
                                                        
35 If obligations were extended this would result in a much higher work load for statutory social work. 
36 This is a mandatory requirement 
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(b) in any other case, the chief executive must decide not to apply as 
described in paragraph (a), and must instead apply under section 
18C for confirmation of the decision not to apply under section 67. 
  
This section places a statutory social worker under a mandatory duty to exercise 
dichotomous decision making (i.e., can only decide to apply to the Family Court for a 
confirmation or a declaration). In either case, the Family Court makes the ultimate 
decision at disposition. The court can only be as effective as the social worker given the 
social worker has the statutory obligation to place all relevant information before the 
court. However, as the burden of proof rests with the subsequent parent, the social 
worker has no statutory responsibility for the quality of information that is provided. 
Given the parents that are being targeted are likely to be involved in highly complex 
family dynamics, this obligation represents one potentially significant challenge for the 
effective implementation of the amendment. Decision making under section 18A is also 
complex given the type of evidence that the amendment is requiring a social worker to 
assess.  
Subsection (3) states: 
A person meets the requirements of this subsection if—  
(a) in a case where the parents own act or omission led to him or her 
being a person described in Section 18B, the person is unlikely to inflict 
on the subsequent child the kind of harm that led to the parent being so 
described; or 
(b) in any case, the parents is unlikely to allow the kind of harm that led to 
the parent being a person described in Section 18B to be inflicted on the 
subsequent child 
 
Section 18A 3(a) and (b), with its emphasis upon unlikely, indicates that the rules 
around propensity evidence are a significant feature of an 18A process.  Therefore, a 
section 18A assessment also places a social worker under a mandatory obligation to 
make an assessment about the current veracity of propensity evidence. There are two 
categories of propensity evidence, both of which are the defining characteristics of the 
two categories of subsequent parents under section 18B(1)(a) & (b): uncharged prior 
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bad acts,37 and prior convictions.38  It is well recognised in jurisprudence that the use of 
propensity evidence or similar fact evidence is highly litigious given the significant risk 
of prejudice that it can represent (Mann & Blunden, 2010). This means that a statutory 
social work practice under section 18A is likely to be legally contentious and potentially 
exposes a social worker’s decision-making process to an increased risk of legal 
challenge.  
In R v Bull39 the CA stated that illegitimate evidence is whether  
“…the evidence in question is more probative than prejudicial. The word 
'prejudicial' in this context means prejudicial in an illegitimate way, i.e., by 
inviting or suggesting a process of reasoning which the law does not 
allow" [para. 8].  
 
As the above CA commentary suggests, when a high risk of unfair prejudice exists, it 
may result in a social worker using evidence illegitimately when completing a section 
18A assessment, that is, may make a decision on either an improper, illogical or 
emotional basis. Therefore, evidence that appeals to a social worker’s sympathies, 
arouses a sense of horror, or provokes an instinct to punish, may cause a social worker 
to base decision making under section 18A on something other than the established 
propositions in the case (Mann & Blunden, 2010). For example, the drafting of the 
amendment itself potentially evokes feelings of disgust and anger towards section 
18B(1)(a) parents; given the media coverage that such deaths attract. The evocative 
images associated with these deaths generate what Warner (2015) describes as a mass 
trauma response that can be triggered by subsequent media coverage of a completely 
different child. Potentially, this trauma response can be triggered by even reading the 
list of convictions; such as those outlined in section 18B(1)(a).  
Alternatively, on hearing the evidence, the social worker may be satisfied with a lower 
degree of probability than would otherwise be required (ALC, 1985).  For example, as 
outlined in chapter 2, under Woolnoth v Woolnoth, the burden of proof against a father 
to prove ‘unfitness’ to have custody of his children required a much higher level of 
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evidence than that of the mother. As outlined above, the usual adjudicatory process 
involved in a section 18A assessment when compared with a section 17 investigation 
process is severely restricted. Therefore, the opportunity for challenge by a subsequent 
parent of a social worker’s assessment is also limited.  
By using the terms allow the kind of harm that led to the parent being a person described 
in Section 18B the provision is clearly aimed at establishing, based upon their past 
conduct, whether a subsequent parent is continuing to exhibit the behaviours that led to 
their categorisation as a subsequent parent under one of the two groups identified in 
18B. However, from a practice perspective, it also assumes that whatever happened, the 
parent ‘allowed it’. This is highly problematic if domestic violence notifications are 
considered.  
Women who go to court to charge their partners for domestic violence would never be 
considered to have ‘allowed’ him to abuse her. However, section 18A is making the 
assumption that even though both mother and children were victims of domestic 
violence, nevertheless, the mother will be considered to have ‘allowed it’ to happen in a 
subsequent child assessment.  Gendered analysis research of how this aspect of a 
section 18A assessment is required to ensure the knowledge base around child-
protection practice does not become unnecessarily discriminatory towards women.  
In terms of social work practice, future research around how the role of a social worker 
under section 18A and its associated challenges is recommended. For example, 
determining whether the outcomes for these two different types of parents are different 
and in what way they may have been different is important, given the potential bias in 
operation between those with a conviction and those without or mothers who have a 





Chapter 10: Stage three – identification issues relating to 
unborn children 
In the final phase of stage 3, chapter 10 takes an in-depth look at the unborn child 
concept as its inclusion into the definition of ‘subsequent child’ has potentially 
significant implications for practice and those parents targeted by section 18A. The 
CYFA1989 defines a subsequent child as a child born or unborn. The CYFA1989 does not 
define ‘unborn’, instead leaving this to practitioners to determine legislative clarity. 
Potentially, this ambiguity negatively impacts upon social work practice and law as 
practitioners are unclear about their jurisdictional boundaries around a completely new 
statutory client.  This chapter attempts to draw upon religious and scientific discourses 
to assist in conceptualising an unborn baby. The chapter then proceeds to analyse the 
New Zealand legal perspectives to determine what current legal protections for unborn 
children exist in New Zealand, and to establish whether these existing protections can 
provide guidance for the extended jurisdiction of section 18A. 
Different perspectives on the concept of unborn child 
Rivière (1985) argues a definition of ‘unborn’ can never be based on purely scientific 
data. Science can provide the data about the development of the embryo and the foetus, 
but the point at which the embryo or foetus achieves a ‘potential for life’ or becomes a 
‘person’ is a subjective rather than an objective assessment. An embryo refers to an 
unborn child growing from conception until the end of two months’ gestation. The term 
in vivo refers to (of processes) performed or taking place in a living organism. In 
contrast, in vitro refers to (of a process) performed or taking place in a test tube, culture 
dish, or elsewhere outside a living organism. Each of these terms represents significant 
legal, ethical and philosophical implications for the generic category under section 18A 
that is referred to as an ‘unborn child’. For example, could the section 18A protections 
apply to in vitro scenarios?  
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Legal principles around unborn children have been subject to considerable anomalies 
and inconsistencies. In the UK, for example, a lacuna40 in the law existed as it was not an 
offence to kill a child who was being born. This prompted the introduction of the Infant 
Life Preservation Act 1929 to address the situation where mothers ‘strangled’ their 
babies at birth. However, when it was promulgated, its scope was considerably wider 
than this. Section 1(1) extended protection to ‘any child capable of being born alive’. 
This has since been referred to as the ‘viable foetus’ principle. Often, it is argued that the 
law is so divided on the subject that “it is impossible for the law to present a moral 
stance that will be acceptable to all” (Fortin, 1988, p. 55).  
In the context of the criminal law, the Crimes Act 1961 provides limited protection for 
an unborn child (s 182).  Although the Crimes Act 1961 recognises the unborn child as a 
‘human being’, the foetus still lacks an independent ‘legal personality’ and is 
consequently unable to take advantage of the full range of protections available to it 
under the law.  In stark contrast, a newly born receives the same level of protection as 
an adult. Whether ‘birth’ can be defined as either complete exit from the birthing canal 
(R v Poulton41), or the cutting of the umbilical cord (R v Trilloe42), or a baby’s first breath 
(R v Brain43), is more ambiguous. Often, the difference between an unborn and a 
newborn could be a matter of minutes, days or weeks so it appears relatively arbitrary 
that protections are unable to be extended to within the womb to at least the later 
stages of gestation, for example, when it is a viable foetus.  
Fortin (1988) argues that “there should be more clarity of thought on the issues 
involved before sporadic legislation clouds the picture” (p. 55).  Section 18A has put the 
issue plainly within contemporary child protection law and practice by including an 
‘unborn child’ within the definition of ‘subsequent child’. This statutory expansion 
therefore represents another challenge associated with the implementation of section 
18A, specifically, determining the stage of pregnancy that attracts section 18A’s 
protection.   
                                                        
40 An empty space in the law with no regulations applicable or an absent part in a law or another written 
document such as a contract. In other words, it denotes an instance when there is no controlling law or 
regulation. 
41 (1832) 5 C & P 329 
42 (1842) Carr and M 650 
43 (1834) 6 C. & P. 349 
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New Zealand Position 
The law of abortion in New Zealand developed differently than in England as it was 
largely implemented through criminal codes. The Criminal Code Act of 1893 was 
expressed in similar terms to ss 182 and 183 of the Crimes Act 1961. The Crimes Act 
1961 is both a consolidating and an amending measure which therefore requires an 
appreciation of its historical development to understand the abortion umbrella that it 
operates under. However, under the general rule of construction in legal interpretation, 
a consolidated statute should be construed without recourse to its history, unless there 
is ambiguity.  
Section 159 of the Crimes Act 1961 defines a ‘human being’:  
A child becomes a human being within the meaning of this Act when it has 
completely proceeded in a living state from the body of its mother, 
whether it has breathed or not, whether it has an independent circulation 
or not, and whether the navel string is severed or not. 
 
This statutory test therefore reflects the common-law tests as outlined above.44  
The term "unlawfully” has been consistently used in the development of abortion law in 
New Zealand. This term has been faithfully reproduced from the 1893 Criminal Code to 
the Crimes Act 1961.  Unlike England, New Zealand made no statutory provision 
corresponding to the equivalent of a ‘therapeutic abortion’ being performed within a 
clinical environment. In the absence of this clarity, the common-law precedence 
established by the Bourne’s case was assumed to apply in New Zealand, which negated 
the need for legislative intervention. As a result, it has been left to the courts to consider 
whether New Zealand should adopt the line of precedence established by the Bourne45 
case or whether New Zealand abortion law would depart from it.  
Bourne’s Case  
A 15-year-old became pregnant as the result of rape. A surgeon performed an abortion 
given the risk to her ongoing mental health the pregnancy represented. He was charged 
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under the Offences against the Person Act 1861, s 58, with unlawfully procuring the 
abortion of the girl. 
The jury was directed that it was for the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable 
doubt, that the operation was not performed in good faith and for the purpose of 
preserving the life of the girl. The jury found that the surgeon was under a duty to 
perform the operation if, on reasonable grounds and with adequate knowledge, he was 
of opinion that the probable consequence of the continuance of the pregnancy would 
cause his patient long-term physical and mental harm. 
Determining the level of existing protection for unborn children in New 
Zealand 
R V Woolnough46  
In this CA case, a doctor was charged with 12 counts of procuring a miscarriage 
contrary to section 183(1) (b) of the Crimes Act 1961. It states: 
Everyone is liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years 
who, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman or girl, whether 
she is with child or not  
a) unlawfully administers to or causes to be taken by her any poison 
or any drugs or any noxious thing or 
b) Unlawfully uses on her any instrument 
 
The trial judge advised the jury that the test for ‘unlawfully’ is whether it is necessary to 
preserve the woman from serious danger to her life or to her physical or mental health, 
not being the normal dangers of pregnancy and child birth. During his summing up to 
the jury, the judge said: 
 “…that pregnancy and child birth have always represented certain risks. 
Furthermore, unmarried women who are pregnant are probably under 
greater emotional and mental strain than if they are not pregnant” (p. 
509).    
 
The trial judge directed the CA to consider whether this direction on ‘unlawfully’ was 
correct in law.  
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The CA affirmed the trial judge’s jury instruction. The CA highlighted that consideration 
of the word ‘unlawfully’ is accepted by the Solicitor General as—  
…the preservation of the life of the mother can be properly regarded from 
a long term as well as a short-term point of view, so that the risks of 
danger to physical or the mental health can be taken into account. (p. 512 
CA)    
 
The Solicitor General highlighted it was insufficient to merely identify that the mother's 
physical and mental health would suffer. The health threat would also need to carry 
with it a real risk to the mother's life.  
In the course of this case, Richmond J discussed how the stage of gestation was a 
relevant factor for consideration. The Woolnough case involved abortions in the first 
trimester of pregnancy. Richmond J was therefore of the opinion that section 182 had 
no application in such cases. Justice Richmond also indicated that a different test of 
‘unlawfulness’ applied at different stages of gestation. At the later stages of pregnancy, 
the greater the justification needed for a termination.  
In his dissenting judgement, Wild J indicated that the Bourne case provided the first 
judicial exposition of what the term 'unlawfully' entails. For Justice Wild, the important 
factor to consider is whether an abortion is necessary for the purpose of preserving the 
life of the mother. In his opinion, the current decision was a judicial extension of the 
direction in Bourne. It introduced a preservation of health, physical or mental health as 
a purpose separate and distinct from the preservation of life. In Justice Wild’s opinion, if 
the test of lawfulness is to be allowed to cover such cases, then it is the function of the 
legislature, not that of the courts, to enlarge it. For Wild J, given this is such a highly 
controversial field, Parliament has not only the responsibility but also the duty to 
ensure legislative clarity.  This occurred at rapid pace following Woolnough by section 6 
of the Crimes Amendment Act 1977 (1977 No 113).   
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187A Meaning of unlawfully 
On 16 December 1977 by section 6 of the Crimes Amendment Act 1977 (1977 No 113), 
section 187A was inserted into the Crimes Act 1961. The definition provides a bright 
line test of 20 weeks’ gestation.  
Where pregnancy is not more than 20 weeks’ gestation, a termination is allowed if— 
the continuance of the pregnancy would result in serious danger to (not being 
danger normally attendant upon childbirth) to the life, or to the physical or mental 
health, of the woman or girl. 
When considering this ground, the following factors can be taken into consideration: 
The age of the woman or girl concerned is near the beginning or the end of the usual 
childbearing years and there are reasonable grounds for believing that the pregnancy is 
the result of sexual violation. 
An abortion can also be performed if there is substantial risk that the child, if born, 
would be so physically or mentally abnormal as to be seriously handicapped.  
In addition, an abortion is permitted if pregnancy is the result of sexual intercourse 
between a parent and child, a brother and sister, whether of the whole blood or of the 
half-blood, a grandparent and grandchild. 
Finally, a termination is allowed if the pregnancy is the result of sexual intercourse that 
constitutes an offence against section 131(1) of the Crimes Act 1961 or that the woman 
or girl is severely subnormal within the meaning of section 138(2) of the Crimes Act 
1961. 
In relation to pregnancies over 20 weeks’ gestation a termination is allowed if it is 
necessary to save the life of the woman or girl and to prevent serious permanent injury 
to her (i) physical health (ii) mental health. 
It is the role of the two certifying consultants to determine whether there are grounds 
under New Zealand law for performing a termination. It is not the role of the general 
practitioner to determine whether there are legal grounds for termination. 
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In the matter of Baby P47 
Baby P’s mother was a 15-year-old girl who remained in a relationship with the father. 
Baby P’s father had previously attacked Baby P’s mother and threatened to kidnap and 
kill the baby. The birth was expected in the next few weeks. The mother was already 
under the custody of the Director-General of Social Welfare and concern for the welfare 
of the unborn child prompted the Director-General of Social Welfare to apply to the 
court for a declaration that she was in need of care or protection. The question arose 
whether the foetus was a ‘child’ within the meaning of the CYFA1989 and therefore able 
to benefit from the protective jurisdiction of the court. 
Held: granting the declaration. 
In making his decision, Judge Inglis argued that Baby P was at a stage of development 
when he would be capable of living independently of his mother. In effect, Judge Inglis 
applied the ‘viable foetus’ doctrine. Judge Inglis sought support for his decision from 
section 182 and section 159 of the Crimes Act 1961, provisions that protect the unborn 
child at 20 weeks of gestation. The protection applies whether or not it is capable of 
being born alive.  
However, the judge declined to consider whether protection under the CYFA1989 could 
apply at an earlier stage of gestation. Judge Inglis then went on to consider overseas 
authority as to whether an unborn child has a separate legal personality. In reaching his 
conclusion, Judge Inglis made a distinction between whether an unborn child is a legal 
person and whether it was a human being entitled to protection under the CYFA1989.  
Although he agreed an unborn child was not a separate legal person, nevertheless it was 
entitled to protection.  
Subsequent commentary disagrees with his Honour not to equate protection under the 
specific legislation—where the statutory term is a child—with the question of whether 
the unborn child is a legal person. In their opinion, the statutory term can only 
encompass ‘legal persons’ (Fortin, 1988). The general trend of decisions in common law 
is not to confer rights on unborn children as legal persons (Glazebrook, 1993). Hence, in 
England, an unborn child cannot be made a ward of the State or be subject to the courts 
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inherent jurisdiction. The criticism of Judge Inglis’s decision revolved around it creating 
a conflict between the unborn child and with the mother's own interests (Rosamund, 
2004). Specifically, the decision provides the opportunity for control to be exercised 
over the mother's behaviour during pregnancy for the benefit of her unborn child. This 
potential conflict has caused the English Court to shy away from deploying any legal 
regime for the benefit of the unborn child at the expense of the mother's interests 
(Fortin, 1998; Rosamund, 2004).  
R v Henderson48  
Henderson was convicted in the High Court under s 182 of the Crimes Act 1961 of 
causing the death of an unborn child. He had assaulted the child's mother in 
circumstances which justified the conclusion that he had intended to kill the unborn 
child. The elapsed period of gestation was estimated at 26 weeks. 
The word ‘child’ in section 182 of the Crimes Act 1961 embraces a foetus. Without 
determining when a foetus becomes a child, the foetus in this case was of about 26 
weeks’ gestation, well past the 20 weeks’ gestation period referred to in s 187A(3) of 
the Crimes Act 1961, and the ordinary and natural meaning of the word ‘child’ included 
the foetus in this case. It was, accordingly, an unborn child. There was no need to 
impose a test of capability of birth and therefore, no onus on the Crown to prove that 
the child was capable of being born alive. 
The 20-week gestation period referred to in section 187A of the Crimes Act 1961 is a 
bright-line test.49 Given the death of the foetus occurred after a 20-week gestation 
period, the Crown was not required to adduce evidence that the foetus was capable of 
being born alive. However, the Court made it clear that the accused could not be found 
guilty of ‘murder’ as even though it was older than 20 weeks’ gestation, it had not been 
born when death occurred therefore not “independent of its mother”. Hence, the court 
recognised that the foetus had no separate legal existence. The Court considered what 
would have happened if the assault had triggered the birth of the baby from which it 
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factors, which leaves little or no room for varying interpretation. The purpose of a bright-line rule is to 
produce predictable and consistent results in its application.  
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subsequently died. This would have resulted in a murder conviction (R v Senior50) in 
recognition that the birth crystallises full legal personality.   
Re an Unborn Child51 
This case involved the production of a pornographic film where the birth of a baby was 
to be featured. The Chief Social Worker filed to place the ‘unborn child’ into the 
‘guardianship’ of the Court.  In supporting the ratio expressed by Judge Inglis in Baby P, 
Justice Heath established that the term ‘child,’ as used under the wardship jurisdiction 
(now called guardianship of the court), applies to the ‘unborn child’.   
In upholding the application, Heath J included an ‘unborn child’ within the definition of 
‘child’ as used in the Guardianship Act 1968.52There were several factors specifically 
relevant for the New Zealand legal environment that Heath J took into account when 
formulating his decision. First, New Zealand has ratified the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of a Child which expressly recognises the existence of rights for a child 
before birth. Secondly, although Heath J recognised that a mother cannot be compelled 
to do anything positive, it does not mean that orders forbidding her (or anyone else) to 
refrain from an action cannot be made within the protective jurisdiction of the court. 
Finally, the decision is consistent with other legislation in New Zealand that protects the 
unborn child, for example, the Crimes Act 1961 and the Contraception, Sterilisation and 
Abortion Act 1977.  
Although Heath J reached the same decision as Judge Inglis in Re Baby P [an unborn 
Child], he reached it by a different route.  As he outlined, Judge Inglis took this view as  
“…medically and physiologically there is only a minor, if not imperceptible 
difference of degree between the unborn child’s state of development and 
the state of development which would be reached after birth” (p. 130).      
 
Although relying upon this decision, Heath J recognised the criticisms that this decision 
attracted as it  
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“…created the potential for the court to control the mother’s behaviour 
during pregnancy – even if it is for the purpose of promoting the welfare 
of the unborn child” (p. 130).     
 
However, the court was clear. The relief could not compel the mother to do anything 
positive against her will. Heath J outlined the strong policy reasons why the law should 
keep out of, and not police, maternal prenatal conduct. Interfering coercively in a 
mother’s conduct during pregnancy may result in greater harm to unborn children if 
mothers are afraid to seek help because of the risk of being subject of coercive measures 
if they do not conform to expectations. This is also driven from the impossibility of 
setting a clear and bright line between 'acceptable' and 'unacceptable' maternal 
behaviour. In addition, enforcing coercive orders against pregnant women is fraught 
with practical difficulties. Finally, it is undesirable for the trappings of the law to be 
deployed to force competent individuals to submit to interference with their bodily 
integrity.  
Heath J concluded his discussions on the definition of a child by stating that  
“It is possible to get into English arguments over the stage at which an 
unborn child becomes child.  Arguments of that type ultimately serve no 
useful purpose. In my view, it is preferable to regard the definition of 
encompassing both 'unborn' and 'born' children and then approach the 
question whether it is appropriate to grant relief as a matter of discretion” 
(p. 134).  
 
The injunction did not interfere with the birth process but only restricted the use of the 
photos; therefore, maintaining Heath J’s position that the ‘physical integrity’ of the 
mother’s body and her right to exercise autonomy over it was upheld.   
R v M53  
The respondent (AB) suffered from severe chronic schizophrenia. She was an in-patient 
at the Mason clinic and was 11 weeks pregnant. The respondent was extremely violent 
towards staff at the clinic and she had no insight into her mental illness. The 
obstetrician and psychiatrist were under the opinion that a birth under her current 
mental health would result in serious threat to the health of both mother and baby. The 
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respondent had consistently refused medical treatment for the unborn baby. Counsel 
for AB argued that detention and treatment under section 30 of the Mental Health 
(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 did not authorise treatment for her 
pregnancy. However, counsel did not argue on the grounds that the unborn child had no 
legal status; they argued on the grounds that a pregnancy was not a mental disorder and 
therefore outside the jurisdiction of the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and 
Treatment) Act 1992. Judge Robinson stated that as there was evidence of a mental 
disorder, this diagnosis "gave him the jurisdiction to grant the application" [para. 9]. 
The sentient point was whether AB lacked capacity under section 5 of the Protection of 
Personal and Property Rights Act 1988. 
 In KR v MR,54 the High Court established four factors to consider when assessing 
capacity under the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988. The High Court 
assesses an individual’s capacity to make relevant decisions; communicate choice; to 
comprehend relevant information and its consequences. When assessing each of these 
components, Judge Robinson found AB had the capacity to understand the nature and 
consequences of decisions in respect of matters related to her pregnancy and delivery of 
her baby. Judge Robinson found AB was also capable of communicating her choice and 
of understanding all relevant information and she demonstrated an appreciation of the 
situation and its consequence and an ability to follow a logical sequence of thought to 
reach a decision. For example, AB clearly outlined that she wanted a natural birth, but 
would consent to a caesarean if her health or that of the baby was at risk.  
Of the four components outlined by the High Court as necessary in determining 
capacity, Judge Robinson formed the view that AB,  
“…does not have the ability to manipulate the information. For example, 
because she does not believe that she has a mental disorder, “she is 
unable to understand and appreciate the complications caused by her 
mental disorder” [para27].  
 
Judge Robinson clearly outlined that if he was not satisfied that AB lacked capacity, he 
would not have the jurisdiction for granting the application. However, Judge Robinson 
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did not address AB's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment for her unborn 
baby under section 11 of the NZBORA, as the following case indicates was possible. 
Ministry of Social Development v R 55  
There were two respondents in this case: the mother (R1) and the unborn child (R2). 
Judge Adams had appointed a lawyer to represent the unborn child’s interests, although 
these ’interests’ were not reflected in the oral judgement. Two applications were before 
the court. The first application was made by the CE of CYF under section 31(2)(f) of the 
COCA to have R1 placed under the guardianship of the court and the CE made the 
court’s agent. The second application was to have R2 attend a medical examination by 
way of an ultrasound and, if necessary, a forced induction. R1 was already in the 
custody of the CE and was approximately 43 weeks pregnant. R2 was under an interim 
custody order under section 78 of the CYFA1989; that would take effect upon R2’s birth. 
R1 had been refusing medical treatment and antenatal care throughout the duration of 
her pregnancy. Under ss 49–58 of the CYFA198956, medical treatment and examinations 
could be imposed. The medical evidence stated:   
“…if we are unable to intervene when medically indicated then the lives 
and wellbeing of both respondents could be at significant risk, depending 
upon the clinical circumstances at the time” [p. 19].  
 
Furthermore, the CE adduced medical evidence that gestation over 42 weeks is outside 
standard clinical practice and known to be associated with the stillbirth of the baby.  
When considering this case, Judge Adams referred to D v Berkshire CC.57 In this case, the 
House of Lords ruled that when considering the need to make a care order, the juvenile 
Court had properly considered events occurring and circumstances existing prior to the 
child's birth. While recognising the unborn child does not gain independent legal status 
until birth, nevertheless, the House of Lords was prepared to acknowledge that in 
certain circumstances, the law may properly concern itself with the treatment of unborn 
children. However, Judge Adams noted that section 36(1) of the COCA allows a child 
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56 Sections titled: “Procedures in relation to medical examinations of children and young persons” 
57 House of Lords (8 Oct, 4 Dec 1986) 
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over the age of 16 years old to refuse medical treatment. Such a provision is consistent 
with UNROC and section 11 of the NZBORA. Section 11 states that  
“…everyone has the right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment”. In 
his decision, the judge stated that there is no evidence that the first 
respondent is “mentally defective or suffering from any mental disorder” 
(para 25).   
 
In refusing both applications, Judge Adams relied upon Justice Heath’s ratio in Re 
Unborn Child. In addition, Judge Adams relied upon the United Nations Convention of 
the Rights of the Child (which the judge found consistent with section 36(1) of COCA, 
and section 11 of the NZBORA. Judge Adams held that R1 (was over 16 years of age) had 
the right to refuse medical treatment. Judge Adams states  
“…to make such an order of an unborn child makes a serious incursion 
into the liberty and rights of the mother …to hold otherwise is to treat her 
as little more than conveyance for the child” (para. 39).  
 
In fully asserting the mother’s right to self-determination, and consistent with Justice 
Heath’s decision in Re: An Unborn Child, Judge Adams confirmed the principle that “a 
pregnant mother should not be forced to do something positive against her will…but she 
can be prevented from taking an action” (para. 38).  
CLM v Chief of the Ministry of Social Development 58  
In certain circumstances, an application for review of a Family Court decision under 
CYFA1989 can be entertained. In this case, Harrison J granted a declaration that the 
Family Court had breached a mother’s right to natural justice under s 27(1) of the 
NZBORA, when it had made an order, without notice, placing the mother’s then unborn 
child in the interim custody of the CE of MSD. From the judgement, it is clear that an 
ante natal assessment was completed based upon the psychosocial environment of the 
mother. In addition, the history of the mother was also taken into account as she had 
her previous four children taken into custody at the time that the interim custody order 
was sought. In the decision, Harrison J took notice that the social worker completing the 
assessment states that the infant would be “highly vulnerable after he/she is born” (p. 
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12). However, what was significant is that no reference was made in the social worker’s 
notes of proposals to remove the unborn baby from the mother’s custody upon birth (p. 
13). In dicta, the judge stated: 
…it must be acknowledged from the outset that CYFS had proper grounds 
for applying to the Family Court for a declaration that CLM’s unborn child 
was in need of care and protection and pending determination of that 
application, for an interim custody order. The evidence justified CYFS 
concerns about the future welfare of CLM’s baby. (p. 13)  
 
This dictum suggests the ability of the court to issue an interim custody order for an 
unborn child is arguable. The dictum contrasts with the line of English precedence 
where the ability to take orders is contingent upon a child gaining an independent legal 
personality. Once that happens, then the full protections available under the law apply. 
Under English law, this does not happen until the physical birth of the child.  
In New Zealand, there is a recognition that an unborn child is entitled to certain legal 
protection; once is has become a viable foetus. This is supported by dicta from Heath J 
who states  
“…it will be rarely necessary for parties to resort to the inherent 
jurisdiction of this court…the issue of this particular case is whether an 
unborn child is a child …only if the answer is no to that question would it 
be necessary to invoke the residual jurisdiction” [para.  36].  
 
Heath J therefore indicating that even where an unborn child is not within the definition 
of a child of a particular statute, it will potentially, nevertheless, attract the protection of 
the Court in its inherent jurisdiction.  Under this jurisdiction, the unborn baby will have 
legal status where the order can be made before birth, but the protection will begin 
upon birth. However, for the purposes of this case, Justice Heath answered the question 
in the affirmative, therefore, whether legal protection for an unborn child is provided 
under the Court’s inherent jurisdiction remains unclear. 
Clearly, all these cases were decided when the situation regarding an unborn baby was 
not made clear in CYFA1989. In relation to section 18A, the inclusion of an unborn baby 
has clarified this issue to a limited extent. However, what section 18A has not clarified is 
the stage of gestation the protective jurisdiction of section 18A applies from. For 
example, should it apply from the whole stage of pregnancy and if so, consistent with 
90 
 
the Crimes Act 1961, should a 20-week gestation period be recognised so that 
pregnancies before this 20-week period attract a different level of protection than 
pregnancies after 20 weeks. Furthermore, consistent with Justice Heath’s dictum, it 
would be necessary to establish what factors contribute towards balancing the mother’s 
rights over with those of her unborn baby. Consistent with the recommendation in the 
Smith (2011) report, the recent reform appears to be placing more emphasis upon the 
‘best interest of the child’ rationale, which may potentially represent a significant 




Chapter 11: Stage four – potential outcomes for section 18B 
(1)(a)  
Stage 4 has a specific focus upon the first population of parents affected by the 
amendment – section 18B(1)(a). When making submissions about the Child Harm 
Protection Orders, the Legislative Advisory Council AC (2013) stated:  
“…the practical ramifications of establishing a two-tier enforcement 
system involving both civil and criminal procedures include issues such as 
double jeopardy/punishment or self-incrimination”. 
 
This population of parents identified under section 18B(1)(a) is unique given section 
18A is triggered in relation to their criminal conviction history. How the amendment 
therefore interacts with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 in relation to this 
population of parents is examined in this chapter.  
Privilege against self-incrimination 
The application of the privilege of self-incrimination in civil proceedings is governed 
under the Evidence Act 2006. Under section 60, privilege applies in a criminal 
proceeding but section 63 states that it does not apply in a civil proceeding.  Section 18A 
is not a criminal proceeding, but it is also not a civil proceeding. Whether section 60 
applies to actions under CYFA1989 for section 18B(1)(b) parents therefore requires 
future research.  
The privilege is defined under the Evidence Act 2006 as— 
60 Privilege against self-incrimination 
(1) This section applies if— 
(a) a person is required to provide specific information— 
(i) in the course of a proceeding; or 
(ii) by a person exercising a statutory power or duty; or 
(iii) by a Police officer or other person holding a public office in the course 
of an investigation into a criminal offence or possible criminal offence; 
and 
(b) the information would, if so provided, be likely to incriminate the 
person under New Zealand law for an offence punishable by a fine or 
imprisonment. 
(2) The person— 
(a) has a privilege in respect of the information and cannot be required to 
provide it; and 
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(b) cannot be prosecuted or penalised for refusing or failing to provide 
the information, whether or not the person claimed the privilege when the 
person refused or failed to provide the information. 
(3) Subsection (2) has effect— 
(a) unless an enactment removes the privilege against self-incrimination 
either expressly or by necessary implication; and 
(b) to the extent that an enactment does not expressly or by necessary 
implication remove the privilege against self-incrimination. 
 
Currently, it is not clear whether this privilege would apply for a subsequent parent 
under section 18B(1)(a). The LAC (2013) were of the opinion that any person who was 
being subject to a CHPO would have the benefit of that privilege. As argued previously, 
given section 18A replaced CHPOs, whether a subsequent parent, who has been 
convicted of a specified offence and being subject to a section 18A assessment, would 
attract the protection of the privilege given any statements that they make may attract 
further criminal liability if MVCOT proceeded to apply to the Family Court for a 
declaration.  If the privilege were to apply this would hugely benefit subsequent parents 
under section 18B(1)(a) as the privilege states that a person cannot be prosecuted or 
penalised for refusing to provide the information. Whether having your rights under 
section 15 and 16 of the COCA abrogated for refusing to provide information under a 
section 18A assessment amounts to being penalised or whether that privilege has been 
removed under section 60 (3)(a)(b) would require future research. 
Furthermore, section 37 also provides legal privilege in respect of FGCs and their 
associated outcomes. One of the criteria for the identification of a section 18B(1)(b) 
parent is that they have had an FGC agree that “there is no realistic prospect that the 
child would be returned to the person’s care.”59 Whether the information that was 
provided at the initial FGC can then be used to inform a section 18A assessment has not 
been considered. For example, section 18A(b) states “unlikely to allow the same kind of 
harm”. The amendment does not specify how the ‘same kind of harm’ is to be identified. 
For example, is it the ‘same kind of harm’ that was outlined in the initial notification or 
was it the ‘same kind of harm’ that was identified following disposition. This point is 
important because the harm that is identified at initial notification can change 
dramatically from the harm that is identified or agreed at an FGC. The author suggests 
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the ‘harm’ identified and agreed at an FGC is the pertinent ‘harm’ for a section 18A 
assessment, as this is the ‘harm’ that is the qualifying characteristic for a section 18A 
assessment. As a result, using this information from a historical FGC, to trigger another 
statutory response in relation to a completely different child, would appear to breach 
the privileged status that FGCs are provided under section 37 of the CYFA and section 
60 of the Evidence Act 2006. There does not appear to be an express removal of FGC 
privilege provided in the suite of VCA amendments.  Whether it can be ‘implied’ 
requires further research.  
Section 27(2) Rights to Justice 
Bill of Attainder 
Section 27(2) of NZBORA states— 
Every person whose rights, obligations, or interests protected or 
recognised by law have been affected by a determination of any tribunal 
or other public authority has the right to apply, in accordance with law, 
for judicial review of that determination. 
 
The section 27(2) reference to ‘other public authority’ would indicate that protections 
around the bill of attainder operates in New Zealand.60 A bill of attainder is therefore a 
clear takeover of a judicial function by the legislature. When the result of the legislative 
act of the conviction is death of the individual, it is a true bill of attainder. If the 
legislative act is for something less than death, such as loss of property or liberty due to 
imprisonment, the law is technically known as a bill of pains and penalties. However, 
both are frequently lumped together under the title of bill of attainder. In each case, the 
condemned person or group suffers a complete loss of due process.  
In Liyanage v the Queen,61 the United Kingdom Privy Council decided a bill of attainder 
case that has been cited as precedent ever since by commonwealth countries. In its 
ratio, the Privy Council expounded on how a bill of attainder alters and jeopardises the 
separation of powers.  
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They noted that 
These alterations constituted a grave and deliberate incursion into the 
judicial sphere. Quite bluntly, their aim was to ensure that the judges in 
dealing with these particular persons on these particular charges were 
deprived of their normal discretion as respects appropriate sentences. ... If 
such Acts as these were valid the judicial power could be wholly absorbed 
by the legislature and taken out of the hands of the judges. (at 284–285)  
 
Ostler (2014) argues “temptation for Parliaments to enact bills of attainder clearly 
continues” (p. 86). In many cases, bills of attainder are not always identified or made the 
subject of judicial review or challenge. The lack of a court challenge is sometimes 
because of a claimant's lack of funds, or that the persons targeted by the law lack 
‘standing’ to bring a challenge, or because the very bill of attainder took that right away 
(Ostler, 2014). In essence, the constitutional function of the judiciary is usurped by the 
legislature. This chapter argues that the first right identified as being affected by the 
subsequent children’s provision is the fundamental right to protection from the 
application of a bill of attainder. 
A bill of attainder occurs when the legislature identifies an individual or group and 
passes a law convicting them of a crime, effectively taking away their property or 
liberty, without affording them a trial to contest the issue.  
Clearly, section 18A is not creating an offence.  
However, this chapter highlights that section 18A may trigger section 27(2) of the 
NZBORA by inadvertently crossing protection and punitive jurisdictional boundaries. 
For example, by specifically targeting those with criminal convictions and then 
imposing an intervention based upon that conviction, the amendment becomes 
retrospectively involved in this criminal conviction process. This perspective is 
reinforced by the LAC (2013) who observed that although the purpose of Child Harm 
Protection orders was to be preventative; nevertheless, the LAC (2013) regarded the 
orders as punitive in nature. A punitive nature is created when an individual, who is 
specifically targeted by an enactment, suffers a complete loss of due process. As outlined 
in chapter 7, section 18A completely circumvents the usual investigative process that 
the majority of the care and protection population under the CYFA1989 are subject to. 
Although subsequent parents are still afforded a process, their process is arguably 
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significantly more onerous given it can be triggered without any actual harm to 
subsequent children being evident. Whether subsequent parents have suffered enough 
of a loss of due process to trigger the protection of section 27(2) of the NZBORA is 
therefore untested and will require future jurisprudential research.  
This potentially punitive nature has implications in relation to NZBORA.  As section 
18B(1)(a) parents are being targeted due to their past criminal convictions, the 
possibility that section 18A can be retrospectively applied to their convictions thereby 
increasing the original sentence merits discussion given sentencing has been the main 
context in which bill of attainder issues have been raised. For example, in R v Poumako  
Thomas J held that  
…section 2(4) of the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (no2) 1999 is 
incompatible with the cardinal tenets of liberal democracy. The Court 
would be compromising its judicial function if it did not alert Parliament 
in the strongest possible manner to the Constitutional privation of this 
provision. (p. 546)  
 
In dicta, Thomas J opined that the provision was ‘dangerously close to a bill of 
attainder’.    
Two characteristics of a Bill of Attainder  
Two characteristics of a bill of attainder are therefore required. First, the groups that it 
applies to need to be readily identifiable. Second, their legal rights, compared with 
others in a similar situation, have been significantly diminished.  The section 18A 
amendment potentially meets both these criteria.  
Readily identifiable population  
Each group of subsequent parents identified under section 18B has several 
distinguishing features that is relevant in relation to this requirement. The population 
being targeted under 18B(1)(a) is remarkably small; this is especially true when 
compared with the group identified under 18B(1)(b). The group in 18B(1)(b) would 
probably capture a significant proportion of children who are in permanent care as 
section 14(1)(a) and (b) are probably the most common grounds for a declaration at a 
FGC. The identification of the group in 18B(1)(a) is also extremely easy to establish as a 
conviction is a matter of record. In R v Poumako, Thomas J’s dicta observed that  
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“widespread media publicity relating to crimes in the home had been 
given to certain cases and the persons who the provision was aimed at 
were readily ascertainable” (p. 556).  
 
There is no doubt that the group of 18A(1)(a) subsequent parents would likewise be 
readily identifiable, given the widespread media attention that certain child fatality 
cases attract.  
In relation to the group under 18B(1)(b), MVCOT will have sufficient records to ensure 
that this group are also readily identifiable. What differentiates these two groups is the 
extent to which their identities are publicly available. For example, information relating 
to the identities of subsequent parents in an 18A(1)(b) are only held by MVCOT and are 
therefore not publicly available. This is especially true given the privilege that outcomes 
from a FGC attract.    
Rights being Diminished 
The rights being diminished for both sets of subsequent parents are their rights to 
parent subsequent children. The judicial rights issue around Bill of Attainder was 
addressed in Morgan v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison62. 
Morgan v Superintendent, Rimutaka Prison .  
Morgan was convicted of cultivation and possession of cannabis, and sentenced to three 
years in prison. When Morgan committed the crime, the law allowed for parole after 
two-thirds of a sentence was completed. When Morgan was sentenced, this parole law 
had been changed by the Sentencing Act 2002 and the Parole Act 2002 and no longer 
allowed for the earlier parole date. Morgan brought a suit after serving two years of his 
prison sentence, asserting that the former law should apply and he should be released. 
Morgan argued that the new laws, which eliminated his parole, were a bill of attainder. 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal summarised this argument, noting 
the appellant has argued that if the 2002 Act were to apply to a person in 
his situation, the effect would be to subject the person to a form of 
legislative punishment aimed specifically at a particular person or group. 
It would accordingly have the character of a bill of attainder. We disagree. 
                                                        




The Court majority concluded that the 2002 Acts had general applicability and did not 
target any particular person or group. However, this dictum can be distinguished in 
application to section 18A given the amendment specifically identifies two groups of 
parents that the provision only applies to. The Court further ruled that there was no 
violation of the NZBORA since the law had no impact on Morgan's actual sentence, but 
only on how that sentence was administered. Once again, this dictum can be 
distinguished in relation to section 18A given both groups of parents under section 
18B(1)(a) and (b) are being subject to a completely separate judicial process, especially 
when this population of parents are compared with the majority of other parents who 
interact with the protective jurisdiction of CYFA1989.  
Section 25(g) Minimum standards of criminal procedure  
Section 25(g) provides a constitutional right to a “minimum penalty”. Section 25(g) of 
NZBORA states: 
Everyone who is charged with an offence has, in relation to the 
determination of the charge, the following minimum rights: 
(g) the right, if convicted of an offence in respect of which the penalty has 
been varied between the commission of the offence and sentencing, to the 
benefit of the lesser penalty 
 
Clearly, this constitutional right would apply only to subsequent parents identified 
under section 18B(1)(a) because s18A is targeting this group of parents based entirely 
upon their criminal convictions. Whether section 18A potentially imposes an additional 
penalty upon this group of subsequent parents requires analysis.  
Section 2 of the Crimes Act 1961 defines an offence as: 
any act or omission for which anyone can be punished under this Act or 
under any other enactment, whether on conviction on indictment or on 
summary conviction 
 
The courts in New Zealand, for the purposes of applying section 25(g) of the NZBORA, 
generally interpret the word ‘offence’ consistently with this definition. The CA in Daniels 
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v Thompson63 states protection against double jeopardy only applies in respect of a 
further criminal prosecution for a criminal offence for which the accused has already 
been convicted or acquitted.  
However, there are indications that the Courts might not apply such a strict definition in 
respect of sections 24 and 25 of the NZBORA. The CA in Drew v Attorney-General64 was 
asked to consider whether disciplinary offences in prisons were of sufficient character 
to meet the definition of an offence for the purposes of sections 24 and 25 of the 
NZBORA. The CA did not reach a finding on this matter but left a clear signal to suggest 
that offences other than criminal offences might fall within the definition. The 
implication for this potential line of precedence is important if the comments by the LAC 
(2013) stated above are taken into account. If, as the LAC (2013) suggest, similar to the 
Child Harm Projection orders, section 18A is regarded as not only preventative but also 
punitive in nature, then the constitutional rights under section 25(g) can potentially be 
triggered for both groups of parents under section 18B(1)(a) and (b).  
The effect of 25(g) of the NZBORA was examined in Palmer v Superintendent Auckland 
Maximum Security Prison.65 In this case, Wylie J examined the use of the word penalty in 
that section, Wylie J stated  
“…an offender must accept the consequences of a change in legislation 
following his/her sentencing in relation to the administration of their 
sentence provided that the penalty or punishment is not increased” (p. 
244).   
 
This chapter argues section 18A provides an additional punishment to those parents 
identified in section 18B(1)(a) because they are being subject to an additional 
restriction of their freedom (i.e., being subject to a section 18A assessment that will 
ultimately result in another court appearance at disposition). In this judgement, Wylie J 
made a distinction between the imposition of a sentence and the administration of a 
sentence (p. 244). In R v Poumako it was appropriate to declare 2(4) inconsistent with 
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both 25(g) of the NZBORA and Article 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights.  
Section 26: Retrospective legislation  
Under section 26(1) persons are entitled to expect the law to be sufficiently clear and 
certain so that he or she can confidently carry out certain activities (or decide not to 
carry out those activities) safe in the knowledge that those acts or omissions comply 
with the law. 
 
Section 26 of the NZBORA states: 
 
(1) No one shall be liable to conviction of any offence on account of any 
act or omission which did not constitute an offence by such person 
under the law of New Zealand at the time it occurred. 
 
(2) No one who has been finally acquitted or convicted of, or pardoned 
for, an offence shall be tried or punished for it again. 
 
Section 26(1) is concerned with ensuring that the law is sufficiently certain and clear to 
enable individuals to refrain from, or perform, activities with the confidence that their 
behaviour complies with the law.66 It ensures that persons are not punished for doing 
something that was not unlawful at the time. Section 26 is consistent with Dicey (1959) 
who outlines that a major component of the rule of law is that a person should only be 
convicted and punished on the basis of existing law. In New Zealand, the LAC (2013) has 
previously provided comment on the issue of retrospectivity. The LAC (2013) observes 
that legislation should, in general, have prospective effect only. In particular, it should 
neither interfere with accrued rights and duties, nor should it create offences 
retrospectively. Legislation should, in general, neither deprive individuals of their right 
to benefit from judgements obtained in proceedings brought under earlier law, nor to 
continue proceedings asserting rights and duties under the law. The European Court of 
Human Rights has also taken the view that the prohibition against retrospective 
offences is to guard against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment.  
                                                        




The European Court of Human Rights adopts the approach that as long as the 
development in the law is ‘reasonably foreseeable67’, then the prohibition against 
retrospective offences does not apply. Developments in the law may be reasonably 
foreseeable in situations where a person who is engaged in an activity that entails a 
degree of legal risk, searches out legal advice as to the legal risks associated with a 
course of action.  However, where conduct is of an ongoing nature and is only unlawful 
for a part of that period, only the conduct that took place after the law change can be 
prosecuted. Although the general principle applies to all statutory provisions that have 
retrospective effect, section 26(1) is primarily concerned with retrospective offences. 
Determining the extent of the abrogation of rights under section 26(1) is therefore 
complex if we take into account the need of ‘reasonable foreseeability’ and how this may 
apply to each of the groups identified as subsequent parents. As at 1 July 2016, those 
subsequent parents, with a specified conviction, could definitely argue that at the time 
of their conviction, the section 18A amendment was not ‘reasonably foreseeable’ given 
it had not even been signalled by Parliament (through Hansard, etc.) that it was a 
possibility. Likewise, section 18B(1)(b) parents could raise a similar argument that this 
amendment was not ‘reasonably foreseeable’, based upon similar grounds.  
For section 18B(1)(b) parents, it is strongly arguable that if it was ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ their subsequent children would be subject to an immediate assessment, 
they may have provided more of a challenge at the FGC process. For example, if section 
18B(1)(b) parents had known at the time that agreeing to the grounds under sections 
14 (1)(a) or (b) would have implications for them as subsequent parents, they may have 
provided more of a challenge to those particular grounds being agreed at this first FGC. 
As the above analysis demonstrates, it is only at this extremely early juncture that a 
parent is able to make their first legally strategic challenge to their categorisation as a 
‘subsequent parent’ because once they are categorised as a subsequent parent, any 
adjudicatory challenge is limited.  
This may still have resulted in a declaration, but if the declaration was made under 
other grounds other than section 14 (1)(a) or (b), then the subsequent parent process 
                                                        
67 Whether as the consequences of Parliamentary scrutiny or judicial interpretation 
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would not apply to them in the future. Section 14(1)(a) refers to a child or young person 
suffering physical, psychological or sexual harm as a result of ill-treatment, abuse or 
derivation. In contrast, section 14(1)(b) raises a care and protection concern if a child or 
young person’s developmental, physical and mental wellbeing is likely to be impaired 
and this impairment is likely to be serious and avoidable. However, the remaining 
grounds refer to serious differences between carers, parents and guardians that may 
cause physical, mental or emotional harm;68a child or young person’s behaviour is likely 
to cause physical or mental harm to themselves or others and either their parents, the 
persons having guardianship or care of them are unable to control them69or if they are 
between the age of 10 years and 14 years and are offending.70 Section 14(1)(f) 
addresses situations where a parent, caregiver or guardian are unable or unwilling to 
care for the child. This provision can potentially be interpreted broadly and would 
easily encompass concerns raised in sections 14(1)(a) and (b).      
However, as section 18A begins to take effect, reliance upon this line of argument loses 
traction. Now, when section 18B(1)(a) offences are committed and section 18B(1)(b) 
FGC declarations are made, it is ‘reasonably foreseeable’ that an 18A assessment will 
apply to them in the future. However, parents will need to be extremely proactive about 
obtaining legal advice before an FGC is held, given the grounds for an FGC are not 
normally communicated until the day of the FGC. When a referral to FGC is made, 
section 19(1A)71 does not make it a requirement that the ‘grounds’ for an FGC are 
required in the ‘statement of reasons’. The referral only needs to provide reasons for the 
belief that a child is in need of care and protection.  The only legal representation 
present at a FGC is a lawyer for child, who are entitled members.72 However, a lawyer 
                                                        
68 Section 14(1)(c)  
69 Section 14(1)(d) 
70 Section 14(1)(e) 
71 Every referral pursuant to subsection (1) shall be accompanied by— 
a statement of the reasons for believing that the child or young person to whom the referral relates is in 
need of care or protection; and (b) particulars sufficient to identify any person, body, or organisation that 
might be contacted to substantiate that belief; and (c) a statement indicating whether or not the referral 
is being made with the consent or knowledge of— (i) the parents or guardians or other persons having 
the care of the child or young person to whom the referral relates; or (ii) the family, whanau, or family 
group of that child or young person; and (d) any recommendation as to the course of action the care and 
protection co-ordinator might take in respect of the referral. 
72 Section 22(1)(h) of CYFA1989 
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for child is not entitled to attend ‘family time73’ unless allowed by the family. Therefore, 
whether the parents are cognisant that any decision they make in family time relating to 
the grounds for a declaration under FGC may have an impact upon them for any 
subsequent children they have, may influence their decision to allow a lawyer into 
family time.  Lawyers representing parents are not entitled members.74 As a result, 
parents, during the course of an FGC, are not able to obtain legal advice about the 
implications of the grounds of the FGC, agreeing to those grounds and a declaration, and 
any future implications as a subsequent parent.  
Foodstuffs (Auckland) v Commerce Commission75 
In addressing issues of non-retrospectivity, the Court of Appeal focused upon three 
provisions of the Interpretation Act 1999.  
Section 7 states—  
An enactment does not have retrospective effect. 
Enactment is defined in section 29 of the Interpretation Act 1999 as—  
enactment means the whole or a portion of an Act or regulation 
The Interpretation Act 1999 also outlines how repeals are to be interpreted by the 
Courts. Specifically, section 17 states— 
17 Effect of repeal generally 
 
(1) The repeal of an enactment does not affect— 
(a)the validity, invalidity, effect, or consequences of anything done or 
suffered: 
(b)an existing right, interest, title, immunity, or duty: 
(c)an existing status or capacity: 
(d)an amendment made by the enactment to another enactment: 
(e)the previous operation of the enactment or anything done or suffered 
under it. 
 
Section 29 of the Interpretation Act 1999 defines a ‘repeal’ as— 
                                                        
73 Section 22(2) of the Children Young Persons that Their Families Act 1989 
74 Section 22 CYFA 
75 [2002] 1 NZLR 353 
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in relation to an enactment, includes expiry, revocation, and replacement 
Technically, section 18A is an ‘amendment’ as opposed to a ‘repeal. The repeal of a law 
differs from the amendment because an amendment involves making a change to the 
law that already exists, leaving a portion of the original law still standing.  When an 
enactment is repealed, none of the previous law remains intact. However, the two terms 
are used synonymously. For example, when the Auckland District Law Society 
commented upon the introduction of the ‘anti-smacking law’, the Society used the term 
‘repeal’ and ‘amendment’ interchangeably (Auckland District Law Society, 2005).   
In Foodstuffs, the CA also considered whether a ‘repeal’ affected an existing right, 
interest, title, immunity, or duty of the appellant. In their ratio, the judges argued that 
the principle in section 7 can also be put ‘positively’, for example, that an enactment, in 
general, should only have prospective effect. The sentient point at issue was whether 
the Appellant is said to have ‘an existing right or interest’ at the time the repeal came 
into force. In their decision, the CA stated that “the distinction between substantive and 
procedural rights is not always decisive” (para. 15). In Foodstuffs, section 17 of the 
Interpretation Act 1999 was specifically related to ‘substantive matters’ as opposed to 
the complementary matter of the processes for completing them and enforcing them 
(para. 16). In terms of section 18A, this chapter argues that the right to parent 
subsequent children is a substantive issue and therefore comes within the jurisdiction 
of section 17 of the Interpretation Act 1999.    
The Appellant was able to successfully argue that the second respondent did not have 
an existing “right or interest” under section 17 of the Interpretation Act 1999 at the 
time that section 47 (1) of the Commerce Act 1986 was enacted on 26 May 2001. The 
key argument this chapter advances is that section 18A contravenes either sections 17 
(b) or (c) of the Interpretation Act 1999. The right to parent subsequent children is a 
fundamental right. The fact that this right can be abrogated based upon a legislative 
presumption of potential harm would appear to be fundamental breach of parental 
rights, such as those in section 16 and 17 of the COCA.  
Section 16 and 17 of the COCA outlines the rights of guardians as— 
The duties, powers, rights, and responsibilities of a guardian of a child 
include (without limitation) the guardian’s— 
104 
 
a) having the role of providing day-to-day care for the child (however, 
under section 26(5), no testamentary guardian of a child has that role just 
because of an appointment under section 26); and 
(b) contributing to the child’s intellectual, emotional, physical, social, 
cultural, and other personal development; and 
(c) determining for or with the child, or helping the child to determine, 
questions about important matters affecting the child. 
(2) Important matters affecting the child include (without limitation)— 
(a) the child’s name (and any changes to it); and 
(b) changes to the child’s place of residence (including, without limitation, 
changes of that kind arising from travel by the child) that may affect the 
child’s relationship with his or her parents and guardians; and 
(c) medical treatment for the child (if that medical treatment is not 
routine in nature); and 
(d) where, and how, the child is to be educated; and 
(e) the child’s culture, language, and religious denomination and practice. 
(3)  A guardian of a child may exercise (or continue to exercise) the duties, 
powers, rights, and responsibilities of a guardian in relation to the child, 
whether or not the child lives with the guardian, unless a court order 
provides otherwise. 
 
Section 17 states: 
 
Child’s father and mother usually joint guardians… 
  
(4) On the death of the father or the mother, the surviving parent, if he or 
she was then a guardian of the child, is the sole guardian of the child. 
 
Although the parent-child relationship has changed over the centuries, the basic 
premise of natural guardianship has not significantly changed. The ratio in Foodstuff, 
however, establishes that a right needed to exist at the time of the breach. This chapter 
also argues that the breach occurred on 1 July 2016 when the section 18A amendment 
took force. On that date, due to past removal history or criminal convictions, both sets of 
subsequent parents had their rights and interests under COCA immediately abrogated 
by becoming classified as the ‘parent of a subsequent child’.76 If a restricted approach 
were adopted and it argued that their parental rights do not crystallise under sections 
16 and 17 of COCA until they are actual parents of subsequent children, then reliance 
would need to be placed upon section 17 (c). Section 18A arguably abrogates a 
subsequent parent’s ‘status’ as a natural guardian when they become categorised as a 
                                                        
76 Section 18B(1)(a) & (b). 
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‘subsequent parent’ on 1 July 2016 when section 18A took force. They are unable to 
enjoy their natural guardianship of subsequent children without a state intervention 




Chapter 12: Stage four – potential outcomes for section 18B 
(1)(b)  
Chapter 12 develops the analysis under stage four with a specific focus upon the second 
population of parents affected by the amendment – section 18B(1)(b).  During the 
consultation process, the section 18B(1)(b) group of subsequent parents were 
described as those parents who have been found, on the balance of probabilities, to 
have committed a specified offence against children. This statement attracted significant 
controversy as no individual can be found, on the balance of probabilities, to have 
committed an offence. The requisite criminal standard has always been beyond 
reasonable doubt. By attributing civil standards towards criminal behaviour and then 
enacting a legal mechanism with the intent to prevent the potential risk of that 
behaviour being repeated, challenges in child protection practice and law are created 
that have potential significant repercussions for vulnerable families (Auckland District 
Law Society, 2013).   
What is clear under section 18B(1)(b) is that a declaration that a child is in need of care 
and protection is the first requirement of the definition of a subsequent parent under 
section 18B(1)(b). Section 67 provides the grounds for a declaration as—   
A court may, on application, where it is satisfied on any of the grounds 
specified in section 14(1) that a child or young person is in need of care or 
protection, make a declaration that the child or young person is in need of 
care or protection. 
 
When the section18A amendment was enacted, section 67 was also amended to give 
effect to the intent of section 18A. Subsection 67 (2) took force on 1 July 2016: 
(2) However, on an application under section 18A(4)(a) or 18D in relation 
to a person to whom section 18A applies, if the court is satisfied that the 
subsequent child is in need of care or protection on the ground in section 
14(1)(ba), it must make the declaration unless it is satisfied that the 







Declaration and the Paramountcy Principle  
It is immediately apparent following the enactment of section 18A that a section 
18B(1)(b) subsequent parent assessment process, when compared with other ‘parents’ 
under CYFA1989, is significantly different. For example, under section 67(1), the court 
may make an application. In contrast to a subsequent parent, under section 67(2) the 
court must make a declaration. If a declaration is made under section 18A, subsequent 
parents are deprived of most of the principles under section 5(a)77(b)78(c)79 (e)80 and 
(g)81because section 18A(6) makes it clear that no FGC is to be held before any 
application is made to the court. Furthermore, as outlined in chapter 7, the 
requirements under section 70 have been waived.82 Therefore, any of the principles that 
refer to family involvement in decision making or an opportunity for the family to be 
heard as a collective group is removed from a section 18A assessment. This singular 
focus upon a ‘child’s best interests’, to the exclusion of their family’s perspective, has 
attracted criticism over the years. For example, in Puao te Ata Tu, The Ministerial 
Advisory Committee (1988) was critical of professionals who demonstrated little 
understanding of the cultural or social implications of their attitudes or decisions (The 
Ministerial Advisory Committee, 1988; RCSP, 1988).    
In February 1992, two years following the implementation of the CYFA1989, the 
paramountcy principle became subject to a "barrage of criticism"(DSW, 1992, p. 5). In 
response, the Minister for Social Welfare, The Honourable Jenny Shipley, ordered a 
review of the new CYFA1989. The very first review item was the status of the 
                                                        
77 the principle that, wherever possible, a child’s or young person’s family, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family 
group should participate in the making of decisions affecting that child or young person, and accordingly 
that, wherever possible, regard should be had to the views of that family, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family 
group 
78 the principle that, wherever possible, the relationship between a child or young person and his or her 
family, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family group should be maintained and strengthened 
79 the principle that consideration must always be given to how a decision affecting a child or young 
person will affect (i) the welfare of that child or young person; and (ii) the stability of that child’s or young 
person’s family, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family group 
80 the principle that endeavours should be made to obtain the support of (i) the parents or guardians or 
other persons having the care of a child or young person; and (ii) the child or young person himself or 
herself  
81 the principle that decisions affecting a child or young person should be made by adopting a holistic 
approach that takes into consideration, without limitation, the child’s or young person’s age, identity, 
cultural connections, education, and health 
82 Mandatory requirement for a FGC to be held before a declaration can be made.  
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paramountcy principle. The review was immediately critical of well-intentioned social 
workers using the paramountcy principal as the underlying legal rationale to remove 
children from their family unit. Similar to the theme expressed by Puao Te Ata Tu, the 
review recognised how Maori and Polynesian families felt deeply ‘hurt’ when decisions 
relating to their whanau were being made by non-Maori social workers who lacked an 
understanding of the cultural or social implications of their decisions (Ministerial 
Advisory Committee, 1998).   
The review concluded it was social work practice that was the cause of the conflict 
between the ‘paramountcy principle’ and the other principles in the CYFA1989 (DSW, 
1992).  To reconcile the conflict between practice, which was dominated by the child’s 
best interests and those interests of their biological family:   
“…an emphasis upon the family group decision making in the CYFA1989, 
there will be no perceived conflict with the interests of the child provided 
all the family members agree” (DSW, 1992, p. 10).   
 
However, as this mechanism for family inclusion and decision making is removed from 
the section 18A process, then the earlier 1988 and 1992 criticisms raised in relation to 
culturally inappropriate practice and the unnecessary removal of Maori children from 
their family unit require reconsideration, academic scrutiny and further research.     
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  
The paramountcy principle is consistent with the United Nations Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (UNCROC). Article 3(1) states: 
In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or 
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative 
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a 
primary consideration. 
 
This paramountcy principle is reflected in other parts of the Convention. The 
Convention makes it clear that a ‘child’s best interests’ is the overriding principle that 
determines the interpretation of the Convention. For example, article 18 preserves the 
right of children to family life. Clause 1 states— 
States Parties shall use their best efforts to ensure recognition of the 
principle that both parents have common responsibilities for the 
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upbringing and development of the child. Parents or, as the case may be, 
legal guardians, have the primary responsibility for the upbringing and 
development of the child. The best interests of the child will be their basic 
concern 
 
Although article 18 preserves a child’s right to family life, this is only if that right is 
consistent with the child’s best interests. Conflict occurs when a ‘child’s best interest’, 
such as those of a new-born baby, are interpreted by child protection social workers 
and associated professionals; and their interpretation is inconsistent with the family’s 
perspective of those interests.  
CHILDREN IN CARE 
The following table is reproduced from the Key Statistics, published by Child Youth and 
Family, to the year ended 30 June 2016.  
Percentage of Maori Children in Care in New Zealand, 2012-2016 
Ethnic Group June 2012 June 2013 June 2014 June 2015 June 2016 
Percentage of Maori 
in care 52% 55% 56% 59% 60% 
 Key Care Statistics, Child Youth and Family, 2016 
From this data, Maori children are consistently disproportionately represented in care 
statistics for at least the last five years. Furthermore, this proportion is growing. As 
outlined above, racial or ethnic disproportionality is defined as the underrepresentation 
or overrepresentation of a racial or ethnic group compared with its percentage in the 
total population (Dettlaff & Rycraft, 2010). Closely related to the disproportionality 
concept is the disparity concept, defined as the unequal outcomes of one racial or ethnic 
group as compared with outcomes for another racial/ethnic group (Douglas & Walsh, 
2013).   
Obviously, these care statistics do not distinguish between the proportion of children in 
permanent care83 or those in temporary care arrangements.84 However, when looking 
at the requirements of section 18B(1)(b), the logical assumption can be made that there 
                                                        
83 Such as those under a section 101 custody order; or a section 102 custody order 
84 under a section 78 interim custody 
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may potentially be a disproportionate representation of Maori in the population of 
parents who are identified in section 18B(1)(b). Furthermore, Maori are also 
disproportionately represented within the criminal justice system. As a result, there 
may also be a disproportionate representation of Maori in the population of subsequent 
parents identified under section 18B(1)(a). The amendment only came into force on 1 
July 2016 and as such, demographic data around subsequent parents is still in its 
infancy. Future research around the actual demographic data that comprises 
subsequent parents under both section 18B(1)(a) and section 18B(1)(b) will be 
required to determine the accuracy of this prediction.   
Treaty of Waitangi & Bi-Culturalism 
In its report, the New Zealand Parliament Constitutional Arrangements Committee 
(2005) argued that  
New Zealand may be better served if it developed its capacity for paying 
systematic attention to constitutional issues as they arise. There is a risk 
at present that individual changes are sometimes made without sufficient 
appreciation, by Parliament and the public, that they have constitutional 
ramifications. (p. 9)  
 
This chapter argues that the introduction of section 18A has potential constitutional 
ramifications that need to be considered. Given any representation of Maori under a 
section 18A assessment, the potential implications for these Maori families and their 
associated rights under the Treaty of Waitangi is briefly addressed.  
The Lands case85 established that the Treaty has legally enforceable effect only when 
referred to in legislation. The Lands case was decided in 1987. Two years later, 
CYFA1989 was promulgated. The Constitutional Arrangements Committee (2005) 
observed that a Parliamentary drafting tendency developed that avoided making 
generic reference to the principles of the Treaty in legislation. Instead, a drafting 
practice developed that only made “vague and general references to the Treaty and its 
principles” (Constitutional Arrangements Committee, 2005, p. 19).   
                                                        
85 New Zealand Maori Council v Attorney-General 
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In the CYFA1989, there is no specific generic reference to the Treaty. However, section 7 
of the Act outlines the statutory duties of the CE.  
Section 7(2)(c) ensures, wherever possible, that all policies adopted by the department, 
and all services provided by the department— 
recognise the social, economic, and cultural values of all cultural and 
ethnic groups; and 
(ii) have particular regard for the values, culture, and beliefs of the Maori 
people; and 
support the role of families, whanau, hapu, iwi, and family groups; and 
avoid the alienation of children and young persons from their family, 
whanau, hapu, iwi, and family group 
 
Although Parliament has arguably made only oblique references to the Treaty and the 
principles contained within it, whether this is sufficient to import the full protection of 
the Treaty is uncertain. 
Social Workers’ Code of Ethics  
Currently, registration with the social workers’ registration board is not a mandatory 
requirement to work as a social worker in New Zealand. However, registration with the 
social workers’ registration board is a mandatory prerequisite for employment as a 
statutory social worker. Statutory social workers are therefore bound by the New 
Zealand social workers code of ethics, especially in relation to working with Maori.  
Among other things, the code states— 
[2.3] Members advocate social justice and principles of inclusion and 
choice for all members of society, having particular regard for 
disadvantaged minorities. They act to prevent and eliminate 
discrimination against any person or group based on age, beliefs, culture, 
gender, marital, legal or family status, intellectual, psychological and 
physical abilities, race, religion, sexual orientation, and social or economic 
status.  
 
[2.4] To this end, members promote socially just policies, legislation, and 
improved social conditions, that encourage the development and just 
allocation of community resources. They also act to ensure that everyone 





Given the disproportionate representation of Maori children in care, and the overall 
disparity in outcomes for Maori families, developing an awareness of the hidden 
sources of social injustices, such as those potentially represented by the section 18A 
amendment, is an ethical obligation for care and protection practitioners. Through 
developing an awareness, potential pathways available for advocacy and challenge are 
identified as the following analysis on the principle of equity and the use of family 
whanau agreements for Maori highlight.  
The Principle of Equity 
In 1989, David Lange Prime Minister of New Zealand set out the five principles that the 
government would abide by when dealing with issues that arise under the Treaty. These 
principles are consistent with the Treaty and with observations made by the courts and 
the Waitangi Tribunal. These principles are identified as the principle of government 
(the kawangatanga principle), the principle of self-management (the rangatiratanga 
principle), the principle of equality, and the principle of redress. In his commentary, 
David Lange highlighted that the principles “are not an attempt to rewrite the Treaty” 
(p1) but act as a guide to assist the government in making decisions with respect to the 
Treaty.  
In the Lands case, the CA accepted that “…the Treaty is a document relating to 
fundamental rights, that is, should be interpreted widely and effectively and as a living 
instrument taking account of the subsequent developments of international human 
rights norms…” (pp. 655–6). As a result, the associated rights and privileges of British 
subjects must therefore be interpreted in contemporary context by the acceptance of 
international treaty obligations such as the International Rights of the Child. 
Furthermore, the second aspect of the equality principle looks to the actual enjoyment 
of social benefits, not merely legal equality. Where serious and persistent imbalances 
exist between groups, in their actual enjoyment of social benefits such as health, 
education or housing, the government should consider particular measures to 
proactively redress the balance.  
If, as predicted above, the population of subsequent parents under sections 18B(1)(b) 
are predominately Maori, then the constitutional principle of equality as under the 
Treaty of Waitangi and New Zealand’s International obligations cannot be said to be 
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met. As outlined throughout the thesis, a section 18A assessment limits or abrogates 
rather than positively enhances subsequent parents’ rights under the CYFA1989. As the 
Key Care Statistics from Child Youth and Family illustrates, a significant proportion of 
the children in care are disproportionately represented by Maori. As this thesis argues, 
the enactment of section 18A and the potential abrogation of associated parental and 
human rights can only contribute to further reducing social outcomes for Maori, rather 
than proactively enhancing them.  This is direct contravention of the Treaty and the 
principle of equality. This chapter refers to the use of family whanau agreements in 
child protection practice to further illustrate this point.   
Family Whanau Agreements 
A family/whānau agreement is a written contract between the family/whānau and 
Child, Youth and Family to provide the minimum necessary level of intervention 
required to address concerns for a child or young person. Child Youth and Family 
describe Family Whanau agreements as— 
an intervention that uses family/whānau strengths and resources to 
ensure that the child or young person’s needs are being met and they are 
being protected and cared for. A family/whānau agreement is established 
as an outcome of an investigation or child and family assessment when it 
is assessed that a family/whānau agreement will address the identified 
needs and the social worker has not formed a belief that the child or 
young person is in need of care or protection. (Family Whanau 
agreements, 2016).  
 
It is clear from the description that family whanau agreements apply to families who 
‘occupy’ the fringes of a care and protection intervention. There is not enough ‘concern’ 
to enable a practitioner to formulate a belief that a child is in need of care and 
protection, but at the same time, a practitioner is unable to conclude a section 15 
investigation with a ‘No Further Action’ outcome. Family whanau agreements therefore 
allow a statutory practitioner to exercise uncertainty.  
Up until 2011, the MSD published key statistics for the number of family whanau 
agreements that were entered into in one year. In 2011—the final year that these 
statistics were published—the Ministry of Social Development stated that a total of 
4,526 family whanau agreements were signed (MSD, 2011). More importantly, when 
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family/whanau agreements are signed, the commentary in the key statistics stated that 
these agreements were more likely to involve Maori children (MSD, 2011).  
Between 2006/2007 and 2010/2011, the proportion of family/whanau agreements 
signed that involved children or young people identified as Maori increased from 42% 
to 48% (MSD, 2011). The assumption can therefore be made that it is primarily Maori 
families that potentially exist at the fringes of a care and protection population; but 
family/whanau agreements are advantageous for them as they act as a filter, preventing 
them from entering into the main protective jurisdiction of CYFA1989.  However, 
section 18A forces practitioners into binary decision making, thereby removing the 
ability for practitioners to exercise professional judgement around uncertainty. As a 
result, more Maori families may incur a declaration as a result of a section 18A 
assessment due to an individual practitioner’s preference for risk-averse practice. In 
direct breach of the principal of equity under the Treaty, section 18A has the potential 
to disadvantage Maori social outcomes. Currently, there is no available data to establish 
whether the trend of whanau agreements being entered into by Maori continued to 
increase over the next 5-year period. Furthermore, whether Maori social outcomes are 
directly disadvantaged by the introduction of section 18A will require further research. 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide &  
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights  
The Genocide Convention criminalizes genocide and upholds the right of racial and 
other groups to exist as distinct groups.  Article 2 of The Genocide convention defines 
genocide as “any of the following acts committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or 
in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, such as”— 
b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group. 
This chapter argues section 18A comes dangerously close to breaching clause B of the 
Genocide Convention as it satisfies the ‘intent’ component of Article 2. This is especially 
true if the prediction relating to Maori disproportionality in the subsequent parent 
population is accurate. This argument is predicated entirely upon the retrospective 
effect of section 18A. The demographic characteristics and identities relating to the 
population of section 18B(1)(b) parents are only held by the Ministry of Social 
Development – a Crown agency. The most recent key statistics relating to children in 
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care illustrate a disproportionate representation of Maori children in care. If the 
population of section 18B(1)(b) parents is disproportionately represented by Maori, 
then the Crown has enacted legislation that they ‘know’ or ‘ought to have known’ would 
immediately apply disproportionately to Maori. Further research will be needed to 
identify the immediate demographics that comprise this group in order to determine 
whether clause B of the Genocide convention is triggered. In particular, determining 
whether a disproportionate number of subsequent children who are taken into care as a 
result of a section 18A assessment identify as Maori would also need to be determined.  
Thornberry (1991) states the motivation to include this provision in the Genocide 
Convention was in recognition that—  
…the separation of children from their parents [and culture] results in 
forcing upon the former at an impressionable and receptive age a culture 
and mentality different from their parents. This process tends to bring 
about the disappearance of the group as a culture unit in a relatively short 
time. (Thornberry, 1991)  
 
This approach under Article 2 of the Genocide Convention is reflected in Article 27 of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Article 27 states— 
Persons belonging to …minorities shall not be denied the right, in 
community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own 
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their own 
language. 
 
Article 27 has been that typically regarded as implying solely "negative rights", that is, 
the right must not be denied. However, the Commission on Human Rights have taken 
the view that 'positive means' of protection are also required. The Committee outlined 
that 'positive means' may require "positive legal measures of protection and measures 
to ensure that effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions 
that affect them" (Baxter, 1998, p. 141). The commentary from the Human Rights 
Committee would indicate that more positive actions need to be implemented than 
previously thought. For example, in terms of a section 18A assessment, Maori families 
should be included in any decision making relating to Maori subsequent children.  In 
completely excluding the FGC process from a section 18A assessment, it would appear 
that a section 18A assessment breaches article 27 of the International Covenant on civil 
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and political rights, article 2 of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide and article 19 of UNCROC for a child’s right to family life.  
The ‘mental harm’ that Maori subsequent parents are potentially exposed to as a result 
of a section 18A assessment can only be assumed. Broadhurst et al. (2015) highlights 
the consistent “fear” that “haunts” (p. 2242) women who have had one removal during 
their experiences of subsequent pregnancies. In her qualitative research focus on the 
experiences of women who have experienced multiple removals, Broadhurst and Mason 
(2013) describe this population of women as a “maternal outcasts… who bear the 
stigma of spoiled motherhood (p. 291).  In more recent research, Broadhurst et al. 
(2015) further defines this group of ‘maternal outcasts’ as “firmly on the outside” (p. 
303). Pence (2011) argues that “trauma in child maltreatment forensic investigations 
and the worker’s role in anticipating and mitigating the effects of trauma during the 
investigative process is rarely addressed in the trauma-informed literature” (p. 49). For 
subsequent children and their families, it is critical that practice avoids “triggering 
memories and reactions associated with past traumas from previous interventions or 
removals” (Pence, 2011, p. 52). Therefore, further research around the specific potential 
trauma and mental harm that a subsequent parent may experience will be important to 
ensure the development of safe practice specifically around a subsequent child and their 
families.  
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child  
Article 2 – International Convention on the Rights of the Child 
Clause 1 & 2 of article 2 state— 
1. States Parties shall respect and ensure the rights set forth in the present 
Convention to each child within their jurisdiction without discrimination 
of any kind, irrespective of the child's or his or her parent's or legal 
guardian's race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, 
national, ethnic or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status. 
2. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the 
child is protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the 
basis of the status, activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child's 
parents, legal guardians, or family members. 
 
In relation to non-discrimination, the marginal note in the Convention states— 
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“…it is the State’s obligation to protect children from any forms of 
discrimination and to take positive action to promote their rights.” 
 
Clause one of the Convention highlights that a child should not be discriminated against 
in terms of their parent’s ethnicity or other status. Section 18A defines a ‘subsequent 
child’ as a child who has a parent identified in section 18B. Therefore, if a subsequent 
child has a parent with a criminal conviction86 or a parent who has had a child 
previously removed from them, they are immediately treated differently than other 
children who are subject to the CYFA1989. For other children, a notification is needed 
before the adjudicatory phase, and if necessary, a dispositional phase is triggered.  
Furthermore, as outlined above, the usual adjudicatory phase under section 18A has 
been significantly bridged. Therefore, section 18A ‘subsequent children’ as opposed to 
other ‘children’ under CYFA1989 are treated differently and arguably, subject to a more 
onerous process based entirely upon the status of their parents.  
Furthermore, if a narrow interpretation of ‘parent’ is adopted, then only biological 
children or children whose families are involved in de facto arrangements will be 
defined as a ‘subsequent child’. This can lead to the situation where subsequent parents 
are involved in informal care arrangements of other children; but these children will 
escape a section 18A definition of subsequent child. This therefore leads to a 
discriminatory situation where children can be in identical contexts but be treated 
differently and defined differently, based entirely upon the status or the domestic 
arrangement of their biological parent. This is a particularly complex scenario if a 
parent unwittingly and unknowingly enters into a domestic arrangement with a person 
who meets one of the criteria identified in section 18B. Their own child, who may never 
have had any interaction with the CYFA1989 previously, is suddenly defined as a 
subsequent child, labelled as ‘high risk’, and automatically subject to the preventative 
jurisdiction established under section 18A. Currently, it is unknown what stigmatising 
effect being labelled as a ‘subsequent child’ will have upon children. Exploring this area 
of research will be important moving forward.  
  
                                                        
86 Murder, manslaughter or infanticide 
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Chapter 13: Stage four – constitutional and human rights issues 
Constitutional Issues 
Chapter 13 finalises the stage four analysis with a focus upon important constitutional 
and rights issues. As outlined earlier, the contrasts between the four groups of parents 
are accentuated, which is attributable to their unique chronological and political 
differences. For example, when the colonisation statutes of both Australia and New 
Zealand were enacted, international conventions such as the Genocide Convention and 
the International Convention on the Rights of the Child had not been promulgated. The 
International political arena is therefore of particular significance to the two groups of 
parents identified under section 18A. Furthermore, Maori had the additional support of 
the treaty, another significant distinguishing feature of the constitutional context within 
which New Zealand child protection law is developed.   
These four groups of parents are geographically, politically and chronologically isolated, 
but nevertheless are bound together through the operation of a legal mechanism 
designed to prevent the risk of potential maltreatment that society has deemed them to 
represent to children in their care. Through this analysis, the highly vulnerable 
characteristics of all these groups of parents is accentuated, as similarities between 
them are established.   
Furthermore, there are fundamental constitutional differences between Australia and 
New Zealand that makes this final stage of the framework the distinguishing feature 
between the two countries. The term constitution refers to the institutions, practices 
and principles that define and structure a political system and the written document 
that establishes, codifies and articulates such a system (New Zealand Parliament 
Constitutional Arrangements Committee, 2005). Australia has a constitution in the first 
sense. This is in direct contrast to New Zealand whose constitution is partly written and 
wholly uncodified (Budge, Crewe, McKay, & Newton, 2001). New Zealand’s constitution 
is composed of unwritten constitutional conventions, precedents, royal prerogatives 
and custom. Of those parts that are written, The Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the 
NZBORA and their interaction with section 18A forms a significant focus of this thesis.  
Aboriginal children who experienced systematic processes of separation from family 
and homeland became known as the "Stolen Generations" (Buti, 2004). In Australia, 
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indigenous children are 10 times more likely than other children to be subject to some 
kind of child protection order (O’Donnell et al., 2010). In a recent qualitative study of 
family lawyers in Queensland, Douglas and Walsh (2013) found that a common theme 
from the participants’ perception is that this disproportionate representation of 
indigenous people in child protection interventions was directly related to “the 
colonisation process, including past removal policies and practice and the resulting loss 
of identity” (p. 60). Despite acknowledgement and recognition of the disastrous 
consequences for Aboriginal families as the result of the implementation of these legal 
mechanisms, the ‘best interest of the child’ rationale has represented a significant 
barrier for Aboriginal people to obtain redress for the significant negative social 
outcomes that the removal policies caused during colonisation. The Crown has escaped 
liability on the basis that the Director of Native Affairs has been given independent 
discretion to act on the best interests of the child and not on the view of the relevant 
Minister of the Commonwealth.87 With its recent enactment, how section 18A interacts 
directly with the international political human rights climate and with New Zealand’s 
own partly written and wholly uncodified constitutional makeup, especially with the 
operation of the NZBORA and the Treaty, is important moving forward.      
Trauma and statutory removal  
When comparing the characteristics of the New Zealand and Australian Aboriginal 
parents targeted during colonisation and parents described under section 18B(1)(b), all 
these three population of parents are bound together by the trauma associated with 
statutory removal. Broadhurst and Mason (2013) highlight that mothers who have been 
subject to multiple removals experience macro-level discrimination by the lack of policy 
agenda that is responsive to their needs post removal. Broadhurst and Mason (2013) 
therefore recommend a more preventative focus for this group of vulnerable adults is 
needed in the future. It is feasible that the parents identified under section 18B(1)(a) 
may never have experienced the statutory removal of a child.  Parents identified under 
section 18B(1)(a) exhibit a different ‘trauma profile’ than the parents targeted during 
colonisation or those parents identified under section 18B(1)(b). Their trauma is 
                                                        
87 Cubillo Trial (2000) 103 FCR 1, 348-349 
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arguably the result of the grief that they have experienced from the death of a child with 
whom they most likely developed a significant attachment.   
Stigma and professional decision making  
Broadhurst and Mason’s (2013) study into mothers who experience successive 
removals is particularly relevant for section 18A’s enactment. Broadhurst and Mason 
(2013) describe mothers who have had successive removals as maternal outcasts “who 
bare the stigma of a spoiled identity” (p. 292). For Keddell (2016) creating additional 
stigma for already stigmatised populations “reinforces existing structural inequalities” 
(p. 76). Dobson (2007) argues that the stigma towards Aborigines that was evident 
during colonisation, is still so pervasive in contemporary practice that the separation 
policies in operation during colonisation are continued “by stealth” (p. 85). While 
focussing upon early prevention is regarded as being in the child’s best interests, Munro 
et al. (2014) highlight the importance of ensuring that “individual families are not 
stigmatised on the basis that they have some characteristics that form part of a causal 
chain leading to being abusive” (p. 70).    
Stigma 
Goffman (1974) argues that contemporary society use stigma to create social identities 
that are ultimately disparaging, demoralising and dehumanising. For Goffman (1974) 
stigmatised individuals or groups are characterised with an undesired differentness 
from normality.  
“As a result, we exercise varieties of discrimination, through which 
effectively, often unthinkingly, reduce the individual’s life chances” 
(Goffman 1974, p. 15).  
 
Although the offending behaviour identified by subsequent parents under section 
18B(1)(a) demonstrates a clear child abuse aetiology, the research is also clear that this 
type of fatality is exceedingly rare (New Zealand Department of CYF, 2006). 
Nevertheless, some of the ‘offenders’ identified in section 18B(1)(a) would have 
attracted considerable media interest at the time of their offending. For this group of 
subsequent parents, Feng et al. (2012) identifies stigma as a particularly acute problem 
because there is no media control over publication of names, pictures of victims and 
perpetrators, which creates shame and disgrace. Furthermore, this group of offenders, 
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having been identified through offending history, is juxtaposed within an enactment 
with a second group of subsequent parents identified under section 18B(1)(b), thus 
creating an implicit association. At such an early stage of the amendment, this subtle 
approach in the drafting of section 18A requires particular scrutiny. As Feng et al. 
(2012) state “child protection law represents a societal value” (p. 277). This chapter 
argues that such a subtle approach in parliamentary drafting is signalling a social value 
where the subsequent parents targeted under section 18B(1)(b) are ‘guilty by 
association’ with those parents identified under section 18B(1)(a). As a strong 
connection between section 18B(1)(a) parents and abuse is made, a similar connection 
is arguably implied between abuse and subsequent parents identified under section 
18B(1)(b) based upon the drafting of the amendment. The influence of stigma on 
professional attitudes towards subsequent parents, and how this may impact upon 
practice decision making, requires future research.  
Building on Goffman’s (1974) work, Easter (2012) developed a bi-social model of 
stigma: ‘volitional’ and ‘non-volitional’ stigma. First, non-volitional stigma refers to 
behaviour that is perceived as involuntary, that is, because of a disability or mental 
illness. Second, volitional stigma arises when behaviour is interpreted as an ongoing 
voluntary behavioural choice. The main difference between these two types of stigma is 
that the latter involves an individual to be judged by normal behavioural standards. 
Therefore, those who are judged under a volitional standard are regarded as morally 
bad (Easter, 2012). In stark contrast, those who are judged under the stigma of a mental 
illness incur “discrimination based on negative stereotypes” (Easter, 2012, p. 1409).  
Leech and Dias (2012) argue that women often face stronger stigma associated with 
behaviour that is regarded as volitional or voluntary. As a result, women suffer more 
severe social implications such as a greater restriction on social and economic capital. In 
relation to volitional stigma, a strong parallel between mothers who were targeted 
during New Zealand’s colonisation and section 18B(1)(b) can be drawn. For example, 
illegitimacy was regarded as a behavioural choice by ‘morally corrupt women’. 
Likewise, consistent with the observation above by Leech and Dias (2012), this stigma 
attached to women during colonisation is evident in section 18A.  
Section 18A(3)(a) states— 
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a person meets the requirements of this subsection if— 
in a case where the parent’s own act or omission  
In the next subparagraph, the section goes on to state— 
to allow the kind of harm.  
 
Section 18A(3) therefore exhibits an underlying discriminatory attitude towards 
victims of domestic violence who fail (i.e., omission) to act to prevent incidences of 
violence and allow the abuse to occur. Given the majority of domestic violence victims 
are women, section 18A therefore reflects a similar gender bias as the early New 
Zealand colonial protection statutes.    
Laing (2016) also observes how legislative frameworks contain an embedded dominant 
discourse that is highly sceptical of women’s allegations of violence. In addition, Laing 
(2016) argues the Family Court system responsible for perpetuating ‘secondary 
victimisation,’ defined as the betrayal domestic violence survivors experience when 
they encounter “victim-blaming attitudes” (Laing, 2016, p. 3). The ‘volitional stigma’, 
driven by what (Warner, 2015) describes as emotional politics, is so persuasive that 
amendments such as section 18A and the associated potential abrogation of 
constitutional and parental rights, become justifiable.     
CONCLUSION 
The development of child protection law and practice in New Zealand has been subject 
to protracted cycles of crisis and reform. Section 18A was enacted on 1 July 2016 as part 
of a reform process. This thesis highlights that although contemporary child protection 
law is characterised by forensic investigative responses, section 18A adopts a 
preventative focus by targeting parents who represent a high risk of harm to 
subsequent children in their care. Section 18A therefore introduces a new conceptual 
client into social work practice called a subsequent child. The political context that 
influenced section 18A’s enactment, although isolated in a moment in time, will remain 
influential until another reform cycle repeals or amends section 18A in its current form. 
This thesis therefore analysed this critical period of reform given the potentially 
significant influence this context will continue to exert on statutory social work practice 
for the foreseeable future. However, as outlined above, this reform had the capacity to 
provide the section 18A amendment with considerable traction that facilitated its 
enactment quickly and without significant academic debate or consultation. Given this 
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knowledge gap, this thesis developed a 5-staged conceptual framework for legislative 
mechanisms that adopt a preventative maltreatment approach to demonstrate how the 
use of such mechanisms are fraught with challenges that may result in disastrous 
outcomes for vulnerable populations when they are used inappropriately or 
inadequately. An approach that is potentially being replicated by the enactment of 
section 18A.   
The framework identified key characteristics that are associated with mechanisms such 
as section 18A. The importance of identifying key legal and theoretical rationales that 
underpin the implementation of the mechanism. For section 18A and the colonial 
statutes, the ‘best interest of the child’ legal rationale that emerged during colonisation 
is still pivotal in contemporary practice. The challenges associated with the theoretical 
rationale such as the use of substantiation data and criminal history to identify parents 
who are regarded as a high risk of potential maltreatment under section 18A was also 
highlighted. The practical challenges involved in the physical identifications the children 
who are under the protective jurisdiction of these mechanism is also explored. Of 
particular focus is the jurisdictional expansion of an unborn child within the definition 
of a subsequent child. The use of presumptions and a reverse onus of proof in a legal 
and practice context are also explored. For example, the implications for a social worker 
when using propensity evidence to inform assessments under section 18A is highlighted 
as propensity evidence has particular challenges in reaction to decision making bias 
which is well recognised in legal research.   The conceptual framework identified the 
interpretational challenges relating to the definition of subsequent child and the parent 
of a subsequent child. Furthermore, the differences between the substantive jurisdiction 
of the Act and the assessment process under section 18A was highlighted.  The thesis 
concluded by highlighting that historically, human rights and constitutional issues have 
always been recognised as representing particular challenges for the use of these 
mechanisms in the colonisation statutes that were enacted in both New Zealand and 
Australia. Therefore, identifying whether there are specific human rights and 
constitutional issues associated with the section 18A enactment was examined.  
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Chapter 14: future research implications 
Throughout the thesis, important areas of future research were highlighted. First, 
consistent with the observations from the Legislative Advisory Committee (2013), more 
research into the potential rights by all those that are affected; both domestically and 
Internationally; needs to be given focus in the future, given this body of reform. One key 
rights issue identified in the chapter is whether section 18A abrogates the right to be 
protected against retrospective legislation for parents of subsequent children under 
section 18B(1)(a).  Another related research area is to determine whether parents of 
subsequent children, defined in section 18B(1)(a), attract the privilege against self-
incrimination. 
 One particular important area of future research is whether the practice tools that have 
been developed in response to one particular legislative purpose are able to be 
effectively utilised when a different statutory purpose in enacted. For example, how the 
role of a statutory social worker has evolved under section 18A in statutory care and 
protection practice is recommended. The jurisdiction established by section 18A is only 
in its infancy; future amendments could potentially expand (or contract) this 
jurisdiction depending upon societies appetite for risk or, as previous chapters have 
highlighted, the level of emotional politics that are leveraged off serious child abuse 
fatalities that attract media attention. Ensuring future social practice evolves with the 
preventative jurisdiction established under section 18A will be an important 
consideration in the future. 
Examining some of the specific interpretation issues relating to section 18A will be 
important from a legal perspective.  As chapter 10 highlights, from what stage of 
pregnancy does a section 18A jurisdiction apply? Establishing clarity around this issue 
will be an important interpretative issue moving forward.  Another important 
interpretative issue to address relates to informal care arrangements. For example, do 
practitioners regard informal care arrangements that represent a risk of abuse as a care 
and protection concern for the caregiver/parent who had the “right of possession;” a 
failure to protect issue? Closely related to this theme, section 18A 3(a) and (b) refers to 
allowing the kind of harm that led to the parent being a person described in Section 18B.  
From a practice perspective, this new body of reform under section 18A assumes that 
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whatever happened, the parent ‘allowed it’.  As the chapter outlines, this is highly 
problematic if domestic violence notifications are considered. Therefore, future 
gendered analysis research of how this aspect of a section 18A assessment is required, 
to ensure the knowledge base around child protection practice does not become 
unnecessarily discriminatory towards women.  
The amendment only came into force on 1 July 2016 and as such, demographic data 
around subsequent parents is still in its infancy. Future critical research around the 
actual demographic data that comprises subsequent parents under both section 
18B(1)(a) and section 18B(1)(b) will be required to identify the demographics of the 
population that is directly affected by the section 18A enactment. This will be important 
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